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VOLUME 43 1998 NUMBER 4
Giannella Lecture
CORPORATE DECISIONMAKING AND THE MORAL RIGHTS
OF EMPLOYEES: PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT
AND NATURAL LAW
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE*
I. INTRODUCTION
P ARTICIPATORY management-the philosophy of involving employ-
ees in corporate decisionmaking-arguably is the most important in-
dustrial relations phenomenon of the last three decades.1 It has been
endorsed by such disparate figures as President Bill Clinton and Pope
John Paul 11.2 Thousands of U.S. firms have adopted one form of em-
ployee involvement or another. 3 Although the long-term economic effects
of participatory management are still unknown, it seems likely to play a
dominant role in structuring U.S. labor relations for the foreseeable
future.
Employee involvement programs in capital-owned firms usefully di-
vide into two basic categories: operational participation and strategic par-
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
1. "Participatory management" and "employee involvement" are used herein
interchangeably as generic terms covering any program purporting to give employ-
ees a role in corporate decisionmaking.
2. See BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, PUTrING PEOPLE FIRST: How WE CAN ALL
CHANGE AMERICA 127 (1992) (promising to "[h]elp workers gain more power in
their companies' day-to-day operations, the organization of their workplaces, and
the type of compensation they receive"); POPEJOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS
43 (1991) [herinafter CENTESIMUS ANNUS], reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE &
PEACE: PAPAL DOCUMENTS FROM RERUM NOVARUM THROUGH CXIATFSIMUS ANNUS
465 (Michael Walsh & Brian Davies eds., 1991) [hereinafter PROCLAIMING JUSTICE
& PEACE] (stating that Catholic social teaching "recognizes the legitimacy of work-
ers' efforts to ...gain broader areas of participation in the life of industrial
enterprises").
3. See Devki K. Virk, Note, Participation with Representation: Ensuring Workers'
Rights in Cooperative Management, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 729, 730 n.3 (1994) (stating
that some surveys have found "approximately 30,000 American employers have es-
tablished some type of cooperative-management program").
(741)
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ticipation. 4  Operational participation refers to programs in which
employee involvement is limited to day-to-day issues of productivity and
working conditions at the plant level. 5 Some of these programs address
issues of firm-wide scope, while others are concerned only with a small
part of the production process within a particular plant.6 Some provide
indirect participation through worker representatives, while others pro-
vide direct participation. 7 Some require employee participation, while
others are voluntary.8 The degree of worker autonomy they provide also
varies widely, although they uniformly prohibit employee involvement in
strategic or policy decisions.9 Quality circles and self-directed work teams,
such as Saturn's well-known work teams, are the best-known examples of
the phenomenon. 10
Strategic participation refers to programs in which employees partici-
pate in major policy decisions, such as those traditionally viewed as falling
within the realm of corporate governance.11 Strategic participation exists
in a number of countries, but the best-known example remains the Ger-
man codetermination system of works councils and supervisory boards.12
In the United States, however, strategic participation is rare and rudimen-
tary. 13 The most famous example is United Auto Workers President
Douglas Fraser's 1979 election to Chrysler's board of directors, which did
4. The discussion herein is restricted to capital-owned firms, i.e., those in
which employees lack significant ownership interests. Although employee owner-
ship obviously has great potential for affecting corporate governance, it is largely
irrelevant to this Article. While employee-owners reasonably might expect a voice
in corporate decisionmaking, such an expectation raises quite different issues
when employees lack significant stock ownership. This Article, therefore, largely
ignores questions relating to employee ownership.
5. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory
of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657 (1996) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Participatory Manage-
ment] (explaining operational participation programs).
6. See id. at 658 (distinguishing between programs that grant employees
power over large-scale decisions and programs that only grant limited power).
7. "Employee participation" refers to programs utilizing direct involvement by
all affected workers, while "employee representation" refers to programs utilizing
indirect involvement through worker representatives.
8. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at 658 (explaining
that such programs vary in many ways).
9. See id. (stating that decisions that ordinarily fall within realm of corporate
governance may be, but usually are not, delegated to employees).
10. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Manage-
ment: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 1998)
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Organizational Failures Analysis] (providing typology of
modern U.S. participatory management programs).
11. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at 658 (defining
strategic participation programs).
12. For a discussion of the German codetermination system, see infra notes
350-60 and accompanying text.
13. See Everett M. Kassalow, Employee Representation on U.S., German Boards,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1989, at 39, 39 (stating that codetermination is signifi-
cantly less common in United States than in Germany).
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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not meet with enthusiastic endorsement by other union leaders or
managers.
14
The legal literature on participatory management, insofar as it is con-
cerned with normative questions, is dominated by calls for some form of
government-mandated employee participation in corporate decisionmak-
ing. 15 Theodore St. Antoine, for example, wrote sympathetically of the
prospect of mandatory German-style codetermination in this country.
16
14. See Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of
Problems and Potential, 4J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 155 (1982) [hereinafter
Summers, Codeternination] (explaining that "[t]he Chrysler experiment has not
been greeted with enthusiasm by either unions or employees"). Although general-
ization is risky, it is possible to identify a number of important differences between
strategic participation in the United States and the German codetermination sys-
tem. As in Germany, strategic participation in U.S. firms is uniformly organized on
a representative basis, usually involving employee representation on the board of
directors. See Kassalow, supra note 13, at 39 (stating that in both countries, strate-
gic participation comes in form of employee board representation). In contrast to
the German supervisory boards, with their one-half employee membership, how-
ever, U.S. boards usually have a very small minority (typically one to three mem-
bers) of worker representatives. See id. at 40. United States companies also usually
have substantial management representation on the board, which is not true of
German supervisory boards. SeeJOHN L. CorroN, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT: METH-
ODS FOR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND WORK ATTITUDES 127 (1993) (noting that in
most American companies, CEO acts as chairperson of board with other corporate
officers as members). The critical difference, however, is the way in which em-
ployee representation comes into force. In the United States, employee represen-
tation is almost always the result of concessionary bargaining with a union. See
Kassalow, supra note 13, at 39 (explaining that number of companies are "pressed
by unions" to "accept employee board representation"). In contrast, sweeping stat-
utory mandates created German codetermination. See id. (stating that source of
employee board representation in Germany rests within "legal foundation").
15. Employees have no present legal right to the sort of participation envi-
sioned by promandate scholars. To be sure, employees have a number of lawful
methods of participating in corporate decisionmaking, if we define participation
broadly to mean the ability to affect the outcome of decisions. Most of these, how-
ever, are quite indirect. Direct participation has traditionally been limited to the
collective (and individual) bargaining process. Strategic management decisions
have generally been beyond the scope of collective bargaining because unions
have no right to strike over these issues. Participation rights today are therefore
relatively limited without a company's willingness to grant such rights. In fact,
some forms of employee involvement are arguably illegal under present law. See
COTTON, supra note 14, at 128.
Participatory management programs implicate at least four core labor law
doctrines: (1) the prohibition of company unions; (2) exclusive representation;
(3) the legal differences between workers and managers; and (4) the distinction
between mandatory, permissive and illegal bargaining subjects. See THOMAS A.
KoCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 234
(rev. ed. 1994). The extent to which these doctrines impede the development of
participatory management is an unsettled question outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, but it seems fair to project that litigation under the labor laws still poses some
threat to the further expansion of participatory management in the United States.
16. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next
Half Century, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631, 660-61 (1985) (stating that "[p]art of the
key to the future of federal labor legislation lies in the future of organized labor").
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Marleen O'Connor went beyond mere sympathy for this idea, affirmatively
urging not only that corporate law mandate employee participation com-
mittees resembling German works councils, along with a duty to disclose
corporate information to employees, 17 but even that director fiduciary du-
ties be created running to employees under the "neutral-referee model."1 8
Other scholars have made similar proposals.' 9 Richard Freeman and Joel
Rogers advocate a slightly different interventionist model in which the gov-
ernment is to use taxation and other incentives to encourage employee
participation. 20 David Levine has also proposed tax subsidies to par-
ticipatory firms. 2 1 In her academic writings, former Council of Economic
Advisors Chairperson Laura D'Andrea Tyson urged the federal govern-
ment to adopt a variety of policies designed to encourage participatory
management. 22
The link between normative analyses of participatory management
and calls for government intervention is hardly surprising. As I have
demonstrated elsewhere, privately-ordered participatory management is a
top-down phenomenon that serves the interests of shareholders and man-
agers.2 3 Absent government intervention, current employee involvement
programs are unlikely to evolve in the directions supported by the afore-
mentioned scholars. As a result, they focus on government mandates.
17. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corpo-
rate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 961-63
(1993) [hereinafter O'Connor, Human Capital Era] (stating that directors should
inform employers about issues traditionally categorized as managerial
prerogatives).
18. See id. at 954-61 (stating that directors should owe fiduciary duty to pro-
vide severance pay, job training and similar benefits to laid-off workers).
19. See, e.g., Mark F. Nowak, Worker Participation and its Potential Application in
the United States, 35 LAB. L.J. 148, 149 (1984) (calling for "grafting" European-style
codetermination onto collective bargaining structure); Lewis D. Solomon & Kath-
leen J. Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity Debate, 12 J. CORP. L. 331, 344-53 (1987) (proposing various legal changes
designed to promote humanistic economy through employee participation).
20. See Richard B. Freeman &Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Repre-
sentation in a Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13, 63-64 (Bruce A. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds.,
1993) (stating that government could encourage participation with taxation).
21. See David I. Levine, Public Policy Implications of Imperfections in the Market for
Worker Participation, 13 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 183, 198-99 (1992) (stating that
participatory firms should receive tax subsidies).
22. See David I. Levine & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and
the Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTrVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183,
235-37 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990) (stating that just-cause employment policies and
partial unemployment insurance for partial layoffs will encourage participatory
management).
23. See Bainbridge, Organizational Failures Analysis, supra note 10 (noting that
benefits derived from participatory management flow primarily to managers and
shareholders).
744 [Vol. 43: p. 741
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Normative analyses of participatory management by promandate
scholars have developed two justifications for government intervention. 24
The first justification is economic, typically arguing that participatory man-
agement is an efficient system of organizing production that is neverthe-
less being thwarted by various market failures requiring governmental
correction. 25 I have explored this argument elsewhere, concluding that
government-mandated employee involvement cannot be justified on eco-
nomic grounds. 26 In this Article, I evaluate the other promandate argu-
ment; namely, the claim that employees have a right to participate in
corporate governance.
27
On close examination, much of the normative literature on employee
participation amounts to little more than "rights talk"; i.e., political rheto-
ric dressed up in legal and/or moral rights terminology.28 For ideologi-
cally motivated proponents of employee participation, this is a useful
debating tactic because our culture's fixation with individual rights imbues
any rights-based claim with an air of legitimacy and inconvertibility. 29 Us-
ing rights-based terminology to phrase the question, however, often im-
pedes or even precludes meaningful analysis.
30
The task before us is thus two-fold. First, we must subject the claim
that employees have a right to participate in corporate governance to a
rigorous process of specification and assessment. 3 1 Second, we must ask
whether this right-as so specified-merits codification into positive law.
A right exists where a basic principle of natural law, or a rule derived
therefrom, gives to one person or class the benefit of a positive or negative
duty imposed upon some other person or class. 32 A right so defined, of
24. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at 673-730 (review-
ing reasons for government intervention).
25. See id. at 680 (setting forth economic function of participatory
management).
26. See id. at 730 (stating that "there is no economic justification for govern-
ment intervention").
27. For a discussion of the claim that employees have a right to participate in
corporate governance, see infra notes 119-61 and accompanying text.
28. See JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198-223 (1980)
[hereinafter FINNIs, NATURAL LAw] (discussing origins of rights talk); MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 4-5 (1991) (same).
29. To be clear, although others might argue that scholarship with an ideo-
logical edge and agenda is inappropriate, my argument herein is unabashedly that
of a conservative (in the Tory rather than libertarian sense) Protestant. Instead,
my point is only that analysis is clearer when pre-analytic moral and political as-
sumptions are laid bare.
30. See GLENDON, supra note 28, at 171-73 (stating that rights-talk rhetoric im-
pedes deliberation).
31. See FINNiS, NATURAL LAw, supra note 28, at 218 (stating that "most asser-
tions of right made in political discourse need to be subjected to a rational process
of specification, assessment, and qualification, in a way that rather belies the pre-
emptory or conclusory sound of '. . . have a right to"').
32. See id. at 205 (defining when rights exist). Thus, my focus narrows to only
one of the four Hohfeldian categories of rights, i.e., the claim right or right stricto
5
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course, is not necessarily part of positive law. As Holmes observed, "noth-
ing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the rights of
man in a moral sense are equally rights in the sense of the Constitution
and the law."'3 3 The conditions to be satisfied before such a right is to be
codified, therefore, must also be defined. As I shall argue below, this task
requires us to focus on moral norms-statements about right and wrong-
that have sufficiently substantial support in the community to justify the
creation of a legal right.
This Article is an exercise in applied natural law, not a discourse on
basic theory. Because my version of natural law jurisprudence is somewhat
unconventional and because natural law is rarely invoked in connection
with corporate governance, a brief statement of foundational premises
seems appropriate, if only in the interest of transparency. Accordingly,
Part II outlines the analytical framework to be used throughout the
Article.3
4
The remainder of the Article is devoted to a natural law-based analysis
of claims that employees are entitled to participate in corporate decision-
making processes. 35 I have two principal foils in these sections. The first
is Roman Catholic social teaching on work and capitalism, which offers
the most fully realized statement of natural law principles applicable to the
problem at hand.36 The second is a body of literature to which I will refer
as secular humanist.3 7 This literature draws mainly on precepts of human-
istic psychology. 38 Although scholars approaching the problem from this
angle are not working within a natural law paradigm, their work deserves
examination both because it has certain similarities to Catholic social
teaching and because it represents the other dominant theory upon which
rights-based claims are made in support of government-mandated par-
ticipatory management.
sensu. See id. at 199 (listing four categories of rights). My focus also rejects the
"choice" or "active rights" theory of rights espoused by scholars such as H.L.A.
Hart and Richard Tuck. See generally Michael P. Zuckert, Do Natural Rights Derive
from NaturalLaw?, 20 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'V 695, 698-99 (1997) (discussing differ-
ence between rights and duties, and this relationship to rights talk).
33. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 460
(1897).
34. For an outline of the analytical framework that will be used in the remain-
der of this Article, see infra notes 58-118 and accompanying text.
35. For a natural law-based analysis of claims that employees are entitled to
participate in corporate decisionmaking processes, see infra notes 119-61 and ac-
companying text.
36. For a discussion of Roman Catholic social teaching on work and capital-
ism, see infra notes 119-218 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion of secular humanist literature, see infra notes 219-91 and
accompanying text.
38. See Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Human Nature and Their Implications
for Business Organizations, 23 FORDHAM UPB. L.J. 221, 221 (1996) [hereinafter Solo-
mon, Perspectives] (discussing term "humanistic psychology" in reference to secular
humanist theory).
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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To be clear, this Article is not intended as an exegesis of Catholic
social teaching. My primary concern is with the policy implications of that
teaching, not its theology. If Catholic social teaching was limited to doctri-
nal statements about the moral conduct expected of Roman Catholic capi-
talists and laborers, it would have little to say to those of us outside that
tradition. Much of the relevant literature, however, purports to speak not
only to Roman Catholics, but also to society at large. This is especially true
of the well-known U.S. Bishops' pastoral letter Economic Justice for All,3 9
which was intended to affect public policy debates on a host of economic
issues.40 Although the relevant papal encyclicals are somewhat more cir-
cumspect in their policy implications, they also purport to state natural law
principles applicable to all.4 ' Thus, my question is not whether the Bish-
ops' pastoral letter or the encyclicals are accurate statements of Catholic
social teaching, but whether they make a case for translating into positive
law the natural law claims they set forth.
Catholic social teaching identifies three areas in which employees
may be entitled to participate in corporate decisionmaking: social, per-
sonal and economic. 4 2 Social matters include working conditions, wages
and benefits, training, job design and similar matters. 43 Personal matters
include personnel decisions, such as hiring and firing, promotions, layoffs
and similar matters. 44 Economic matters include firm investments, board
representation, mergers, lines of business, profits, dividends, restructur-
39. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL:
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986) [hereinafter BisHoPS'
LETTER], reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: RE-
FLECTIONS ON THE U.S. BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING
AND THE U.S. ECONOMY app. (Thomas M. Gannon ed., 1987) [hereinafter THE
CATHOLIC CHALLENGE]. Specific policy statements, such as those found in the Bish-
ops' Letter, are properly viewed (even by Catholics) as prudential judgments about
how the social teaching applies to the problem at hand. See CHARLES E. RICE, 50
QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW 227 (1993) (explaining that American Bishops
use social teachings in determining stance on specific issues). Even devout
Catholics are free to question such judgments, because the "bishops, as bishops,
'have no greater insight into policy matters than anyone else."' Id. (quoting J.
Brian Benestad, Catholic Social Teaching, Political Philosophy and Pope John Paul's
Laborem Exercens, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH CONVENTION OF THE FELLOWSHIP
OF CATHOLIC SCHOLARS 59 (1982)).
40. See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 39, 27, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHAL-
LENGE, supra note 39, app. (stating that "[w]e ask you to become more informed
and active citizens, using your voices and votes to speak for the voiceless").
41. SeeJohn Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, 45 MERCER L. REV. 687,
690 (1994) [hereinafter Finnis, Liberalism] (noting that relevant papal encyclicals
state that natural law principles are applicable to all).
42. See MichaelJ. Naughton, Participation in the Organization: An Ethical Analy-
sis from the Papal Social Tradition, 14 J. Bus. ETHICS 923, 925 (1995) [hereinafter
Naughton, Participation in the Organization] (noting that employees may be entitled
to participate in three areas of corporate decisionmaking).
43. See id. (defining social matters).
44. See id. (defining personal matters).
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ings and similar matters.4 5 The initial papal view, as exemplified by Pius
XII's reaction to German codetermination, was that employees have a nat-
ural right to participate in decisions relating to social and personal mat-
ters, but not economic matters. 4 6 The more recent Bishops' pastoral
letter, in contrast, at least implicitly endorsed worker participation in all
three areas. 47 Outside the Catholic tradition, the secular humanist litera-
ture almost uniformly claims that workers are entitled to participate in all
three areas.
48
Although the relevant Catholic social teachings and secular humanist
arguments are complex and nuanced, both fairly can be said to emphasize
two basic claims. First, participation is asserted to be an essential mecha-
nism for full development of human personality. 49 Self-realization and
self-actualization are the conceptual engines driving this claim. 50 I evalu-
ate this claim in Part III of this Article. 5 1 Second, participation is posited
to be an essential feature of human dignity.52 Because merely invoking
the broad concept of human dignity does little to promote the necessary
process of specification and assessment, Part IV extracts from the relevant
literature three basic ways in which participation might advance human
dignity. 53 First, participation may promote trust between employers and
employees. 54 Second, participation promotes workplace democracy. 55
Third and finally, participation rights may protect employees from oppor-
tunistic conduct by employers. 56 As I argue in Part IV, only the final the-
45. See id. (defining economic matters).
46. See id. at 926 (stating that "Pius XII was adamant that a natural right to
economic participation violates owners' rights to private property").
47. See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 39, 1 13-15, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC
CHALLENGE, supra note 39, app. (asserting that all people have right to participa-
tion generally, including in economic matters).
48. See Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 242-46 (advocating workers'
right to participate).
49. See id. at 222-28 (citing ability to participate as important element to
human personality development).
50. See id. (noting that desire for self-realization and self-actualization creates
need to participate).
51. For a discussion of the claim that participation is essential for the full
development of the human personality, see infra notes 222-30 and accompanying
text.
52. See Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 222-28 (noting that participat-
ing in life's decisions is important part of human dignity).
53. For a discussion of the three basic ways in which participation might ad-
vance human dignity, see infra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of how participation may promote trust between employ-
ers and employees, see infra notes 310-431 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of how participation promotes workplace democracy, see
infra notes 432-74 and accompanying text.
56. For a discussion of how participation rights may protect employees, see
infra notes 475-549 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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ory rises to the level of plausibility, and it still can not justify government-
mandated employee participation.
5 7
II. MORAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW
Law consists in the first instance of a set of doctrinal propositions; i.e.,
the legal rules derived from statutes, judicial precedents and opinio juris.
Legal reasoning is more than the mere identification and manipulation of
doctrinal propositions, however, because doctrine itself is inextricably
linked with morality and policy. The doctrinal propositions of which law
consists thus rest on a tripod whose legs are: moral norms, which charac-
terize conduct as right or wrong;58 policy, which characterizes states of
affairs as good or bad in light of the general welfare of society;59 and expe-
rience, which teaches us the way the world works. 60 Although all three are
important, moral norms have special relevance to evaluating asserted
rights because it is morality itself that shapes our perceptions of what con-
stitutes an injury for which one has a right to redress. 61
Skeptics claim that moral norms are indeterminate, abstract and un-
democratic in a pluralistic society. 62 None of these claims, however, is fa-
tal to my project. Unless one insists on unanimity, it remains possible to
identify many moral norms as to which majority consensus exists. 63 Most
people still believe, for example, that promises should be kept and that
57. For a discussion of the plausibility of the third theory, see infra notes 541-
49 and accompanying text.
58. Moral norms are to be distinguished from the concept of social norms.
The burgeoning and important literature on the latter commonly defines social
norms as "rules or standards enforced solely by private (that is, non-state) actors."
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employ-
ment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1914 n.1 (1996) [hereinafter Rock &
Wachter, Enforceability of Norms].
59. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAw 26 (1988)
(stating that "[p]olicies characterize states of affairs as conducive or adverse to the
general welfare").
60. See id. at 37 (stating that "[e]xperiential propositions are propositions
about the way the world works"). Note that I am generalizing an analysis that
Eisenberg restricted to common law adjudication.
61. See id. at 14-15 (discussing moral norms in common law and stating that
morality largely shapes our perceptions of what constitutes injuries and rights).
Some natural law jurisprudes, of course, would assert that I am putting the cart
before the horse. An important strain of natural law thinking denies that a positive
law contrary to the precepts of natural law is even a law. "It is void, an act of
violence rather than law." RICE, supra note 39, at 30. For a more nuanced account,
see FINNIs, NATURAL LAW, supra note 28, at 354-62 (discussing effects of injustice on
obligation to obey law).
62. See generally Russell Mittinger, Distinguishing Between Constitutional Art and
Morals, 4 S. CAL. INTERImisc. L.J. 567, 567 (1995) (discussing views of natural law
skeptics generally).
63. Although some minorities may hold values different from those of the
majority, this does not foreclose the use of moral norms in lawmaking "as long as
the community is not exceptionally pluralistic and the norms claim to be rooted in
aspirations for the community as a whole." EISENBERG, supra note 59, at 21.
9
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lying is wrong. This consensus as to basic social morality permits one to
"reach a pretty firm sense of what most people would regard as fair in a
given case."6 4
The claim that moral norms are indeterminate is contradicted by ex-
perience, as Melvin Eisenberg has argued:
Moral norms such as "promises should be kept" and "lying is
wrong" are neither vacuous nor susceptible to any interpretation.
Furthermore, this argument confuses the definition of a concept
and the instances that fall under it. People who are not expert at
systematization often cannot give a satisfactory definition of a
concept even though they can easily identify cases falling under
it.6
5
The latter point, reminiscent ofJustice Stewart's famous remark about ob-
scenity, is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Eisenberg's defense of
social morality.66 It may be enough to know a moral norm when we see it,
even if we cannot state the norm with the precision one expects of moral
philosophers or theologians.
To be relevant to lawmaking, a moral norm must satisfy two condi-
tions: 1) it must be supported by the relevant community or society and 2)
it must be true. The requirement of social support is not wholly uncon-
troversial, but can be justified on various grounds. Perhaps the most tell-
ing is the simple point that laws based on moral norms lacking social
support will fail their intended purpose. For example, regardless of the
truth or falsity of the temperance norm, Prohibition failed in large mea-
sure because the moral norms invoked to justify the 18th Amendment lost
social support.67
The requirement that a moral norm be true is far more controver-
sial. 68 Skeptics deny that the truth of a moral norm can be established. 69
64. Id. A caveat is in order. Moral norms are very useful in defining broad
rules of general application and even for defining narrow rules applicable to issues
involving profound questions of morality, but they are a blunt instrument poorly
suited to fine detail work in the interstices of commercial law. As such, even if I
were persuaded that employees have a moral right to participate in corporate gov-
ernance, I am doubtful that moral norms would tell us very much about the partic-
ular form such participation should take.
65. Id.
66. SeeJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material ... embraced...
[by the term 'hard core pornography']; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that.")
67. See Paul M. Robinson, One Perspective on Sentencing Reform in the United
States, 8 CRIM. L.F. 1, 33 (1997) (describing how change of community norms can
cause changes in law).
68. See Mittinger, supra note 62, at 567 (discussing requirement that moral
norms be true).
69. See id. (discussing skeptics' view).
[Vol. 43: p. 741
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/1
1998] PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT AND NATURAL LAW 751
At best, they regard moral norms as indeterminate "can't helps."70 Yet,
the genuine immorality of an act is a necessary, but not sufficient, condi-
tion for the legitimacy of its legal prohibition.7 1 Because all conceptions
of good necessarily invoke nonderivable moral assumptions, we cannot
avoid an inquiry into the morality of an lact we propose to regulate.
72
To be sure, the truth of moral norms and their support in the com-
munity are necessarily intertwined. Laws mala in se derive their legitimacy
from ideals-justice, love, liberty-that have traction precisely because
they are based in a common belief in the truth of some abstract princi-
ple.73 Thus, community support is evidence of a norm's validity, while the
ability of a given norm to command such support depends on whether it is
true.
At the same time, however, truth and social support ultimately must
be kept separate. Failing to do so leads inevitably to the contractualist
fallacy; namely, the position that moral norms are simply an agreement
among members of society.7 4 Russell Kirk characterized Edmund Burke's
vision of natural rights as not merely a matter of convention, but as
"human custom conforming to divine intent."75 Unconstrained contrac-
tualism, in contrast, makes lawmaking a mere popularity contest among
competing political positions clothed in the language of rights. Inevitably,
the lowest common moral denominator will prevail. 76 Indeed, as Pope
70. See Richard Posner, Lecture: 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 IHARv. L. REv. 1637, 1675 (1998) [herein-
after Posner, Problematics] (describing example of moral norm as "can't helps"); see
also Gerald V. Bradley, Law and Economics: Overcoming Posner, 94 MICH. L. REv.
1898, 1909 (1996) (book review) [hereinafter Bradley, Law and Economics] (refer-
ring to Homles's "can't helps" as value judgments). For a more thorough explana-
tion of Holmes's "can't helps" theory, see id. at 1912-15.
71. See Gerard V. Bradley, Pluralistic Perfectionism: A Review Essay of MAKING
MEN MORAL, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 671, 674 (1996) [hereinafter Bradley, Pluralis-
tic Perfectionism] (stating that immorality is necessary, but not sufficient, for legal
prohibition).
72. See Bobby Jindal, Relativism, Neutrality, and Transcendentalism: Beyond Au-
tonomy, 57 LA. L. REv. 1253, 1253 (1997) (stating that "any justification for acting
in a non-random manner involves non-derivable morality").
73. See id. (stating that "whether one appeals to justice, love, value of human
life, etc., one is appealing to a common belief in some abstract principle of good").
74. See Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously:
Economics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 671, 708
(1993) (stating that moral norms should reflect agreement among members of
society). Contractualism's principal virtue is that linking wide social support for a
moral norm to truth claims implicates both notions of consent-"persons should
be bound only by what they have agreed to"-and notions of rationality-norms
that rational people are willing to accept are themselves rational. Id. Hence, my
view is that strong social support for a particular moral norm is evidence that it
may be true, although not dispositive of its truth.
75. RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND FRoM BURKE TO ELIOT 50 (7th rev.
ed. 1993) [hereinafter KIRK, CONSERVATIVE MIND].
76. Note that contractualism also runs afoul of public choice theory, espe-
cially Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which postulates that there is no way to ag-
gregate individual preferences that satisfies such basic requirements as transitive
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John Paul II observed, "if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct
political activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for
reasons of power." 77 At its worst, contractualism leads to the sort of totali-
tarianism exemplified by Revolutionary France in whom the state, embod-
ying the "general will," subjugated both faith and conscience. 78 The social
contract degenerated into nothing more than an accord among those who
had the power to impose their will on others. 79
How then shall the truth of a moral norm be established? The vari-
ous schools of natural law offer three sources: revealed truth, practical rea-
soning and the traditions of the community. 80 All three shall be treated as
grist for the mill herein.
Natural law consists of "a loosely-knit body of rules of action pre-
scribed by an authority superior to the state." 81 But what authority?
Burke contended that "[m]an's rights exist only when man obeys God's
law" towards which we grope feebly and imperfectly 8 2 I thus submit that
most people believe that promises should be kept and lying is wrong be-
cause those norms are revealed truths affirmed by the foundational reli-
gious texts of our culture.
preferences and pareto optimality. See Raj Bhala, Equilibrium Theory, The FICAS
Model, and International Banking Law, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 38 (1997) (providing
broad definition of Professor Arrow's theory). For a general study of Professor
Arrow's work, see GEORGE FEIWEL, ARRow AND THE THEORIES OF ECONOMIC POLICY
(1987).
77. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 2, 1 46.2, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE
& PEACE, supra note 2, at 468.
78. See David AJ. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1373, 1397 (1990) (book review) (contrasting totalitarian France with views of
American founders).
79. See RICE, supra note 39, at 37-38 (explaining how strict accordance to natu-
ral law encourages individual rights rather than incarnating general will by follow-
ing divine command).
80. Russell Kirk offers a somewhat more elaborate panoply, positing that the
various schools of natural law derive the rules thereof from "divine commandment,
from right reason with which man is endowed by his Creator, from the nature of
mankind empirically regarded, from the abstract Reason of the Enlightenment, or
from the long experience of humankind in the community." Russell Kirk, Natural
Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036
(1994) [hereinafter Kirk, Tension]. In the interests of brevity, I have chosen to
collapse the three central categories into one or, perhaps more precisely, to ignore
the distinctions among them.
81. Id.
82. KIRK, CONSERVATIVE MIND, supra note 75, at 49.
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Because legal elites are largely secular in outlook,8 3 as are most mod-
ern American elites, 84 arguments founded on revealed truths inevitably
have little traction in the academy. Yet, large segments of our society still
look to their sacred texts for answers to moral problems-and find
them.8 5 Indeed, although our society admittedly is increasingly pluralistic,
"the democratic reality, even, if you will, the raw demographic reality, is
that most Americans derive their values and visions from the biblical tradi-
tion."8 6 This is especially true of such seemingly disparate groups as Prot-
estant Evangelicals, Roman Catholics and Orthodox Jews.8 7 At the very
least, those skeptical of the claims of faith must therefore concede that
moral norms affirmed by the foundational texts of Judaism and Christian-
ity are strong evidence that such norms have considerable support in our
culture.
A second, long dominant, strain of natural law jurisprudence relies
not on revealed truths, but mainly (or even solely) on human reason. 88
Natural law originated with the Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle,
and it was universalized by the Stoics and further developed by the Ro-
mans.8 9 As such, natural law was linked with reason, not religion. Cicero
wrote, for example, "True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it
is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to
duty by its commands, and averts wrongdoing by its prohibitions."90
Although natural law was eventually allied with Christianity, most no-
tably by St. Thomas Aquinas, the natural law mainstream still emphasizes
83. See Thomas Shaffer, The Tension Between Law in America and the Religious
Tradition, in THE WEIGHTIER MATFERS OF THE LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND RELIGION
315, 327 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 1988) (stating that "modern
law schools ... have systematically-theologically!-discounted, discouraged and
disapproved of the invocation of the religious tradition as important, or even
interesting").
84. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REvOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF
DEMOCRACY 215 (1995) (stating that "[t]he elites' attitude to religion ranges from
indifference to active hostility").
85. See Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming
Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1509 (1989) (book review) [hereinaf-
ter McConnell, Role of Democratic Politics] (stating that Orthodox Jews, Amish and
fundamentalists "look to their sacred texts for 'answers' to specific questions-and
find them").
86. RICHARD NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 139 (2d ed. 1986).
87. See McConnell, Role of Democratic Politics, supra note 85, at 1509-10 (stating
that Evangelicals, Roman Catholics and Orthodox Jews "use scripture as a vantage
point for criticizing present-day institutions and practices"). Roman Catholics
share the Evangelical and Orthodox beliefs in the existence of revealed truths, but
find such truths in both the Bible and the teachings of the Church. See id. at 1510
(explaining differences between religious viewpoints).
88. See generally RICE, supra note 39, at 30 (defining natural law).
89. See id. at 30-36 (discussing history of natural law).
90. David F. Forte, Eve Without Adam: What Genesis Has to Tell America About
Natural Law, THE RUSSELL KIRK MEMORIAL LECTURE PRESENTED TO THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (visited May 1, 1996) <http://townhall.com/hefitage/library/catego-
ries/theory/lect570. html> (quoting Cicero's De Republica 3:21).
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reason. 9 1 Religiously grounded natural lawjurisprudes, of course, do not
reject the claims of revealed truth. 92 Some believe that human reason is
the means by which we refine our understanding of divine instruction. 93
Burke contended, for example, that there are "eternal enactments of di-
vine authority which we can endeavor to apprehend through the study of
history and the observation of human character."94 Others, however, as-
sign revealed truth to the category of faith, and natural law to the category
of reason, and the two are then asserted to be compatible, even though
distinct.9
5
Although I find the former school of thought more congenial than
the latter, revealed truths admittedly tell us relatively little about the spe-
cific problem at hand. Accordingly, I rely herein mainly on what John
Finnis refers to as the test of practical reasonableness. 96 Practical reason is
91. See id. With specific regard to Catholic social teaching on the economy,
Charles Curran observed that it initially "saw all of social, political and economic
life in the light of the natural law and did not appeal directly and explicitly to the
gospel, redemption, grace, or Jesus Christ." Charles E. Curran, Relating Religious-
Ethical Inquiry to Economic Policy, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra note
39, at 42, 43. Many natural law jurisprudes rely similarly on reason and their un-
derstanding of human nature to identify moral principles without invoking re-
vealed truths of divine origin. See, e.g., Philip E. Johnson, Some Thoughts About
Natural Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 217, 217 (1987) (distinguishing natural law from di-
vine law); see also Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 2393, 2394, 2404-05 (1992) (identifying "the insistence that moral princi-
ples are objectively valid and discoverable by reason" as characteristic of natural
law and identifying religious connotations of natural law as one reason for skepti-
cism about it).
92. See RICE, supra note 39, at 29 (stating that natural law and revelation com-
plement each other).
93. See Soper, supra note 91, at 2406 (discussing moral truths and reason).
94. KIRK, CONSERVATIVE MIND, supra note 75, at 49.
95. See, e.g., RJCE, supra note 39, at 29 (stating that "natural law and revelation
complement each other"); Forte, supra note 90 (stating that "[w]estern civilization
was built upon both reason and faith: the faith of the Judeo-Christian revelation
and the reason that discovered and applied the natural law").
96. See FINNIS, NATURAL LAw, supra note 28, at 100-27 (discussing test of prac-
tical reasonableness), Practical reasonableness is only part of Finnis's jurispru-
dence of natural law, the totality of which appears to consist mostly of lists. He
begins with seven "basic values": life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friend-
ship, practical reasonableness and religion. See id. at 86-90. In turn, the test of
practical reasonableness consists of nine requirements: a coherent plan of life, no
arbitrary preferences among value, no arbitrary preferences among persons, de-
tachment, commitment, efficiency, respect for every basic value in every act, the
common good and following one's conscience. See id. at 103-26. Each of the seven
basic values is said to be of equal importance, and Finnis denies that it is possible
to rank them. See id. at 92-93. Instead, an important component of practical rea-
sonableness is making decisions in a way that does not directly damage any of the
seven basic values. See id. at 119-20. Because Finnis defines natural law as being
concerned with "good and proper conduct," not drafting positive legislation, he is
willing to accept the resulting indeterminacy. Id. at 18. For a criticism of Finnis's
list of basic values and definition of practical reasonableness, see William H. Wil-
cox, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 408, 408-20 (1983) (book
review) (criticizing Finnis's test of practical reasonableness).
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a way of thinking about how things ought to be, using rational arguments
about how people ought to behave. 97 Alternatively, as Finnis put it, practi-
cal reasoning is the natural law method of "working out the (moral) natu-
ral law from the first (pre-moral) principles of natural law." 98 In
particular, it is a way of choosing "commitments, projects, and actions,
knowing that choice effectively rules out many alternative reasonable or
possible commitment(s), project(s), and action(s)." 99 As this definition
implies, practical reason alone cannot be dispositive when making public
policy rather than personal moral choices. As Finnis acknowledged, "the
integration of even an uncontroversial requirement of practical reasona-
bleness into the [positive] law will not be a simple matter."' 0 0 It is a start-
ing point, not a conclusion.
Practical reasonableness should not be confused with a purely instru-
mental explanation for moral norms. Moral norms involve making judg-
ments about right and wrong, which is inconsistent with a purely
instrumental understanding of norms. In addition, providing an ex post
instrumental justification for a moral norm is not the same as providing an
ex ante account of how and why the norm came into existence.
At the same time, however, an instrumental analysis can be instruc-
tive. Although cost-benefit analysis may strike a discordant note in an es-
say on moral norms, efficiency is a basic element of practical reasoning.
One should seek to achieve the good by actions that are efficient for their
purposes: "One must not waste one's opportunities by using inefficient
methods." 10 1 Cost-benefit analysis thus comes into play not only as a pol-
icy-based argument potentially capable of trumping moral norms, but also
within the task of specifying and assessing claimed moral norms.
Although practical reason is a useful guide, it flirts with a grave dan-
ger; namely, the triumph of individual reason. Burke contended that indi-
vidual reason could never fully comprehend the divine intent, although
we grope towards it through history, myth, fable, custom and tradition. 10 2
Of these, tradition and custom are the most important.
97. See Steven J. Burton, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 710, 715 (1988) (stating that practical reason focuses on what "ought" to be).
98. FINNiS, NATURAL LAw, supra note 28, at 103 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
99. Id. at 100.
100. Id. at 283-84.
101. Id. at 111. To be sure, Finnis constrains the efficiency criterion by refer-
ence to other moral criteria. See id. at 112 (stating that calculating most efficient
course is complicated by various considerations, such as moral constraints on
human behavior).
102. See KIRK, CONSERVATIVE MIND, supra note 75, at 50 (stating that "the expe-
rience of the species is taught to us not only through history, but through myth
and fable, custom and prejudice").
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Tradition often has a hard time withstanding the assaults of individual
reason. 10 3 Yet, tradition-even if seemingly foolish-has extraordinary
value. 10 4 First, tradition provides a solution for the risk of value disagree-
ment, which modern scholars typically regard as a major problem for natu-
ral law-based jurisprudence. 0 5 Philip Soper, for example, opined that
"[i]f we accept that natural law is just another way of claiming that ethical
statements can be true or false, then we will have to recognize that people
who accept the theory can nevertheless reach different conclusions about
fundamental moral questions with no clear way of judging among
them."'1 6 To those natural law scholars who invoke revealed truth as a
means of making such judgments, Soper responds by asserting that associ-
ating natural law and faith offers good grounds for being skeptical of the
former.1 0 7 If so, however, the traditions of the community provide an al-
ternative standard for identifying moral truths that does not require one
to accept the claims of any particular faith.
Second, respect for tradition is closely linked to the virtue of pru-
dence. 10 8 Edmund Burke echoed Plato in his assertion that prudence was
the chief virtue of true statesmen. 10 9 Prudence requires a degree of con-
sequentialist reasoning that some natural law scholars, such as Finnis, find
troubling.1 10 When the question of codifying purported natural rights
103. See McConnell, Role of Democratic Politics, supra note 85, at 1506 (stating
that "[a]n excess of 'self-critical rationality' is death to tradition").
104. Incorporating traditional values into natural law implicates the enduring
question of "whether natural law implies the existence of universal moral truths
that make the theory incompatible with theories that recognize cultural or social
variation in ethical 'truth.'" Soper, supra note 91, at 2395 n.4. My own view, for
what it is worth, is that some truths are universal-prohibitions against murder and
incest being good examples-while others are culturally bound. The genesis of my
position is St. Paul's comment that he became "all things to all men," which im-
plies that he was willing to accommodate cultural variations that did not offend the
universal moral truths to which he was committed. 1 Cor. 9:22.
105. See, e.g., Soper, supra note 91, at 2405 (discussing risk of value disagree-
ments among those who accept theory of natural law).
106. Id. Notice that Soper's invocation of value disagreements as a problem
for natural law implicitly includes a pre-analytic assumption of individual auton-
omy and the legitimacy of individual reason.
107. See id. (stating that skepticism of natural law theory is rooted in failure to
"distinguish between faith and reason as the basis for one's claim about moral
truth").
108. See RUSSELL KIRK, THE POLITICS OF PRUDENCE 19-20 (1993) [hereinafter
KIRK, PRUDENCE] (stating that "in politics we would do well to abide by precedent
and even prejudice, for the great mysterious incorporation of the human race has
acquired a prescriptive wisdom far greater than any [person's] petty private
rationality").
109. See id. at 20 (stating that "Burke agrees with Plato that in the statesman,
prudence is chief among virtues").
110. See, e.g., FINNIs, NATURAL LAW, supra note 28, at 112 (stating that conse-
quentialist reasoning "is irrational"). Incorporating prudential considerations into
a natural law methodology also implicates David Hume's well-known point that
"ought" claims cannot be derived from "is" statements. See Zuckert, supra note 32,
at 707 (stating that Hume's point is that "is" statements and "ought" statements are
[Vol. 43: p. 741
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/1
1998] PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT AND NATURAL LAW 757
arises, however, attention to long-term consequences is essential. If noth-
ing else, the law of unintended consequences must be given its due. The
prudent legislator is hesitant to promulgate reforms that may give rise to
new and unforeseen abuses that are worse than the evil' to be cured.
Although prudence justifies reliance on empirical observations about
the current state of the world, it also justifies consideration of the tradi-
tions of the community. The prudent legislator respects tradition pre-
cisely because the enduring truths of what Burke aptly called "original
justice" are revealed slowly, with experience, over time.11 1 As John Ran-
dolph put it, providence moves slowly, but the devil always hurries. 11 2 The
individual is foolish, but the species is wise. We thus turn aside from an-
cient usage at our peril; it is far better to profit from the wisdom of our
forebearers.1
1 3
Third and finally, a great virtue of tradition is that it gives us a vantage
point different from today's prevailing judgment.]1 4 Individual reason in
today's moral climate too often leads to mere values, which are purely
matters of personal preference, lacking the moral force to bind others. In
contrast, tradition emphasizes virtue, which is backed by the sanction of an
enduring moral order with real teeth. The seven cardinal virtues-justice,
fortitude, prudence, temperance, faith, hope and charity-thus are not
questions of personal preferences. The individual can choose not to live
up to those standards, but our moral heritage treats that choice as a sin
having consequences.
The function of practical reason within a moral tradition thus is not a
critical one, seeking to expose the tradition's faults, but rather a respectful
one, seeking to learn what the tradition offers. 115 Edmund Burke, for ex-
ample, approved of those who:
different in kind and one by itself cannot lead to other). As we have seen, natural
law is fundamentally a series of "ought" claims. According to some interpreters of
Hume, empirical observations about the state of the world cannot lead to conclu-
sions about the validity of a purported natural right or law. See id. (discussing
interpretations of Hume). It is possible, however, to construct a natural law meth-
odology that satisfies Hume's point that "ought" conclusions must derive from an
"ought premise," and yet still have room for empirical claims as well. For a discus-
sion of the implications of Hume's analysis for natural law, see id. at 706-08 (dis-
cussing Hume's effort to make people aware of function of "ought" premises in
our moral judgment).
111. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke's
"Constitution of Freedom," 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 393, 403 [hereinafter McConnell,
Establishment and Toleration] (stating that Burke believed "original justice" reveals
itself slowly, overtime).
112. See KIRK, PRUDENCE, supra note 108, at 20 (noting that John Randolph
stated that "providence moves slowly, but the devil always hurries").
113. See id. at 251.
114. See McConnell, Role of Democratic Politics, supra note 85, at 1505.
115. See id. at 1507 (stating that practical reason approaches tradition with
"respectful-even pious-attitude").
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[I] nstead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity
to discover the latent wisdom that prevails in them. If they find
what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to
continue the prejudice [i.e., tradition or custom], with the rea-
son involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice and to leave
nothing but the naked reason. 116
This form of respect for tradition requires neither blind resistance to
change nor a return to some idyllic past. Burke, the father of modern
conservatism, was known in his own time as a reformer. 1 17 Burke's conser-
vatism was expressed in his limitation of reform to clear and present social
dangers and his resistance to reforms premised on abstract reason.) 8 A
Burkean theory of natural law thus admits the possibility of legal reforms
based on natural rights as discerned by practical reasoning within the con-
fines of our moral traditions, but rejects radical reforms purported to pro-
mote some radical or utopian academic scheme.
III. PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT AND THE SELF
A. Participation as a Means of Self-Fufillment in Catholic Social Teaching
Worker participation in corporate decisionmaking has been a major
theme of Catholic social teaching for several decades. 119 In the Bishops'
pastoral letter on economic justice, for example, the U.S. Bishops en-
dorsed collective bargaining by unions, asserted that workers have a right
to be informed about prospective plant closings or layoffs and to negotiate
with management over alternatives, encouraged consideration of coopera-
tive ownership structures and opined that directors' fiduciary obligations
to shareholders should be tempered by economic justice to employees and
other nonshareholder constituencies.' 2 0 Of particular relevance to the
problem at hand is the Bishops' endorsement of what they called "new
forms of partnership between workers and managers" to promote "greater
participation and accountability within firms."12 1 Without suggesting any
particular form of worker participation (such as codetermination), they
116. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE § 2(a)
(1893).
117. See KIRK, PRUDENCE, supra note 108, at 50-51 (stating that without Burke's
contributions, conservative-minded people would be impoverished because Burke
foresaw revolutions of our time and expounded principles that conservatives have
since endeavored to defend).
118. See PETER JAMES STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAw 113
(1958) (noting that Burke was convinced that alterations in civil society should not
be made by virtue of abstract speculative reason).
119. See generally BISHOPS' LETrER, supra note 39, 301-02, reprinted in THE
CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39, app. (discussing Catholic social teaching and
worker participation).
120. See id. 301-05, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39,
app. (discussing approaches to increase worker participation).
121. Id. 299, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39, app.
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did generally endorse what they called "innovative methods for increasing
worker participation within firms. 1 22
The relevant papal encyclicals tend in the same direction. In his 1981
encyclical Laborem Exercens,1 23 for example, Pope John Paul II asserted that
a worker "wishes to be able to take part in the very work process as a sharer
in responsibility and creativity at the work-bench to which he applies him-
self."'124 Although the Pope has said that the "church has no models to
present,"1 21 some commentators believe that Pope John Paul II in fact has
tried to strike a compromise between socialism and capitalism through a
form of corporatism in which state planning of the economy is balanced
by democratic self-management within the enterprise. 126 Laborem Exercens,
in particular, endorses an employer-employee partnership apparently to
be achieved through co-ownership and codetermination. 12 7
The claims made by Catholic social teaching in this area rest on a
number of grounds. In this part, I examine the assertion that the right of
employees to participate in corporate decisionmaking derives from their
fundamental human need for personal development and self-fulfillment, a
claim that goes back to at least Pope John XXIII. 128 Expanding on prior
encyclicals positing workers to be partners in the productive process, Pope
John contended that work is one of the means whereby we perfect and
fulfill our human potential. 129 The personality and human nature of a
worker denied the sense of personal initiative that comes from participa-
tion will be stunted.1 30 Because a worker vested with decisionmaking
and/or initiation rights is empowered to make free choices, his or her
122. Id. 301, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39, app.
123. POPEJOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS (1981) [hereinafter LABOREM Ex-
ERCENS], reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 351.
124. Id. 15, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 374.
125. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 2, 43, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE
& PEACE, supra note 2, at 465.
126. See, e.g., John Gray & William Doino, Jr., The Last Socialist?, NAT'L REV.,
June 30, 1989, at 27, 27 (stating that Pope's vision is "an alternative to both capital-
ism and socialism").
127. See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 123, 1 14.4, reprinted in PROCLAIMING
JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 373-74 (noting "special significance" of proposals
for worker ownership and participation).
128. For a discussion of the assertion that the right of employees to partici-
pate in corporate decisionmaking derives from their fundamental need for per-
sonal development and self-fulfillment, see infra notes 222-30 and accompanying
text.
129. See Naughton, Participation in the Organization, supra note 42, at 926 (in-
terpreting Pope John XXIII's assertions to stand for proposition that participation
in workplace is instrumental to development of human personality).
130. See id. at 926-27 (stating that to deny workers freedom of action through
participation prevents them from perfecting their personality).
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personality develops in a more wholesome way than if he or she is treated
as an automaton whose every action is subject to hierarchical control.' 3'
Pope John XXIII's argument was framed within the broader context
of the series of papal encyclicals touching on the economy, beginning with
Pope Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum13 2 and culminating with Pope John Paul
II's Laborem Exercens and Centesimus Annus.133 Work is seen in these en-
cyclicals as a means by which humans collaborate in God's ongoing act of
creation.' 3 4 The Creator hid untold riches and possibilities within crea-
tion, which it is humanity's vocation to discover and develop through
work. 13 5 Humanity's capacity for creativity is thus one of the ways in which
people were made in God's image. This innate capacity, however, re-
quires development. Accordingly, work is not only a process by which we
collaborate in God's creative transformation of the world, but also a pro-
cess by which we are transformed into a more fully human person. 136 This
process of self-fulfillment is both a duty and a privilege. 137
Participation rights, opine the encyclicals, promote creativity by pro-
viding a sphere of action within which workers may take personal initia-
tive.' 3 8 In contrast, workplaces organized "so as to ensure maximum
returns and profits with no concern whether the worker, through his own
labor, grows or diminishes as a person," deny these purported human
needs and, moreover, result in worker alienation.' 39 "The effects of non-
131. See id. at 927 (arguing that because work is formative, structure of work-
place must accommodate self-determining nature of people by allowing workers
their own management when possible).
132. POPE LEO XIlI, RERUM NOVARUM (1891) [hereinafter RERIIM NOVARUM],
reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTIcE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 15.
133. See generally CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 2, reprinted in PROCLAIMING
JUsTIcE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 351 (standing for proposition that work is means
by which humans collaborate in God's ongoing act of creation); LABOREM Ex-
ERCENS, supra note 123, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at
432 (same).
134. See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 123, 25, reprinted in PROCLA-MING
JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 386 (stating that humans throughout ages have
acted creatively in accordance with God's will). See generally Michael Novak, Crea-
tion Theology, [hereinafter Novak, Creation Theology] in CO-CREATION AND CAPITAL-
ISM: JOHN PAUL 1I's Laborem Exercens 17 (John W. Houck & Oliver F. Williams eds.,
1983) [hereinafter CO-CREATION AND CAPITALISM] (discussing creation theology).
135. See Novak, Creation Theology, supra note 134, at 28 (stating that it is voca-
tion of people to discover their possibilities for "the common good of all").
136. See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 2, 7 32-33, reprinted in PROCLAIMING
JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 456-57 (discussing virtues achieved through
work).
137. See POPE PAUL VI, POPULORUM PROGRESSIO 15 (1967) [hereinafter
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO], reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2,
at 221, 226 (stating that "every man is born to seek self-fulfillment" and that
humans are "endowed with intellect and free will").
138. See Naughton, Participation in the Organization, supra note 42, at 929 (dis-
cussing encyclicals' views regarding creativity and participation).
139. CENrrEsIMus ANNUS, supra note 2, 1 41.1, reprinted in PROCLAIMINGJUSTICE
& PEACE, supra note 2, at 464.
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participation-passivity, inertia, timidity, and intellectual stagnation-
cheat people of the full development of their personhood."1 40
I am skeptical of the papal argument for both empirical and theoreti-
cal reasons. If Pope John Paul II is correct, employee involvement should
enhance employee morale. In turn, workers empowered by participation
rights should be more productive than alienated workers denied such
rights.14 ' Neither seems to be the case. I have reviewed the relevant em-
pirical literature in detail elsewhere.1 42 Suffice it to say that there is no
conclusive documentation that employee involvement consistently leads to
long-term economic benefits. As another review of the empirical evidence
concluded, "while participation may improve productivity, participation
does not consistently have this effect and, in some cases, is actually less
effective than non-participation." 1
43
The encyclicals' line of argument is also undermined when we more
rigorously examine the place of work in human nature and development.
Pope John Paul II's understanding of work is consistent with the claims of
various psychologists that work satisfies a number of human needs.14 4 As
the story goes, humans need safety-security, structure and order.145
Work provides a regular paycheck and a structured environment in which
we spend much of our day. 14 6 Humans also need recognition-a sense
140. Michael Naughton, An Essay on Jonathan Boswell's COMMUNITY AND THE
ECONOMY: THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CO-OPERATION, 51 REV. Soc. ECON. 86, 90
(1993) [hereinafter Naughton, An Essay]. Exercising our creative powers in the
workplace not only helps us more accurately reflect the image of God in which we
were created, but it also promotes virtue. See Naughton, Participation in the Organi-
zation, supra note 42, at 928-29 (discussing importance of creativity as image of
divinity that ought to be expressed in workplace). Virtue is a willingness to act
against interest, and thus "the means whereby man becomes good as man."
LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 123, 9.3, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE &
PEACE, supra note 2, at 365. Pope John Paul II contends that industriousness, dili-
gence, honesty, prudence and the like are all virtues essential to success in a mar-
ket economy that are learned in the workplace. See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note
2, 32.2, reprinted in PROCLAIMINGJUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 456-57 (discuss-
ing important virtues for success in market economy).
141. Cf George C. Lodge, Managers and Managed: Problems of Ambivalence, in
CO-CREATION AND CAPITALISM, supra note 134, at 229, 232 (stating that fulfillment
and efficiency improve with participation); Marshall Sashkin, Participative Manage-
ment is an Ethical Imperative, 12 ORG. DYNAMICS 5, 11 (1984) [hereinafter Sashkin,
Participative Management] (arguing that "participative management has positive ef-
fects on performance, productivity, and employee satisfaction").
142. See Bainbridge, Organizational Failures Analysis, supra note 10 (finding em-
pirical evidence inconclusive at best in demonstrating that participatory manage-
ment improves worker morale and productivity).
143. Edwin A. Locke et al., Participation in Decisionmaking: When Should it be
Used?, 14 ORG. DYNAMICS 65, 69 (1986).
144. See, e.g., ABRAHAM MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 3943 (2d ed.
1970) (discussing various human needs).
145. See id. (discussing safety needs).
146. See Thomas Earl Geu & Martha S. Davis, Work: A Legal Analysis in the
Context of the Changing Transnational Political Economy, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1679, 1683
(1995) (stating that work satisfies needs for safety, pay and structure).
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that they are respected by others.' 4 7 Work (and the money it brings in)
provides status and distinction that help meet this need.148
Surely Pope John Paul II overstated the case, however, when he
opined that work is the "essential key" to the "whole social question."1 4 9
There is no scriptural basis for that claim. 150 To the contrary, insofar as
the Pope's arguments rely on humanity's status as cocreator with God,
those arguments are entirely nonscriptural. Humans may (and should)
imitate God's creative work, but people do not share in God's work as
Creator. In the Genesis account, creation was completed on the sixth
day.15 1 "That is exactly why God could call it good and rest" on the sev-
enth day. 152 Instead of being part of an ongoing process of creation, work
was a direct result of the Fall-when exiled from Eden, humans were con-
demned to "painful toil."' 153 Work was thus not intended to be intrinsi-
cally fulfilling, but simply a necessary means of survival. 15 4
The papal vesting of work with such substantial spiritual significance
errs in at least two further respects. First, it smacks of salvation through
works. Indeed, a prior Pope (Paul VI) explicitly linked the duty to work
out one's own self-fulfillment to the duty to work out one's own salvation:
"In God's plan, every person is born to seek self-fulfillment .... Endowed
with intellect and free will, each man is responsible for his fulfillment even
as he is for his salvation."' 55 I do not claim to understand the intricacies
of modern Catholic doctrines on salvation; I only point out that the appar-
ent linkages between work, self-fulfillment and salvation are troubling to
those of us who come out of the Protestant tradition of salvation by grace.
Second, the Pope's privileging of work flirts with the error of idolatry. As I
explain in the next section, an overemphasis on self-fulfillment risks deify-
147. See FRANCIS FUKUyAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 162-63
(1992) [hereinafter FUKUVAMA, END OF HISTORY] (discussing history of philosophi-
cal texts dealing with "recognition"); MASLOW, supra note 144, at 45-47 (stating that
humans have desire for reputation and prestige).
148. See Geu & Davis, supra note 146, at 1683 (stating that "work may be one
way to achieve recognition").
149. LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 123, 3, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE
& PEACE, supra note 2, at 357.
150. See Stanley Hauerwas, Work as Co-Creation: A Critique of a Remarkably Bad
Idea, in CO-CREATION AND CAPITALISM, supra note 134, at 42, 43 (stating that 'John
Paul II is only using scripture to buttress a theory arrived at on other grounds").
151. See Genesis 2:1-2 (stating that God rested on seventh day).
152. Hauerwas, supra note 150, at 45.
153. See Genesis 3:17. It would be more precise to say that unfulfilling and
even painful work was the result of the Fall. See Hauerwas, supra note 150, at 48
(discussing scripture's treatment of work). Before the Fall, Adam was to till and
keep the Garden. See Genesis 2:15. As a result of the Fall, however, work was trans-
formed into the painful toil detailed in Genesis 3:17.
154. See Hauerwas, supra note 150, at 48 (stating that "[w]ork gives us the
means to survive").
155. POPULORUM PROGRESSIO, supra note 137, 15, reprinted in PROCLAIMING
JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 226.
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ing the self, although Catholic social teaching purports to avoid this error
by remaining ultimately fixed on the Deity.
156
Even if we concede, arguendo, that work is central to one's self-defini-
tion, we need not concede the conceptually distinct claim that workers
have a moral right to participate in corporate decisionmaking. The cen-
trality of work to the human experience is more directly relevant to the
question of whether there is a right to work than to the one at bar. A right
to participate in workplace decisions requires further justification. As we
have seen, the Pope advances self-fulfillment as one such justification.
In my judgment, however, Catholic social teaching in this area rests
on untenable assumptions about both work and human nature. As to
work, recall Pope John Paul II's claim that participation rights promote
creativity. Assuming arguendo that management of the enterprise is a cre-
ative activity, only those who "take the initiatives, who make the proposals,
or who mobilize opposition to them, [and] who do the talking in whatever
bodies take the major decisions" truly can be said to be acting creatively:
Even where these [firm] decisions are taken by the workers ...
collectively, most of them (if the organization is large) are mere
listeners and voters. Their role is not unimportant, but it also is
not exactly 'creative', as the role of a leader may be said to be.
And if the workers elect representatives to make the major deci-
sions for them, their role as mere electors, though still impor-
tant, is even less creative. All or most of the workers in an
organization can take a creative part in managing it, only if two
conditions hold: if the organization is small and they all take part
in making the major decisions. 157
As to the assumptions made by Catholic social teaching with regard to
human nature, Pope John XXIII asserted that as workers become more
educated they desire "to assume greater responsibility in their own sphere
of employment."' 58 Pope John Paul II likewise assumed that the individ-
ual worker wishes "to take part in the very work process as a sharer in
responsibility and creativity. '159 He therefore condemned the "system of
excessive bureaucratic centralization, which makes the worker feel that he
is just a cog in a huge machine moved from above." 160 Much of the secu-
lar humanist literature on participatory management likewise treats em-
ployees as having a uniform preference for participation:
156. For a discussion of the potential consequences of an overemphasis on
self-fulfillment, see infra notes 162-90 and accompanying text.
157. John Plamenatz, Why Should the Workplace be Democratic, in MORAL RIGHTS
IN THE WORKPLACE 293, 297 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1987).
158. POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA 1 96 (1961) [hereinafter MATER
ET MAGISTRA], reprinted in PROCLAMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 98.
159. LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 123, 15, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUS-
TICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 374.
160. Id.
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The opportunity to speak and be heard is a vital factor of employ-
ees' self-esteem and sense of contribution to the firm ...
[W]ork organizations in which widespread participation is the
norm may also contribute to the performance goals of the firm
by making better decisions, because many points of view are con-
sidered in the decisionmaking process. 16 1
In other words, employees represent many different points of view, but all
have a taste for participating in corporate decisionmaking.
I believe that these empirical claims are, at best, over-stated. Some
workers demonstrably prefer hierarchical workplaces where decisionmak-
ing is reserved to management over workplace democracy.' 6 2 Consider
the empirical data on union involvement, which suggests that apathy is
common.1 63 Only a very low percentage of a union's members actively
participate in its affairs.' 64 In his important case study of an early self-
directed work team, John Witte contended from such evidence that "there
is little reason to suspect that most workers would either endorse the idea
of participation or become actively involved if the opportunity arose."1 65
To the contrary, Witte posits that workers generally accept hierarchical
authority and perceive obedience to authority as an integral part of their
job because "for the majority, disobedience is unthinkable."' 66
Although there is more recent evidence that some American workers
desire a greater voice with respect to shop floor issues, such as work con-
tent and schedules, there is still both empirical and anecdotal support for
161. Karen L. Newman, The Just Organization: Creating and Maintaining Justice
in Work Environments, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1489, 1498 (1993) (footnotes omit-
ted); accord Lodge, supra note 141, at 232 (stating that "implicit in all [companies]
is the idea that relationships between those who manage and those who are man-
aged are best determined by consensus rather than by conflict around a
contract").
162. SeeJoseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Toward a The-
ory of Hierarchy, 6 BELLJ. ECON. 552, 571-72 (1975) (stating that some employees
prefer coercive hierarchies); see also JOHN F. WTrTE, DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY, AND
ALIENATION IN WORK: WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN AN AMERICAN CORPORATION 40-
41 (1980) (stating that some workers prefer to leave decisionmaking to people in
authority). See generally DavidJ. Glew et al., Participation in Organizations: A Preview
of the Issues and Proposed Framework for Future Analysis, 21 J. MGMT. 395, 404-05
(1995) (summarizing studies of personality differences and similar factors affect-
ing outcome of participatory management).
163. See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 162, at 25 (providing empirical data on union
involvement).
164. See id. (noting that union participation is generally low). But see PAUL C.
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
30 (1990) (stating that union participation is active).
165. WrrE, supra note 162, at 25.
166. Id. at 38; accord Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI-KENT
L. REv. 159, 202 (1991) (arguing that employees are "conditioned to accept
managers").
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Witte's pessimistic prediction.' 6 7 A recent study of transportation firms
found that long-term use of employee involvement initiatives increased
stress and decreased employee fulfillment-exactly contrary to the encycli-
cals' expectations.' 68 A study of "empowered" employees versus a control
group of "unempowered" employees within a single insurance company
found no statistical difference between the two groups on such productiv-
ity-related issues as motivation, or even on some job satisfaction measure-
ments. 169 Only about half of the participants in Witte's own case study
were willing to change jobs to get more participation, and that rate de-
clined rapidly if doing so would require longer hours or lower pay. 170 In
unionized plants, rank and file workers have often resisted collective bar-
167. See WITrE, supra note 162, at 25-31 (finding that workers' interest in par-
ticipation generally lies in matters concerning their own work). Witte's data show
the lowest worker interest with respect to strategic decisions and personnel mat-
ters. See id. (presenting statistics regarding how much influence workers think they
should have). The more recent and more comprehensive Families and Work Insti-
tute survey found equivocal results. See ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., THE FAMILIES AND
WORK INSTITUTE's NATIONAL STUDY OF THE CHANGING WORKFORCE: HIGHLIGHTS 15
(1993) (noting that most workers are not unequivocally devoted to serving their
companies and organizations because of uncertain terms of employment in today's
economy). On the one hand, 55% of workers who had changed jobs within the
preceding five years listed control over work content as a "very important" factor in
deciding to take their current job. See id. On the other hand, only 6% of all work-
ers listed control over work content and schedule as a measure of personal success.
See id. at 13. In both cases, multiple responses were allowed. Other polling results
vary, although most show that more than half of workers desire participation in
decisionmaking. See Tom Juravich, Empirical Research on Employee Involvement: A
Critical Review for Labor, 21 LAB. STUD. J. 51, 58 (1996) (finding that 62% of workers
wanted to influence training decisions, while 52% wanted influence over imple-
menting new work); see also Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations, Employee Participation and Labor-Management Cooperation in American Work-
places, CHALLENGE, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 38, 39 (stating that more than 80% want to
participate in decisionmaking). Note, however, that none of this data support the
proposition that one size fits all.
168. See Ronald D. Anderson et al., Relationships of Work Improvement Program
Experience and Logistics Quality Management Factors, 36 TRANsP. J. 20, 30-31 (1996)
(noting possible confounding factors). For a recent anecdotal account supporting
this conclusion, see Ralph T. King, Jr., Jeans Therapy: Levi's Factory Workers are As-
signed to Teams, and Morale Takes a Hit, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1998, at Al (supporting
conclusion that long-term use of employee involvement initiatives increased stress
and decreased employee fulfillment).
169. See Alan J.H. Thorlakson & Robert P. Murray, An Empirical Study of Em-
powerment in the Workplace, 21 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 67, 79-80 (1996) (stating that
although results of study indicated that there was no significant difference between
empowered and nonempowered groups, hypothesis could not be ruled out be-
cause of lack of supplemental follow-up and extenuating factors, such as
downsizing).
170. See WITTE, supra note 162, at 34 (showing number of workers willing to
change jobs in exchange for participation). In fact, there is good evidence that
many workers prefer pay to participation or, at least, are more effectively motivated
by pay than by involvement in decisionmaking. See Bainbridge, Participatory Man-
agement, supra note 5, at 702-03 (discussing Witte's finding that workers are unwill-
ing to trade pay reductions for greater participation in decisionmaking).
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gaining agreements that included employee involvement. 171 In firms
adopting self-directed work teams, ten to twenty percent of employees will
resist the change because they prefer a mundane job to the greater re-
sponsibility and higher expectations associated with team membership. 172
Other studies have found even higher rates of resistance-participation
rates in voluntary participatory management programs range from a low
of thirty-three percent to a high of sixty-eight percent of the eligible
workforce. t 73 Conversely, a study of nonparticipating employees found
that interest in volunteering for employee involvement programs ranged
from a low of fifteen percent to a high of sixty-three percent. 174 Anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that firms using participatory management tech-
niques are expending considerable effort in selecting employees who are
psychologically equipped to work under those conditions, which is pre-
cisely what one would expect if some workers are not temperamentally
suited for participatory workplaces. 175 The existence of differing tastes
among workers is also suggested by evidence that workforce demographics
are correlated with the effectiveness of participatory management.1 76
Why do some workers prefer hierarchy? Some are simply being eco-
nomically rational. Behavioral patterns, learned over many years and rein-
forced by past rewards, are exceedingly resistant to change. 177 As such,
many firms will experience a path dependent resistance to participatory
171. See Mike Parker, Industrial Relations Myth and Shop-Floor Reality: The Team
Concept in the Auto Industry, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE AMBIGUOUS
PROMISE 249, 259 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell John Harris eds., 1993) [herein-
after INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA].
172. See CorroN, supra note 14, at 196 (stating that some workers prefer their
present work over work with increased responsibilities and higher expectations).
173. See Robert W. Miller & Frederick N. Prichard, Factors Associated with Work-
ers' Inclination to Participate in an Employee Involvement Program, 17 GROUP & ORG.
MGMT. 414, 415 (1992) (citing study of participation rates in voluntary par-
ticipatory management programs).
174. See id. (stating that among nonparticipating employees, interest in volun-
teering for employee involvement programs is lower).
175. See Edward E. Lawler, The New Plant Revolution Revisited, 19 ORG. DYNAM-
ICS 4, 5-6 (1990) (stating that firms involved in participatory management spend
more time selecting employees).
176. See Robert Drago, Share Schemes, Participatory Management and Work Norms,
23 REv. RADICAL POL. ECON. 55, 59 (1991) (discussing study of participation
schemes in Australia that found that such programs are more effective when work
force is homogeneous); see also Glew et al., supra note 162, at 405-06 (stating that
women and minorities tend to view themselves as not participating in decisionmak-
ing). Management demographics also appear relevant, in light of findings that
female managers tend to provide more frequent opportunities for employee in-
volvement than male managers. See id. at 406 (stating that female managers pro-
vided opportunities for participation more frequently than male managers,
resulting in increased offers of participation from employers); see also Judy B.
Rosener, Ways Women Lead, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 119, 120 (stating
that women "encourage participation").
177. See Jeffrey Gandz & Frederick G. Bird, The Ethics of Empowerment, 15 J.
Bus. ETHiCs 383, 387 (1996) (explaining that worker preference for hierarchy may
be learned through past behavior patterns).
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management. Introduction of participatory management within a firm
typically entails substantial change, which will threaten vested interests in
the workforce. Self-directed work teams threaten the seniority-and even
the jobs-of forepersons and other supervisory employees. Surviving su-
pervisors are thrust into new positions as "team consultants," rather than
bosses, with new and demanding responsibilities. Gain-sharing, pay for
skills and team-based compensation all threaten traditional seniority-based
compensation. Training may be resisted by some workers-the "old dogs"
who don't want to learn new tricks. The job rotation and stress on "con-
tinuous improvement," characteristic of self-directed work teams, will
threaten those workers who prefer a more mundane set of job
responsibilities.1 78
Studies of formalization-the creation of written rules, procedures
and instructions-provide an alternative explanation of the taste for hier-
archy.1 7 9 Formalization reduces role conflicts and ambiguity, which in-
creases work satisfaction and reduces feelings of alienation and stress. 180
In contrast, employee involvement can trigger role stress because many
employees lack the quasi-management skills-agenda building, conflict
management and problem-solving-required for successful employee in-
volvement. 181 Alienation can result from the greater workload and nega-
tive changes in peer group relationships experienced by some participants
in employee involvement. 18
2
Workers who respond well to formalization are poor candidates for
participatory management, and vice-versa. This hypothesis is supported by
findings that the success of a participatory management program largely
depends on the personality of workers and managers. 183 Workers with
weak desires for independence are unaffected by employee involvement,
178. See Parker, supra note 171, at 266 ("Kaizening [a component of
NUMMI's employee involvement program referring to continuous job improve-
ment] is supposed to be creative, but I mean how many times can you sit there and
Kaizen a job after you've done it for four and one-half years?"). NUMMI is the
well-known GM-Toyota joint venture. See id.
179. See Paul S. Adler & Bryan Borys, Two Types of Bureaucracy: Enabling and
Coercive, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 61, 61 (1996) (discussing studies that have found that
formalization results in coercive organization because it entails abrogation of indi-
vidual autonomy).
180. See id. at 62 (stating that formalization may reduce worker stress and
alienation).
181. See Why Doesn't This Team Work?, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 26,
30 (explaining that "[t]hese are people who just don't have the skills needed to
work constructively in teams-and who are unable or unwilling to acquire those
skills"). Several empirical studies have confirmed that training in these skills is an
essential component in successful employee involvement. See Ray W. Coye &James
A. Belohalv, An Exploratory Analysis of Employee Participation, 20 GRouP & ORG.
MGMT. 4, 4 (1995) (summarizing empirical studies).
182. See Glew et al., supra note 162, at 407-08 (explaining that some partici-
pants in employee involvement programs experience alienation).
183. See CoTroN, supra note 14, at 18 (comparing personalities of workers
and managers with regard to participatory management programs).
27
Bainbridge: Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Parti
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
while those with strong independence drives get increased job satisfaction
from it.' 8 4 Based on the various studies recounted above, both types of
workers appear to be present in the American workplace. Whether the
taste for participation or for hierarchy is more common is hard to say from
the evidence to date, but at the very least the "checkered history of job
enrichment efforts has taught us not to assume that everyone wants more
autonomy, challenge, and responsibility at work."' 85
Proponents of the papal position might dismiss such workers as being
unable to recognize their own needs. 1 86 Such an argument appears to be
implicit in Pope John Paul II's assertion that someone "is alienated if he
refuses to transcend himself and to live the experience of self-giving and
of the formation of an authentic human community oriented toward his
final destiny, which is God.' 8 7 This papal dictum smacks of the Aristote-
lian error of monistic perfectionism, which is the view that there is one
supremely valuable way of life. 1 88 Indeed, the Pope appears to make the
same error for which he condemned socialism; namely, the belief "that the
good of the individual can be realized without reference to his free
choice." 189
184. See id. (summarizing results of research); see also Glew et al., supra note
162, at 405 (summarizing studies finding that individuals with strong need for in-
dependence and low need for authority showed most productivity gains from par-
ticipatory management, while workers who need authority favor structured
hierarchy).
185. David E. Bowen & Edward E. Lawler, The Empowerment of Service Workers,
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring 1992, at 31, 39.
186. I note en passant that the heterogeneity of worker tastes is a principal
reason I have opted against evaluating arguments based on a Rawlsian conception
ofjustice. Trying to figure out what people would do behind the veil is necessarily
indeterminate once we concede the existence of differing tastes. A Rawlsian might
object that individuals behind the veil of ignorance are unencumbered by these
sorts of values and preferences. To imagine such an unencumbered self is, how-
ever, "not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person
wholly without character, without moral depth." MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179 (1982). Real people are capable of self-knowledge,
which the Rawlsian unencumbered self is incapable of in any morally significant
sense. See id. at 180 (comparing own character and ability of self-knowledge to
deontological self, which is without character and incapable of self-knowledge).
187. CENTESIMus ANNUS, supra note 2, 41.2, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE
& PEACE, supra note 2, at 464.
188. See Bradley, Pluralistic Perfectionism, supra note 71, at 677 (stating that Ar-
istotle's cardinal error was his monistic perfectionism, or that "there is one su-
premely valuable form of life that is the standard for everyone"). Bradley also
stated that "Aristotle mistakenly thought that a person's apparent failure, for
whatever reason, to live up to the contemplative ideal was an imperfection which
meant that that person was justly treated by public authority as an inferior." Id.
189. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 2, 13, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE
& PEACE, supra note 2, at 442. As one commentator observed of the comparable
claims made by the secular humanists:
Workers seem not always to share the aspirations for their class of the
radicals. Often, they seem to care less about managing the businesses
they work in than about being well organized to get good wages and con-
ditions of work, and other concessions, from their employers and the gov-
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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To be sure, my argument is only that worker tastes are heterogeneous.
Some workers do want to participate in corporate decisionmaking. Pre-
sumably, at least, some such workers also develop feelings of alienation
when they are denied participation rights. Should not their needs and
desires be factored into the public policy equation? But how do we decide
which set of preferences to privilege? Implicit in much of the papal and
secular literature in this area is the notion that the desire for participation
is somehow more authentic and, hence, more worthy of protection. In
this regard, much of the literature smacks of a variant of hard determin-
ism, asserting that choices made in accordance with a system of belief or
socially constructed values are inauthenic. 190 Even if one accepts the de-
terminist view, however, why is the choice to participate any more authen-
tic than the choice to refrain from participation? If one is socially
constructed and, hence, not authentic, is not the other equally socially
constructed?
I find it useful to recast the problem of choosing between competing
sets of preferences in economic terms. First, recall that prudence dictates
attention to long-term consequences before codifying purported natural
rights, which requires making predictions about the effect of new regula-
tions on human behavior. Making such predictions is one of the great
strengths of economic analysis. 19 1 Second, the economic concepts of
Pareto superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, along with the distinctions
between them, nicely capture the point I am trying to make in this
section. 1
92
To satisfy the Pareto superiority definition of efficiency, a transaction
must make at least one person better off and no one worse off.1 93 Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency does not require that no one be made worse off by a real-
location of resources. 19 4 Instead, it requires only that the resulting in-
emnment. Radicals sometimes put this down to their being affected by
'bourgeois' ideas or diverted from ambitions they would otherwise have
by bourgeois tastes and comforts. But many of the ideas and tastes that
critics of bourgeois society call bourgeois are no more bourgeois than
proletarian.
Plamenatz, supra note 157, at 298.
190. For a general discussion of hard determinism, see RachelJ. Littman, Ade-
quate Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction of Free Will, 60 ALB.
L. REv. 1127, 1137 (1997).
191. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Con-
tractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 856, 873, 886
(1997) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Community and Statism] (stating that economic
analysis makes reliable predictions about human behavior).
192. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 13-14 (4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs] (discussing economic concepts of
Pareto superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
193. See id. at 13 (stating that "[a] Pareto-superior transaction is one that
makes at least one person better off and no one worse off").
194. See id. at 13-14 (discussing requirements of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
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crease in wealth be sufficient to compensate the losers.19 5 Note that
although there does not need to be any actual compensation, compensa-
tion must be possible.19 6
Once the heterogeneity of worker tastes is conceded, government-
mandated participatory management cannot be defended on Pareto supe-
riority grounds. Those workers who have a taste for hierarchy would be
worse off under such a mandate. The case for government mandates thus
must be phrased in Kaldor-Hicks terms. For example, enough workers
with a taste for participation must benefit from compulsory employee in-
volvement to justify imposing it on all. If so, mandatory participatory man-
agement would be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, so long as the harm to workers
that lose would be offset by the gains made by winners.
The validity of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a guide to public policy is
sharply disputed.' 9 7 In particular, important strains of natural law theory
are clearly inconsistent with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. The Lockean strain,
for example, precludes the use of others as means to our own ends.' 98
The modern strain associated with Catholic thinkers such as Finnis and
German Grisez likewise proscribes doing evil that good may result.' 99 Be-
cause the Kaldor-Hicks standard permits uncompensated wealth transfers,
it runs afoul of these precepts.
The debate over Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, however, need not detain us
further because government-mandated participatory management cannot
be justified even under that lenient standard. I demonstrated this point in
detail elsewhere.2 00 In this Article, I want to emphasize three points di-
rectly relevant to the argument made by the papal encyclicals.
First, even conceding arguendo the Pope's argume'nts premised on
worker alienation, how far should the argument be pressed? The point is
essentially a prudential one. Many things in life impede self-fulfillment,
interfere with one's sense of personhood and give rise to feelings of aliena-
tion. Are they all to be regulated as well? Prudence, reinforced by the law
of unintended consequences, argues against such a course.
195. See id. (discussing compensation component under Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency).
196. See id. (explaining that compensation must be possible under Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency).
197. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 91-94 (1981) [herein-
after POSNER, ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE] (criticizing Kaldor-Hicks criterion because "it
does not ensure that utility will be maximized"); Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic
Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547, 554-55
(1993) (discussing Kaldor-Hicks in terms of public policy).
198. SeeJ. BUDZISZEWSKI, WRITTEN ON THE HEART: THE CASE FOR NATURAL
LAw 106 (1997) [hereinafter BUDZISZEWSKI, WRITTEN ON THE HEART] (explaining
that Lockean idea states "that we are not to use others as a means to our ends").
199. See id. at 198 (stating that doing some evil may produce good result).
200. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at 709-18 (evaluat-
ing leading arguments favoring mandatory employee involvement and concluding
that mandatory employee involvement is not Kaldor-Hicks efficient).
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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Second, government mandates can themselves interfere with the indi-
vidual's search for self-fulfillment. Hegel believed that freedom of con-
tract had value precisely because it permits each of the parties to the
contract to be recognized as formal equals, capable of exercising his or
her individual will. 20 1 In the employment contract context, the employee
achieves such recognition when he or she voluntarily enters into an agree-
ment with the prospective employer. In contrast, government mandates
deny the employee that recognition precisely because the employer is
compelled to offer the mandated benefits. 20 2 I develop this argument in
more detail below, demonstrating that the moral norms of our democratic
polity are inconsistent with government-mandated employee involvement.
Third and finally, it is far from clear that participating in corporate
decisionmaking is a useful way of addressing feelings of alienation. Just as
participatory management is unlikely to employ the creativity of most
workers in large enterprises, it seems equally unlikely to make their jobs
less dull. Moreover, there are many other sources of alienation in most
work environments over and above the decisionmaking process. Indeed,
some jobs are inherently boring and alienating, even under otherwise
ideal working conditions.
Participatory workplaces, therefore, can be just as alienating as hierar-
chical workplaces. 20 3 As we have seen, this is especially true of workers
who prefer hierarchy, but it may be true of all workers. In today's corpo-
rate world, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, participatory management is
used, not to prevent worker alienation, but mainly as a way of tapping
workers for information and to prevent shirking.20 4 Proponents of the
papal position might dismiss this argument (among others) by conceding
that present forms of employee involvement are, in their view, flawed, but
that some ideal form exists that would be more effective in promoting
human development. Such an argument, however, smacks of the "if only
people were different" fallacy. 205 Sound public policy must be based on
201. See Jonathan R. Macey, Firm-Specfic Human Capital Investments and Hege-
lian Ethics: A Comment on Cornell and Posner, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 505, 512 (1990)
[hereinafter Macey, Firm-Specific] (explaining that freedom of contract represents
autonomy and free will).
202. See id. at 512-13 (noting that government regulatory measures may deny
employees free will recognized in freedom of contract).
203. For an anecdotal account of one workplace in which quality circles ap-
pear to be quite alienating, see GUILLERMOJ. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS: QUAL-
ITY CIRCLES AND ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 23-31 (1988) (describing
workers' dissatisfaction with employer's policy to implement quality circles). Most
strikingly, this example is taken from a subsidiary of a corporation ranked first in a
survey of community and environmental responsibility. See id. at 32.
204. See Bainbridge, Organizational Failures Analysis, supra note 10 (finding
that managers institute participatory management to further informational and
monitoring interests, not for workers' benefit).
205. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 6 (1969) [hereinafter Demsetz, Information and Efficiency] (discussing
nature of human behavior).
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how people actually behave, not how we hope they would behave in an
ideal world.
In sum, arguments premised on worker self-fulfillment cannot justify
government-mandated participatory management. Mandates can only be
justified (to continue using economic terminology) if they are demonstra-
bly Pareto superior or, at least, Kaldor-Hicks efficient. In contrast, a free
market approach to employee involvement can be justified without having
to reach a firm conclusion on the efficiency issue. In other words, we do
not need to conclude either that all firms and workers need highly author-
itarian and rigidly hierarchical structures or that all need participatory de-
mocracy. Instead, if some firms and some workers prefer hierarchy, and
some prefer participation, a free market approach permits them to choose
the proper working environment for themselves.
To be clear, I am not arguing that a free market approach is perfect.
For example, in the absence of regulation, some firms may exploit their
workers.20 6 If the perfect should not be allowed to become the enemy of
the good, however, the question is not whether contracting in a free labor
market is a perfect system, but simply whether it is superior to possible
alternatives, specifically, government mandates imposed by legislative or
regulatory fiat. Although proponents of mandates are quick to assert the
market's flaws, they rarely acknowledge the equally glaring flaws of the
legislative process. I contend, therefore, that a free market approach is
superior to mandatory rules in enough respects tojustify incurring the risk
of occasional outcomes that are inefficient or appear to be unfair.
The capital, product and labor markets give corporate directors
strong incentives to seek rules that enable them to attract capital and labor
at the lowest possible CoSt. 2 0 7 Voluntary employee involvement will thus
be designed to meet specific firm needs relating to monitoring and infor-
mation transmission. In contrast, the incentives of legislators and regula-
tors are driven by rent-seeking and interest group politics, which have no
necessary correlation to corporate profit maximization. 20 8 Accordingly,
206. As I explain below in more detail, however, this concern is frequently
overstated in the promandate literature. For a further discussion, see infra notes
475-509 and accompanying text.
207. SeeJonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contrac-
tual Perspective, 18J. CORP. L. 185, 206 (1993) [hereinafter Macey, Corporate Law]
(noting that driving market forces for corporate directors are competition in capi-
tal market, competition in internal and external labor markets and competition in
products markets).
208. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRicKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991) (stating that proposition that leg-
islators and regulators are driven by rent-seeking and interest-group politics is ex-
treme form of basic tenet of public choice theory because it ignores possibility that
legislators sometimes pursue public interest and/or ideological goals). In general,
I concur with Jonathan Macey that "there is no reason to believe that politicians
and bureaucrats are any more benign, selfless, and impartial than the corporate
managers, directors, and controlling shareholders whose authority would be dis-
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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mandatory employee involvement is likely to be driven by the political
concerns of the governmental actors drafting the mandates.
The evidence from other countries strongly justifies this predic-
tion.209 As I explain below in more detail, government-mandated forms of
employee representation take shape in response to political forces, not
economic ones. Such programs are intended not to produce improved
employee attitudes or greater productivity, but to redistribute power
within firms from managers and shareholders to labor.2 10 In like manner,
mandatory employee involvement in this country doubtless would be in-
fected by interest group politics.
One possible scenario is that government intervention would be
designed to protect union interests. 2 11 Given the apparent decline in the
placed in a legal regime governed by mandatory rules." Macey, Corporate Law,
supra note 207, at 205.
209. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at 879-81 (describ-
ing weaknesses of Japanese and German mandatory employee participation
programs).
210. See COTTON, supra note 14, at 114-15 (stating that redistribution of power
will put labor on more equal footing with interests of management and
stockholders).
211. Cf Parker, supra note 171, at 252-53 (noting that automobile unions
tried to use political process to win influence over not just health and safety policy,
but also corporate pricing and investment decisions). Greater employee control
over the decisionmaking process leads to wealth transfers from shareholders to
employees. See id. Adoption of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1994), in 1947, for example, reduced shareholder wealth by about
15.9%. See Craig A. Olson & Brian E. Becker, The Effects of the NLRA on Stockholder
Wealth in the 1930s, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 116, 123 (1990) (analyzing drop in
stockholder wealth between Senate's introduction of NLRA and adoption of
NLRA). This is not surprising, given that rent-seeking on behalf of their members
is one function of unions. Cf POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS, supra note 192, at 321
(noting that classical economic theory treats unions as labor monopoly). Faithful
union leaders should use the political process to maximize the wealth of their con-
stituents. This conclusion arguably would render union opposition to employee
involvement somewhat surprising if these plans actually shift power to workers,
which supports the hypothesis that such programs are not intended to empower
workers, but rather to provide new mechanisms for monitoring their productivity
and tapping their knowledge. Many union-oriented observers see participatory
management as simply a sophisticated anti-union device; at the very least, it seems
fair to say that such programs erode union support and power. See MASAHIKO
AoI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM 131 (1984) (finding that
union activists view participatory programs as potentially anti-union); GRENIER,
supra note 203, at 20-21 (stating that "union leaders have expressed concern that
the boom in work innovations, participation programs for employees . . . repre-
sents a new wave of management initiated anti-union control mechanisms"); Rob-
ert B. Moberly, Worker Participation After Electromation and Du Pont, in RESTORING
THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAw 147, 157 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds.,
1994) (examining how committees may actually diminish union bargaining power
and effectiveness); Virk, supra note 3, at 746 (viewing unions as incompatible with
participatory management model). Such concerns are buttressed by evidence that
cases in which the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) invalidated employee
involvement programs Under NLRA section 8(a) (2) almost uniformly involve em-
ployer use of various anti-union tactics. See James R. Rundle, The Debate Over the
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power of organized private-sector labor unions as special interest groups,
however, this scenario is perhaps unlikely. 212 A more plausible scenario
may be that mandatory employee involvement programs would be drafted
in a way that benefits politically powerful large businesses, but may not
benefit smaller firms, especially if big business and organized labor join
forces. 213 In any case, the main point is that a proposal to mandate partic-
ipation would quickly become little more than a political football between
competing interest groups, with very little reason to believe that the out-
come will be either morally or economically optimal.
Let us assume, however, that one could find a legislative or regulatory
body that was willing to act solely in the public interest with respect to
employee involvement. Let us further assume employee involvement is in
the public interest. A legislative solution would still be less desirable than
allowing the market to function, even under such assumptions. Legisla-
tors and regulators necessarily have less information about the needs of a
particular firm than do that firm's employees, managers and directors. A
fortiori, legislatures will make poorer decisions than the firm's constitu-
ents. 2 14 Put another way, legislators and regulators are no less subject to
bounded rationality than any other decisionmakers. Just as the limits on
cognitive competence impede the ability of market actors to write com-
plete contracts, bounded rationality necessarily impedes the development
of detailed legislative solutions. 215 The legislative task is further compli-
Ban on Employer-Dominated Labor Organizations: What is the Evidence, in RESTORING
THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAw, supra, at 161, 166-73 (stating that NLRB
rarely ordered disestablishment under NLRA section 8(a) (2) if it found no other
unfair labor practices). A more nuanced account is provided by Weiler, who notes
that participatory management may shift the locus of union power from the na-
tional level to the local level, and from officers to members, which would account
for the opposition by union leaders. See WEILER, supra note 164, at 37.
212. Cf GRENIER, supra note 203, at 178-79 (noting deteriorating political
power of organized labor with respect to labor law revisions); RAYMOND L. HOGLER
& GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR LAW IN THE AMERI-
CAN WORKPLACE 91-92 (1992) (same).
213. See Kevin G. Salwen, To Some Small Firms, Idea of Cooperating With Labor is
Foreign, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1993, at Al (stating that many small businesses actively
resist employee unionization, seeing it as something more appropriate for large
corporations).
214. Cf Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALl Code, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 984, 996 (1993) (noting that legislatures will make poorer decisions than
corporation's constituents with respect to corporate governance rules). The prob-
lem is not just lack of information about particular firms, but also lack of informa-
tion about the market as a whole. See Pete Hoekstra, Mandated Cooperation: A '90s
Oxymoron, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1993, at A14 (arguing against Ford-Kennedy Bill,
which mandates employee involvement programs). Congressman Pete Hoekstra
opined: "Today's congressional proposals are 15 to 20 years behind the cutting
edge of today's marketplace. Do we want government to promote already-out-
dated ideas, or rather to give companies the flexibility to experiment and deter-
mine what works best for their unique circumstances?" Id.
215. See Hoekstra, supra note 214, at A14 (stating that lack of flexibility and
thoughtfulness in legislative solutions will lead to destruction of cooperative em-
ployer-employee relations).
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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cated because any mandatory policy promulgated in this area would en-
compass countless firms in numerous industries. As a result, legislative
action is likely to take on a one-size-fits-all approach, which in turn is un-
likely to fit anyone.
In sum, regulatory initiatives that go beyond privately negotiated
agreements likely will leave all parties worse off.2 16 Investor and worker
preferences vary, but mandatory rules prohibit them from customizing
their firm's operating rules to meet those individual preferences. In the
face of such rules, firms for whom employee involvement is inefficient will
have higher labor costs, which may lead them to move offshore or to tem-
porary workers. 2 17 In contrast, enabling rules allow firms to develop inno-
vative modifications to their rules in response to changing conditions.2 18
B. Participation as a Means of Self-Actualization in Secular
Humanist Literature
In its emphasis on self-fulfillment, Catholic social teaching somewhat
resembles secular humanist literature because both flirt with the error of
idolatry by over-emphasizing the self.2 19 Catholic social teaching, how-
ever, is redeemed by its concomiunt emphasis on the faith relationship
with God. 220 In contrast with Catholic thought, secular humanist litera-
ture emphasizes a psychological concept of self-actualization that goes be-
yond merely flirting with error to become wholly inconsistent with the
conception of human nature inherent in Western natural law. 22 1
In a widely cited article, organizational psychologist Marshall Sashkin
claimed that participation is a basic human need. 222 As his argument
goes, human needs include autonomy, interpersonal contact and mean-
216. SeeJonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments and the
Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuKE L.J. 173, 200-01 [here-
inafter Macey, Externalities] (stating that parties are worse off when regulatory ini-
tiatives supersede private agreements).
217. See Marc Linder & Larry Zacharies, Opening Coase's Other Black Box: Why
Workers Submit to Vertical Integration into Firms, 18J. CORP. L. 371, 373 (1993) (stating
that many firms are using temporary workers to avoid plethora of regulatory con-
straints existing in labor market).
218. See Macey, Externalities, supra note 216, at 194 (stating that enabling rules
allow firms to modify their rules as conditions change).
219. See PAUL C. VITZ, PSYCHOLOGY AS RELIGION: THE CULT OF SELF-WORSHIP
93 (1977) ("To worship one's self (in self-realization) or to worship humanity is, in
Christian terms, simple idolatry operating from the usual motive of unconscious
egotism.").
220. See id. at 101 ("The individual Christian ... has many guides to keep him
[or her] away from extreme selfishness. First, there is the love of God, expressed
in faith .... ").
221. See Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 223 (discussing development
of self-actualization concept in humanistic psychology).
222. See Sashkin, Participative Management, supra note 141, at 10 (finding inter-
personal contact to be basic need at work).
775
35
Bainbridge: Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Parti
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ingfulness. 223 Hierarchical workplaces deny these needs and, as a result,
"the worker is made to feel infantile-a psychologically unnatural and un-
healthy state."22 4
In legal literature, a similar position is staked out by Lewis Solomon,
who relies on Abraham Maslow's "humanistic psychology" to argue, inter
alia, that employees have a right to participate in corporate decisionmak-
ing. 225 Maslow contends that humans develop in different stages, at each
of which they have different needs. 226 Maslow's theory is hierarchical and
chronological-as people progress through the various stages, the needs
typical of the next developmental level become their dominant mo-
tivators. 22 7 The first four levels are referred to as "deficiency needs"; i.e.,
those needs that recur and must be repeatedly satisfied-physiological
needs, such as food and water; safety; belongingness; and self-esteem. 228
The fifth, final and highest stage is the need for self-actualization, which
Maslow describes as a "growth need," one whose gratification leads to self-
fulfillment and maximized potential. 229 According to Maslow, self-actual-
ized individuals "are characterized by a superior perception of reality,
spontaneity, autonomy, freshness of appreciation, richness of emotional
reaction, improved interpersonal relations, increased creativity, increased
acceptance of self, of others, and of nature." 230
Solomon uses Maslow's hierarchy of needs to make a number of
claims about corporate law, several of which relate to the problem at
hand.23 1 One is an empirical claim which states that "[m]odern business
executives have sought to create a work environment in which people are
encouraged to self-actualize." 232 According to Solomon, this practice is
exemplified by Douglas McGregor's "Theory Y," which is one of the theo-
retical underpinnings of modern participatory management. 233 Solomon
223. See id. at 10-11 (stating that three basic human work needs are autonomy,
meaningful work and interpersonal, task-relevant contact).
224. Id. at 10.
225. See Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 221-34 (using Abraham Mas-
low's humanistic psychology to support statement that decentralization of business
organizations and greater employee involvement in decisionmaking leads to
greater productivity).
226. See id. at 222-23 (citing ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONAL-
iTv 35-47 (1954)).
227. See id. (stating that humans develop at different stages and are motivated
by different needs at each stage).
228. See id. (summarizing first four needs).
229. See id. (discussing need for self-actualization).
230. Id. at 224.
231. See Lewis D. Solomon, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate
Constituency Debate, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 321, 33842 (1990) [hereinafter Solomon,
Humanistic Economics] (stating that Maslow's human-needs theory is basis for em-
ployee participation); Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 222 (describing how
businesses have incorporated aspects of Maslow's theory into corporate structure).
232. Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 225.
233. See id. at 225-26 (explaining concepts in Douglas McGregor's "Theory
[Vol. 43: p. 741
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/1
1998] PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT AND NATURAL LAW 777
asserts that participatory firms are more productive and profitable.2 34 The
difficulty with Solomon's empirical claim, of course, is that it is not sup-
ported by the evidence. As we have seen, and as I have demonstrated else-
where in more detail, modern participatory management is simply old
wine in new skins. 235 It is intended to foster information channels within
the firm and to prevent shirking by employees-precisely the same goals
of supposedly old-fashioned Taylorism. Claims that participatory manage-
ment universally-or even generally-enhances productivity and profit-
ability also remain unproved, if they have not been affirmatively disproved.
Solomon's normative claim is that humans "need to achieve a better
balance between materialistic and spiritual aspects of life."2 36 Because
corporations are created by the state, society may legitimately demand of
them not "only efficient production of goods and services, but recognition
of, and action toward solving, societal problems and improving the quality
of life." 237 Although he acknowledges that some workers will prefer hierar-
chical organizations in the workplace, 23 8 Solomon's normative position
translates into a preference for worker ownership and participation.
239
An ideal society, in his view, "is one that encourages change and enables
each member to achieve his [or her] full potential."240 This is so not only
because of the superior moral and physical characteristics of self-actual-
ized people, but also because individual self-actualization redounds to the
benefits of society as a whole. 24 1 He posits that "[g]reater [worker] in-
volvement in decisionmaking at work will allow for greater concern by in-
dividuals for other aspects of life. This concern will lead to more satisfying
lives and perhaps a more effective political process in which people be-
come involved in the decisions that affect their lives." 24 2 Social policy can-
not create self-actualized people, but it can promote and encourage self-
234. See id. at 226 (stating that firms with participatory programs are more
profitable); Solomon, Humanistic Economics, supra note 231, at 344 (explaining that
employee participation increases productivity and efficiency).
235. See Bainbridge, Organizational Failures Analysis, supra note 10 (rejecting
argument that Taylorism and participatory management fundamentally differ).
236. Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 234.
237. Solomon & Collins, supra note 19, at 341. This argument appears to be a
variant on the old concession theory, pursuant to which the corporation was re-
garded as a quasi-state actor exercising powers delegated by the state. It has been a
long time since mainstream corporate legal theory took the concession theory seri-
ously. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407, 433-36 (1989) (stating that most advocates of
government regulation no longer emphasize concession theory).
238. See Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 247-48 (stating that some work-
ers prefer nonparticipation and hierarchical organizations).
239. See id. at 251 (noting that some employees prefer worker ownership and
participation).
240. Solomon, Humanistic Economics, supra note 231, at 338.
241. See id. at 340 ("[S]elf-actualized people use their potentials for creative
results that are beneficial to themselves and society as a whole.").,
242. Solomon & Collins, supra note 19, at 337.
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actualization. 24 3 Because bureaucratic and hierarchical workplaces stifle
self-actualization, while participatory workplaces promote it, social policy
should encourage employee involvement. 244 In one of his earliest articles
on this subject, for example, Solomon proposed creating a federal agency
empowered to review corporate decisionmaking mechanisms to ensure
that they gave reasonable opportunity for employee involvement. 2 45 Solo-
mon's later work acknowledges various obstacles to achieving his desired
policy outcomes, which lead him to believe that some form of radical
shock to the political and economic system may be necessary before they
can be achieved. 2
46
Much of my critique of Catholic social teaching on worker participa-
tion applies in full force to secular humanist literature. In particular,
many of the erroneous empirical claims made by the former are echoed by
the latter, especially the notion that people generally want not only mean-
ingful work, but also the right to participate in firm decisionmaking. 247
Secular humanist scholarship, however, raises additional concerns that de-
serve close scrutiny.
Chief among these concerns is the philosophical concept of the au-
thentic self, which is implicit in the psychological concept of self-actualiza-
tion. 248 As Maslow constructed it, the authentic self resembles a tootsie
243. See Solomon, Humanistic Economics, supra note 231, at 341 (stating that
social policy can create environment that promotes self-actualization).
244. See id. at 342 (describing weaknesses of bureaucratic organizations and
need for decentralization to promote human growth); see also Lewis D. Solomon,
On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held
Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WAsti. & LEE L. REV. 1625, 1632 (1993) [here-
inafter Solomon, Frontier of Capitalism] (encouraging employee involvement to
achieve self-actualization).
245. See Solomon & Collins, supra note 19, at 351 (advocating federal agency
to promote goals).
246. See, e.g., Solomon, Frontier of Capitalism, supra note 244, at 1670-71 (admit-
ting obstacles to employee involvement).
247. See, e.g., Solomon, Humanistic Economics, supra note 231, at 344 (stating
that "employees want and need control over their work"); see also Solomon, Perspec-
tives, supra note 38, at 238-39 (asserting that employees want work that is meaning-
ful and empowering). While Solomon now makes a more tempered set of claims
that acknowledge that the search for meaningful and participatory work is not
universal, the thrust of his argument still privileges those who seek self-transcen-
dence. See id. at 240, 256 (stating that individuals with traditional beliefs and those
who desire participatory work "must strike a balance," but concluding that em-
ployee participation in decisionmaking will lead to overall enrichment).
248. See, e.g., MASLOW, supra note 144, at 3-4 (discussing authentic self). In his
most recent work, Solomon has somewhat backed off his reliance on Maslow's hu-
manistic psychology in favor of something called "transpersonal psychology,"
which is said to connote "exceptional mental health that enables an individual to
evolve to states of consciousness that transcend the normal limitations of the ego."
Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 228. Transpersonal psychology is also attrib-
uted to Maslow, but to the work done at the end of his life, in which he added a
sixth human need; namely, self-transcendence, the need to transcend the normal
ego. See id. at 228-34 (explaining Maslow's idea of transcendence). According to
Solomon, the shift to transpersonal psychology solves various communitarian con-
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pop-there is an innate self at the core of personality, surrounded by lay-
ers of false consciousness created by social conditioning. 249 This authen-
tic, presocial self is uncovered through the process of self-actualization.
Maslow's model is problematic on three levels. First, it is inconsistent
with the mainstream of modern psychology. Except for humanists like
Maslow, modern psychology treats the self as a mixture of innate qualities
and social influences. 250 The two elements are not easily disentangled.
The innate self is transformed by each experience and, in turn, becomes
the new baseline from which further development begins.
251
Second, the authentic self is normatively troubling for those of us who
reject modern left-liberalism. On some issues, left-liberalism smacks of
classical liberalism and modern libertarianism; on others, left-liberalism
smacks of statism. 252 The state is thus denied the power to punish certain
choices (most notably those relating to sexuality), while others (most nota-
bly those relating to economic life) are subject to paternalistic state inter-
vention. 253 The authentic self is the philosophical vehicle through which
left-liberalism achieves this outcome. Private consensual sexual conduct is
claimed to be a product of the authentic self and thus immune from regu-
lation, while various economic choices are defined as the inauthentic
product of social influences and thus subject to regulation.2 54 But the
authentic self is too weak a reed to bear this normative load. It provides
no mechanism for distinguishing authentic choices from those that are
the product of social influences, except the normative preferences of the
speaker.255
Third and finally, the authentic self and self-actualization are inconsis-
tent with Western moral traditions. Here we must draw a distinction be-
tween Catholic social teaching and the secular humanist accounts.
Although I believe the privileged position given work and self-fulfillment
cerns associated with self-actualization's emphasis on individual autonomy. See id.
at 228 (stating that weaknesses of humanistic psychology are reason for develop-
ment of transpersonal psychology). In my judgment, however, the shift does not
solve the problems I address below. Indeed, in some respects, transpersonal psy-
chology compounds the problem. According to Maslow, the self-transcendent per-
son becomes "divine or godlike." Id. at 231 n.72 (citing ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE
FARTHER REACHES OF HUMAN NATURE 274-75 (1971)). The search for self-transcen-
dence thus smacks of the sins of those who built the Tower of Babel, thereby ad-
ding hubris to the errors of self-actualization.
249. SeeJohn Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept of the Core Self: Toward a Rec-
onciliation of Naturalism and Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 289, 356-58 (1997) [here-
inafter Hill, Core Sel (distinguishing between innate self and social self).
250. See id. at 359-60 (stating that most contemporary psychologists view self
as multilevel layering of social and biological influences).
251. See id. at 360 (discussing role of experience on one's innate self).
252. See id. at 358 (discussing how concept of authenticity permits modern
left-liberal to choose both traditional libertarianism and authoritarianism).
253. See id. (discussing choices that are subject to state regulation).
254. See id. (differentiating between private conduct and economic choices).
255. See id. at 360 (stating flaw of authentic self theory).
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by the social teaching is both theologically and economically problematic,
the social teaching is redeemed in large measure because it recognizes
that self-fulfillment comes only in relation to the Deity. 256 In contrast,
Sashkin's and Solomon's arguments are based on the secular notion that
self-realization is the highest human goal and the height of emotional de-
velopment. 257 These arguments dismiss those who pursue goals laid down
by others, including believers in religious morality, as outer-directed and
emotionally stunted.
Maslow's secular humanist psychology thus shifts the emphasis from
God to self. Traditional concepts of virtue, which emphasize self-denial,
give way to a secular psychology that emphasizes self-actualization and self-
fulfillment. Maslow's emphasis on self-actualization is not the only strand
of this self-centered psychology. Erich Fromm argued, for example, that
vice is indifference to one's self and virtue is self-affirmation. 258 Carl Rog-
ers's client-centered therapy promoted self-direction and self-confi-
dence. 259 Rollo May, influenced by existentialism, stressed the process of
choice as the means to becoming oneself.260 As with Maslow, each was a
self-confessed secular-humanist. All believed in human beings, not in
God. Fromm, for example, held that if the sacred exists, its center is the
self,26 1 and Maslow held that the ideal self-actualized individual is
nonreligious. 262
Contrast the treatment of creativity by Maslow and its treatment in
Christian thought.263 Creativity is a defining characteristic of Maslow's
ideally self-actualized human.26 4 Participatory management's attractive-
ness for those influenced by Maslow stems from the resulting emphasis on
self-expression. By encouraging workers to express their creativity, em-
ployee involvement helps them become more fully self-actualized. Christi-
256. See, e.g., CENTESIMUs ANNUS, supra note 2, 41, reprinted in PROCLAIMING
JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 463 (stating that through gift of self and relation-
ship with God, people will find themselves).
257. See Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 223 (stating that self-actualiza-
tion is highest level of fulfillment person can obtain); see also Sashkin, Participative
Management, supra note 141, at 14 (noting that organizations that do not meet
workers' need for self-realization will have considerable costs).
258. See VITz, supra note 219, at 19 (explaining "that the character structure
of the mature and integrated personality, the productive character constitutes...
'virtue,' and that 'vice,' ... is indifference to one's own self and self-mutilation").
259. See id. at 21 (noting that Rogers's therapy promotes self-direction and
self-confidence).
260. See id. at 26 (commenting that May emphasized that role of choice is
essential in becoming oneself).
261. See id. at 20 (stating that if sacred exists, its center is in self and "selves of
others").
262. See id. at 24 (stating that secularization correlates with self-actualization).
263. See id. at 23, 102 (comparing idea of creativity in Christian thought and
Maslow's theory).
264. See id. at 23 (noting that Maslow referred to creativity as "universal hall-
mark" of ideal person).
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anity rejects an emphasis on original or creative self-expression. 265
Instead, Christian creativity finds expression through reflecting the eter-
nal beauty of the divine.266 Put another way, because humans were cre-
ated in God's image, they should imitate God's creative work. 267 In doing
so, humans become not self-actualized, but virtuous. Indeed, the virtues
associated with a free-market economy-honesty, industriousness, pa-
tience, deferred gratification and the like-are all extolled by the
Church. 2
68
Sashkin's and Solomon's analysis also differs from Christianity in its
view of work.269 Protestantism views work as a calling from God to be
approached in an attitude of service. 270 An important strain of Catholic
thought, represented by Michael Novak, takes a similar view of work.2 71 In
this tradition, work is not an occasion for self-actualization, but rather a
calling from God.27 2 Treating work as a vocation, however, does not nec-
essarily mean that work is supposed to be a means of self-fulfillment. The
Fall's direct consequence, as we have seen, was to render much of work
inherently boring and unfulfilling.273 Being granted the right to partici-
pate in decisions about unfulfilling work seems unlikely to transform that
work into something fulfilling. Tedium and painful toil will still await
some workers, no matter how democratic we make the workplace decision-
making process.
Besides its rejection of traditional Western religion, the secular hu-
manist view of self-actualization also conflicts with a proper understanding
of human nature. 274 Those who wish humans to become self-actualized
265. See id. at 102 (emphasizing that Christians should develop their abilities
to serve God better rather than focus on being creative).
266. See id. (noting that creating beauty comes through reflection of eternal
beauty and wisdom).
267. See id. at 91, 102-04 (stating that because God created humans in God's
image, creativity should reflect eternal wisdom).
268. See Oliver F. Williams, Introduction to Co-CRF.ATION AND CAPITALISM, supra
note 134, at 1, 9 (noting that habits and virtues required to participate in free
market, such as honesty, industriousness, patience and deferred gratification, are
extolled by Church).
269. For a discussion of Sashkin's and Solomon's views of work as a means of
self-actualization, see supra notes 222-46 and accompanying text.
270. See Roger B. Hill, History of the Work Ethic (visited Jan. 15, 1999) <http://
www.coe.uga.edu/-rhill/workethic/hist.htm>.
271. See generally MICHAEL NovAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING: WORK AND THE Ex-
AMINED LIFE (1996) [hereinafter NovAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING] (describing work,
particularly business, as calling from God).
272. See id. at 38-39.
273. Even work performed by professional elites can be quite tedious, as any
law firm associate will confirm. See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving
the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal
Labor Markets of Elite Firms, 84 VA. L. REv. 1581 (forthcoming 1999) (describing
unrewarding "paper work" performed by many law firm associates).
274. See Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 232 (discussing transpersonal
theories). Solomon's most recent work in this area goes beyond secular humanism
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believe that humans are intrinsically good, and that evil or vice comes into
the world through socialization that denies the self its potential for growth
and fulfillment. 275 The pursuit of self-fulfillment is the highest human
goal, and all humans have the capacity to become fully self-actualized.2 76
Maslow thus provided the psychological basis upon which modern left-lib-
eralism grounds its belief that education, positive legislation and alteration
of environment can produce humans like gods. 2 77 This belief denies that
humanity has a natural proclivity toward violence and sin. 278 In contrast, a
strong strand of traditional Western thought is far more skeptical about
human perfectibility. 2 79
The imperfectibility of humans is, of course, a basic tenet of Christian-
ity.280 The Church regards the vices of pride, vanity, jealousy, greed and
insatiable desires as an intrinsic part of human nature since the "Fall of
Man." 28 ' This theological claim is confirmed by studies of both human
and animal behavior. The vast weight of evidence suggests that aggression
is an intrinsic property of human nature. 282 In contrast, Maslow's studies
of purportedly self-actualized individuals have been criticized as scientifi-
cally flawed.28 3 Maslow had no control group and he did not preserve
data on how his subjects were selected. 28 4 As B.F. Skinner asked of Carl
Rogers, "What evidence is there that a client ever becomes truly self
directing?" 285
Christianity sets forth not self-perfection, but self-denial, as an aspira-
tion. 28 6 It teaches not self-love, but rather an orientation towards God and
other people. 287 To be sure, there is a Christian form of self-affirmation,
to draw explicit and approving analogies to "Eastern religions and non-Western
psychologies." Id.
275. See id. at 243 (proposing that human nature is essentially good).
276. See MASLOW, supra note 144, at 46-47 (discussing need for self-
actualization).
277. SeeJohn Lawrence Hill, Mill, Freud, and Skinner: The Concept of the Self and
the Moral Psychology of Liberalism, 26 SETON HALL L. Rv. 92, 133 (1995) [hereinafter
Hill, Mill, Freud, and Skinner] (discussing process by which humans become like
gods).
278. See VITZ, supra note 219, at 41, 45 (discussing convictions of "selfists" re-
garding intrinsic goodness); see also Hill, Mill, Freud, and Skinner, supra note 277, at
133; cf. Solomon, Perspectives, supra note 38, at 243 (stating that "we are mostly
good").
279. See VITZ, supra note 219, at 49 (criticizing selfist position that human na-
ture is primarily good).
280. See id. at 91 (recognizing that people are sinful).
281. See id. (discussing sinful nature of humans).
282. See id. at 38 (stating that aggression is present in humans at birth).
283. See id. at 42 (criticizing Maslow's studies of purportedly self-actualized
individuals).
284. See id. (observing that clinical setting does not satisfy rigid scientific
standards).
285. Id. at 51.
286. See id. at 91 (noting that Christian purpose is to "lose the self").
287. See id. at 96 (discussing Commandments' precedence over self-love).
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but it is not the humanist's unqualified affirmation of the self. Christians
affirm only those aspects of the self that derive from our creation in God's
image (e.g., rationality, moral responsibility and the capacity for love),
while denying those aspects of the self deriving from the Fall (e.g., selfish-
ness, covetousness, malice, hypocrisy and pride). Agape love-the highest
Christian virtue-requires the sacrifice of self in the service of others. 288
Thus, Christian forms of self-affirmation include a strong element of self-
denial.
Indeed, Christians ought to view the search for self-actualization as
quite sinful. Maslow and others thought that low self-esteem was a great
obstacle to self-fulfillment. 289 In the quest to bring humans to realize
their full potential (to become fully self-actualized), they therefore pro-
moted high self-esteem. 290 Thus, the self remains the focal point of both
the problem and its cure. For Christians, called upon to lose themselves,
this is the sin of idolatry, which is the personification and deification of
the human will.29 1
C. The Revolt of the Elites
At least insofar as secular humanist argument is concerned, query
whether we face what might be called a "Revolt of the Elites" problem. 29 2
The reference, of course, is to Christopher Lasch's argument that the val-
ues and attitudes of the professional and managerial elites, and those of
the working classes, have dramatically diverged. 29 3 In that regard, con-
sider John Witte's finding that activist employees, defined as those most
likely to seek an active role in participatory management, were atypical in
a number of significant respects. 29 4 They tended to be white males who
were younger, more politically active and better educated than their
peers.2 95 They also tended to be far more ambitious than their peers,
288. See id. at 100 (describing Christian love as "[s]trong, outflowing love of
each particular human being, warts and all").
289. See MASLOW, supra note 144, at 45 (discussing "esteem needs").
290. See id. at 46-47 (discussing self-actualization).
291. See VITz, supra note 219, at 93 (noting that worshiping one's self or hu-
manity is idolatry).
292. Cf Hauerwas, supra note 150, at 48-49 (describing Pope John Paul II's
view of work as "romantic and elitist"); MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC
CAPITALISM 434-35 (1982) [hereinafter NovAK, DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM] (noting
that antipathy to capitalism is highest among certain elites, including clergy).
293. See LASCH, supra note 84, at 25-41 (analyzing divergence of values and
attitudes between working class and elite classes).
294. See WrrrE, supra note 162, at 54 (stating that activist employees "were not
typical members of the workforce").
295. See id. (describing characteristics of activist employees). One study of
participation schemes in Australia found that such programs appear to be more
effective when the work force is homogeneous. See Drago, supra note 176, at 59
(providing insight into Australian programs). If this is also true of American work-
ers, this implies that employee involvement programs will be adversely affected by
current legal and market conditions relating to diversity in the workplace.
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while simultaneously being less tractable to supervision.2 9 6 Is it instructive
that, setting aside race and gender, Witte's description of activist employ-
ees is a fair description of most academics?
If academic and other cultural elites have a taste for participating in
decisions affecting them that is not necessarily shared by workers, the secu-
lar humanist argument becomes another form of monistic perfectionism.
It fails to allow for the diversity of preferences revealed by human experi-
ence. Worse yet, it fails to recognize that people are fulfilled in part by
choosing not only their own preferences, but also how to pursue them.
George Bernard Shaw's reworking of the Golden Rule seems apt: "Do not
do unto others as you would have that they do unto you. They may have
different tastes."2 97
IV. HuMAN DIGNITY
Human dignity is a major emphasis of both Catholic social teaching
and the secular humanist literature. 298 Marleen O'Connor, for example,
expects firms to recognize that "employee participation in workplace gov-
ernance is valuable because it achieves human values by enhancing worker
dignity."299 Catholic social teaching goes even further, treating human
dignity as the very well-spring of human rights.300 Pope John Paul II, for
example, affirms "the transcendent dignity of the human person who, as
the visible image of the invisible God, is therefore by his very nature the
subject of rights which no one may violate." 30 1
The difficulty with arguments founded on assertions about human
dignity is illustrated by those that rely on variants of the categorical imper-
ative; i.e., the Kantian claim that individuals are entitled to be treated as an
296. See WITTE, supra note 162, at 55-56 (finding differences between activist
employees and other employees in amount of ambition).
297. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 24 (1974).
298. See, e.g., BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 39, 1 13-14, reprinted in THE CATH-
OLIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39, app. (describing human dignity as essential right).
299. Marlene O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring
the Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit Agreements [hereinafter
O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice], in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw 234 (Law-
rence Mitchell ed., 1995).
300. See SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES (1965) [hereinafter
GAUDIUM ET SPES], reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 157
(revealing teachings of human dignity).
301. CENTESlMUS ANNUS, supra note 2, 1 44.1, reprinted in PROCLAIMINGJUSTICE
& PEACE, supra note 2, at 466-67; see id. 11.2, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE &
PEACE, supra note 2, at 440 (stating that "beyond the rights which man acquires by
his own work, there exist rights which do not correspond to any work he performs
but which flow from his essential dignity as a person"); see also LABOREM EXERCENS,
supra note 123, 1 9.3, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 366
(stating that humans "should not experience a lowering of [their] own dignity" in
work).
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end in themselves, not as a means to someone else's end.30 2 One sees
echoes of this view in some natural law scholarship, notably that of John
Finnis, who opines that individuals are entitled to the dignity of being re-
sponsible moral agents, which requires that they not be made "to live their
lives for the convenience of others."30 3 Some of those holding such views
further assert that individuals are therefore entitled to participate in the
decisions that affect them.30 4 But why? As a general matter, the categori-
cal imperative's indeterminacy is "notorious." 30 5 Moreover, conceding ar-
guendo the categorical imperative's validity, its relevance to participatory
management is not obvious. In most systems of government other than
New England town meetings, for example, citizens do not have the right
to participate directly in decisions that affect them. Why should economic
life be different?
My point is not that concern for human dignity is irrelevant to the
moral status of participatory management. My point is only that human
dignity is an indeterminate concept requiring greater specification and
assessment. In Catholic social teaching, substantial content is given to the
concept of human dignity by reference to the quest for self-fulfillment,
which we have already examined.3 0 6 A review of the literature, however,
identifies three distinct ways in which further content might be given to
the concept of human dignity as it relates to employee involvement. First,
participation in corporate decisionmaking may promote trusting relation-
ships between employees and employers. 30 7 Second, employee involve-
ment purportedly promotes workplace democracy.30 8 Third and finally,
participation may protect important employee interests. 30 9
302. See Peter J. Riga, Authority in Morality, 41 AM. J. JuRus. 307, 311 (1996)
("The Kantian demand is to treat others as yourself, as ends, as persons and never
as means.").
303. FINNIs, NATURAL LAw, supra note 28, at 272.
304. See generally Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of
the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 65 (1995)
(arguing that individuals are entitled to participate in decisions that affect them);
see also Manuel G. Velasquez, Ethics, Religion and the Modern Business Corporation,
reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39, at 55, 60 (asserting that indi-
viduals have right to self-determination).
305. See BUDZISZEWSKI, WRITTEN ON THE HEART, supra note 198, at 198 (dis-
cussing "emptiness of... Categorical Imperative").
306. See, e.g., MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 158, 83, reprinted in PROCLAIM-
INC JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 97 (arguing that human dignity is served by
quest for self-fulfillment).
307. For a discussion of how participation in corporate decisionmaking may
promote trusting relationships between employees and employers, see infra notes
310-431 and accompanying text.
308. For a discussion of how employee involvement may promote workplace
democracy, see infra notes 432-74 and accompanying text.
309. For a discussion of how employee participation may protect employee
interests, see infra notes 475-549 and accompanying text.
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A. Trust
A number of scholars have advanced trust-based arguments in favor of
government-mandated employee involvement. 310 In legal literature, the
most visible proponent of such arguments is Marleen O'Connor, who con-
tends that labor-management relations policy must take into account
"goodwill trust," which she defines as "the feeling that trading partners
possess a moral commitment to maintain the relationship." 31 At the core
of her argument is Harvey Leibenstein's concept of X-inefficiency, which
is the gap between the firm's actual productive output and the output
level that could be achieved under ideal circumstances. 3 12 The size of this
gap is supposedly affected by the way in which a firm treats its employees.
As the theory goes, workers who view their job as part of a collaborative
process will shirk less than workers who are subjected to traditional hierar-
chical monitoring:3 1 3
Leibenstein explains that firms have an incentive to increase
profits by obtaining the maximum amount of work effort at the
lowest cost in terms of working conditions. Similarly, workers
have an incentive to obtain the best working conditions in return
for the lowest amount of effort possible. Under the prisoners'
dilemma solution, employees supply the lowest effort possible, re-
gardless of the motivations provided by managers. Similarly,
managers will provide low motivations, regardless of the effort
put forth by employees. In contrast, if the parties trust each
other to cooperate, it is possible to attain the "golden rule solu-
tion," in which employees provide maximum effort in return for
optimal working conditions and wages.3 14
310. See, e.g., O'Connor, Promoting EconomicJustice, supra note 299, at 222 (dis-
cussing trust-based argument for mandatory employee involvement); Hyde, supra
note 166, at 191-94 (advancing trust-based justification for employee ownership of
enterprise).
311. O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice, supra note 299, at 222.
312. See generally HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FiRM: THE INEFFICIENCIES OF
HIERARCHY (1987) (deriving and demonstrating efficacy of X-inefficiency); see also
O'Connor, Promoting EconomicJustice, supra note 299, at 224 (discussing inefficiency
due to less than ideal circumstances).
313. Cf O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice, supra note 299, at 224 (discuss-
ing circumstances under which workers shirk).
314. O'Connor, Human Capital Era, supra note 17, at 920. Note that
O'Connor treats the management-labor relationship as a prisoners' dilemma for
purposes of game theoretic analysis. I have elsewhere questioned the utility of
game theory in this context and, assuming arguendo its utility, the validity of
O'Connor's conclusions. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at
712-16 (discussing "current fad" of game theory). One issue I raised in that earlier
article was whether the prisoners' dilemma is the correct game theory model for
the employment relationship, noting that some aspects of labor relations are bet-
ter modeled as a chicken game. See id. at 713. Although I do not want to rehash
those arguments here, it is worth noting that the relevant game theory model in
fact appears to be what Robert Ellickson refers to as the specialized-labor game.
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Building interpersonal trust between workers and managers is thus a criti-
cal goal for O'Connor. She contends that trust evolves over time in a rela-
tionship from small things to larger matters as the partners prove
themselves to be trustworthy.3 15 Further, she opines that trust arises as
feelings of fellowship develop.3 16 Because O'Connor believes that par-
ticipatory management provides a vehicle for these sort of trust-building
activities, she proposes that corporate law not only mandate employee par-
ticipation committees resembling German works councils, along with a
duty to disclose corporate information to employees, 317 but also create
director fiduciary duties to employees. 3 18 Because she also believes that
workers and managers cannot reach the "golden rule" outcome on their
own, she contends that government intervention is necessary.3 19 In con-
trast, I have elsewhere argued that there is no market failure justifying
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SET-rLE DISPUTES
162-64 (1991) (discussing specialized-labor game).
A prisoners' dilemma is the appropriate model for a coordination problem in
which the cooperative outcome is reached when all players provide identical labor.
See id. at 209 (noting that described coordination problem is "best modeled as a
Prisoner's Dilemma"). When players have asymmetric abilities and the largest pay-
off occurs when only the cheapest labor provider works, which seems to be an
accurate description of the corporate-employee relationship, the specialized-labor
game is a better model. See id. at 210. In social relationships involving prisoners'
dilemma, we expect a social norm requiring everyone to contribute, without pros-
pect of reward, to producing the good in question. See id. at 209 (discussing func-
tion of prisoners' dilemma in close-knit groups). The Golden Rule is an example
of such a norm. In specialized labor situations, however, shirking is the dominant
choice. See id. at 162-64 (discussing specialized-labor game and concluding that
shirking is dominant choice for each player involved). Cooperative outcomes in
this game are achieved not through trust-based social norms, but through volun-
tary contracting. See id. at 211 ("In most Specialized Labor situations in a market
economy, cooperative outcomes are reached through contractual exchange.").
Contracts are a superior solution (vis-t-vis social norms) to specialized-labor games
because they are the most effective means of rewarding unique skills. See id. at 247
(noting that contracts are effective at rewarding "those who have gone to the
trouble of acquiring special skills"). Where contracting is impracticable, we ob-
serve rewards (such as high social status) for those who perform unusually well. See
id. at 211 (discussing situations in which contracts are not economical). The key
point, however, is that social norms of trust are inapt for specialized-labor games.
Trust is not going to achieve the "golden rule" solution when specialized labor is
the correct model. Thus, social policies designed to promote workplace trust are
likely to be unavailing.
315. See O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice, supra note 299, at 223 (stating
that trust evolves from small to large matters).
316. See id. (stating that fellowship aids in development of trust).
317. See id. at 261-63 (proposing that corporate law mandate employee partici-
pation committees and impose duty to disclose corporate information).
318. See id. at 254-61 (proposing that corporate law create fiduciary duties to
employees). I have elsewhere rejected proposed fiduciary duties similar to those
put forward by O'Connor. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423,
1437 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Shareholder Wealth].
319. See O'Connor, PromotingEconomicJustice, supra note 299, at 343 (demand-
ing legal intervention because parties cannot reach golden rule on their own).
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government intervention. 320 In this Article, I want to make two somewhat
different points. First, government intervention would be unavailing be-
cause participatory management will not promote trust between workers
and managers. Second, whatever one makes of the instrumental aspects
of the debate, there is no trust-based natural law justification for govern-
ment intervention.
1. The Instrumental Value of Trust
I do not take issue with the general proposition that trust has instru-
mental value. Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of the physi-
cal phenomenon of friction. Just as friction reduces the efficiency of a
machine, transaction costs are a dead weight loss making transacting less
efficient. 321 Contracts are a useful, but ultimately imperfect, device for
minimizing transaction costs.
In many settings, contracts are necessarily incomplete. Three closely-
related factors are at work here-opportunism, uncertainty and complex-
ity.3 2 2 Opportunism is a critical component of any transaction cost sched-
ule. Parties to a contract are inevitably tempted to pursue their own self-
interest at the expense of the collective good. Uncertainty reflects the dif-
ficulty parties have in predicting the conditions they will face in the future.
Complexity arises when the parties attempt to specify contractually how
they will respond to a given situation. As the relationship's term length-
ens, it necessarily becomes more difficult to foresee the needs and threats
of the future, which in turn presents an ever-growing myriad of contingen-
cies to be dealt with. The more contingencies to be accounted for and the
greater the degree of uncertainty that is present, the more difficult it be-
comes for the parties to draft completely specified contracts. 323 Indeed,
the phenomenon of bounded rationality, which becomes important in the
presence of uncertainty and complexity, implies that making complete
320. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at 712-18 (arguing
that there is no market failure justifying government intervention).
321. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 1-
2 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] (stating that transac-
tion costs reduce transaction efficiency).
322. See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAw.
461, 464-65 (1992) [hereinafter Dooley, Two Models] (arguing that opportunism,
uncertainty and complexity create incomplete contracts). The three factors are
not wholly independent. Uncertainty can result from opportunistic behavior, for
example, where there is strategic nondisclosure or deliberate distortion of infor-
mation. SeeWILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 321, at 57 (discussing
connection among opportunism, uncertainty and complexity).
323. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 23 (1975) [herein-
after WILLIAMSON, MARKETS] (noting that under conditions of uncertainty and
complexity, it becomes "very costly, perhaps impossible, to describe the complete
decision tree").
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contracts is at best costly and may prove impossible.3 24 Given the limits on
cognitive competence implied by bounded rationality, incomplete con-
tracts are the inevitable result of uncertainty and complexity. 325
Because ex ante contracting is often an imperfect solution, parties fre-
quently rely on noncontractual social norms to minimize transaction
costs.3 26 Trust, for example, acts as a lubricant to reduce social friction.3 27
If I trust you to refrain from opportunistic behavior, I will not invest as
many resources in ex ante contracting. "He who is faithful with that which
is least is also faithful with that which is much .... -328 If you prove trust-
worthy, I will not need to incur ex post enforcement costs. Thus, trust is
not only honorable, it is socially useful. 329
In my judgment, however, trust-based justifications for government-
mandated employee involvement founder on several grounds. Consider
first the empirical data recounted above. 33 0 Assuming participatory man-
324. See generally WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITtUTIONS, supra note 321, at 30-
32, 45-46 (defining bounded rationality and describing its effects on contracting
process).
325. See Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 119, 121-25 (1988) (arguing that transaction costs are pervasive and
large, which leads to theory of firm premised on transaction cost minimization).
These costs are further compounded by the secondary and tertiary costs associated
with enforcement mechanisms.
326. The classical example is Stewart Macaulay's study of social norms in Wis-
consin business firms. See generally Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business, 28 Am. Soc. REv. 55 (1963) (finding that norms of fair dealing are signifi-
cant constraint on business behavior).
327. See ARROW, supra note 297, at 23 ("Trust is an important lubricant of a
social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree
of reliance on other people's word.").
328. Luke 16:10.
329. There is nothing inconsistent between the notion that people honor
their commitments and a model of human behavior based on rational choice.
Consistently trustworthy behavior sends a message about reliability that pays long-
term benefits under many (albeit not all) market conditions. Game theorists have
identified some very strong incentives for individuals to behave cooperatively.
Consider, for example, that one powerful strategy in an infinitely repeated game is
to play on a "tit-for-tat" basis: Player 1 begins by cooperating, and then chooses in
each subsequent round to play as Player 2 did on his or her previous choice. In
effect, "tit-for-tat" can train the opposing player to be cooperative. See generallyJ.
KEITH MURNIGHAN, BARGAINING GAMES 81-84 (1992) (exploring valuable role trust
can play).
330. Why should participation in the decisionmaking process promote trust
between employee and employer? Trust is a belief that the other person is trust-
worthy, which in turn is a belief that he or she will keep his or her commitments.
Institutional arrangements that make commitments credible thus ensure trustwor-
thiness and thereby promote trust. See Russell Hardin, Trustworthiness, 107 ETHICS
26, 32 (1996) (discussing promotion of trust). Thus, the most plausible connec-
tion between participation and trust is that the former helps prevent untrustworthy
(i.e., opportunistic) conduct by the employer. If so, the instrumental account of
trust offered by O'Connor and others also arguably collapses into a variant of the
self-protection account. For a discussion of the self-protection account, see infra
notes 475-549 and accompanying text.
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agement promotes trust between workers and managers, we ought to see
that reflected in empirical evidence of enhanced productivity and profit-
ability. As noted above, the empirical evidence is mixed, at best. In addi-
tion, the empirical evidence that many workers prefer hierarchical
workplaces further undercuts the claim that participatory management
can promote trust between workers and managers.
Conceding that the empirical evidence is flawed and therefore assum-
ing arguendo that participatory management might nevertheless have the
beneficial effects ascribed to it, I remain unpersuaded. Those who favor
trust-based explanations of participatory management frequently contrast
U.S. industrial relations to those of Germany and Japan. 33 1 As the story
usually goes, the competitive prowess of German and Japanese firms can
be attributed to the high levels of trust found in such firms, which in turn
can be attributed to the participative work practices followed by such
firms. 3 32 On close examination, however, this story breaks down at several
critical points.
To be sure, as Francis Fukuyama has demonstrated, U.S. workplaces
are low-trust environments. 333 In many firms, workers and managers sim-
ply do not trust each other very much. In contrast, Japanese and German
workplaces are said to be characterized by high levels of trust.334 Is this
disparity causally linked to the degree of employee participation practiced
by firms in these countries? Certainly, labor relations in the three differ
rather dramatically in a number of regards, including the degree to which
employees are involved in decisionmaking processes. In the United States,
the dominant mode of industrial relations has long been so-called scien-
tific management, at whose door Fukuyama contends much of the blame
for low levels of trust in U.S. workplaces can be laid. 33 5
In the early part of this century, Frederick W. Taylor developed the
most famous form of what came to be called "scientific management. '33 6
Taylorism was directed at a persistent information asymmetry between
workers and managers.33 7 Pre-Industrial Revolution workplaces were
characterized by persistent information asymmetries favoring workers and
331. See, e.g., O'Connor, Human Capital Era, supra note 17, at 945 (discussing
participatory relationships in Germany and Japan).
332. See id. at 901 (discussing role of trust in German and Japanese firms).
333. See FRANcis FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 255 (1995) [hereinafter FUKUYAMA, TRUST] (stating that American
workplaces are low-trust environments).
334. See id. at 10 (stating thatJapanese and German workplaces are high-trust
environments).
335. See id. at 226 (arguing that scientific management created declining trust
in American workplaces).
336. See Co-IrON, supra note 14, at 4-5 (crediting Taylor with development of
"scientific management").
337. SeeJohanna Oreskovic, Capturing Volition Itself: Employee Involvement and
the Team Act, 19 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 229, 273 (1998) (discussing information
asymmetries and Taylorism).
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a resulting high degree of control by those workers.3 38 Craftspeople were
highly trained and knew a great deal about the production process.3 39
Taylor recognized that workers who knew more than management about
the production process could shirk by controlling the pace of produc-
tion.340 With the coming of the Industrial Revolution and assembly line
production, however, it became possible to redesign the workplace so as to
shift control to managers. 341 Taylor wanted to take advantage of those
possibilities to reverse the information asymmetry in management's
favor.3 4
2
Taylor required managers to use time and motion studies to identify
the ideal method of performing each step in the production process.3 43
Managers then were to impose that method on workers. To achieve this
goal, Taylor adopted three core principles: (1) distillation of craft knowl-
edge into work rules taught to employees; (2) advance planning of pro-
duction processes by management; and (3) elimination of the need for
thinking or learning by workers.3 4 4 These principles were implemented
by industrial engineers and management experts, who broke down a given
production process into a large number of small steps, each allocated to a
single worker who was closely supervised. 345 Hence the narrow job de-
scriptions typical of Taylorism, because shirking could be easily detected
when employees are only charged with performing a single task. Hence
also Taylorist compensation schemes based on the old maxim "a fair day's
pay for a fair day's work,"34 6 which was possible precisely because the em-
ployees' narrow job descriptions and close supervision allowed pay to be
closely linked to productivity.
According to Fukuyama, Taylorism had deleterious effects on U.S. in-
dustrial relations. 347 It sent workers a clear message that they were not
338. For a discussion of information asymmetries generally, see id.
339. See Geu & Davis, supra note 146, at 1685-87 (stating that craftspeople
were highly trained and knowledgeable).
340. Cf Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Chang-
ing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 71, 141-42 (1988) (stat-
ing that workers had power to control production rate under certain
circumstances).
341. See Geu & Davis, supra note 146, at 1686 ("After the Industrial Revolution
... the organization of the workplace became far more impersonal.").
342. See Co-roN, supra note 14, at 4-5 (providing general discussion of
Talyorism).
343. SeeJulius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition:
The Paper Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803, 1808 (1993) (stating that scientific
management required managers to identify each step of production process).
344. See COT rON, supra note 14, at 5 (citing three core principles of Taylor);
Geu & Davis, supra note 146, at 1690 (same).
345. Cf WEILER, supra note 164, at 196 (demonstrating implementation of
three core principles).
346. Richard E. Walton, From Control to Commitment in the Workplace, HARV.
Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 76, 78.
347. See FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 333, at 226-27 (noting deleterious ef-
fects of Taylorism on American industrial relations).
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trusted. It also promoted an adversarial and legalistic approach to collec-
tive bargaining. A downward spiral of growing distrust resulted.348
Although the German and Japanese systems differ dramatically from
each other, both entail a higher degree of employee involvement than
does scientific management. 349 Because the German system is based on
statutory mandates comparable to those proposed by the academics to
whose work this Article responds, I will focus mainly on the German sys-
tem at the expense of the Japanese system. 350 The German codetermina-
tion system, as created by statute, includes two important elements. First,
there is a dual board structure-a supervisory board that appoints a man-
aging board, with the latter actively operating the firm.35 1 Workers are
represented only on the former.352 The supervisory board concept is diffi-
cult to translate into terms familiar to those trained exclusively in U.S.
forms of corporate governance. Its statutory mandate is primarily con-
cerned with the appointment and supervision of the managing board.3 53
In theory, employees and shareholders are equally represented on the su-
pervisory board. In practice, however, the board is often controlled either
by the firm's managers or a dominant shareholder. 354 One of the em-
ployee representatives must be from management, and shareholders are
entitled to elect the chairperson of the board, who has the power to break
tie votes.3 55 If push comes to shove, shareholders thus retain a slight but
potentially critical edge.
348. See id. (noting spiral of growing distrust that resulted from Taylorism).
349. This Article will focus primarily on the German codetermination system.
For a discussion of the German codetermination system, see infra notes 350-60 and
accompanying text.
350. See Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and
Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT'L REv. L.
& ECON. 203, 204 (1994) (noting that there are at least four different models of
participatory management in Germany). Some other member-states of the Euro-
pean Union also have some form of employee representation, and there have long
been proposals to develop harmonized company laws or even a European Union-
wide company law that would provide for employee representation. SeeTerence L.
Blackburn, The Societas Europea: The Evolving European Corporation Statute, 61 FoRD-
HAM L. REv. 695, 743-55 (1993) (discussing draft proposal for harmonization of
natural company law). Unless otherwise indicated, discussion of codetermination
in this Article focuses on the 1976 German codetermination statute, which applies
to corporations having more than 2000 employees.
351. See CorON, supra note 14, at 118 (noting dual board structure in Ger-
man codetermination system).
352. See id. (noting worker presence only on supervisory boards).
353. See Hopt, supra note 350, at 204 (discussing statutory mandate of supervi-
sory boards).
354. See id. (noting that managers or dominant shareholders often control
board).
355. See MOTOHIRO MORISHIMA ET AL., INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRAcY IN SELECTED PA-
CIFIc RIM AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 23 (1995) (discussing chairperson's power to
break ties).
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The other component of German codetermination is the works coun-
cil, which somewhat resembles U.S. operational participation.3 5 6 Works
councils are concerned with issues affecting individual plants rather than
the whole firm.357 In theory at least, works councils have considerable
control over shop floor and other issues that affect the personnel of a
particular plant.358 Depending on the nature of the issue at hand, the
council may be entitled to provision of information, consultation with
management or codetermination. 35 9 Their statutory mandate ranges
from such minor issues as individual personnel grievances to such major
concerns as the introduction of new technology or plant closings.
360
Conceding that German workers have greater opportunities for for-
mal participation in firm decisionmaking than do workers of U.S. firms in
which scientific management is still practiced, those differences lack both
instrumental and normative traction. My argument runs through several
steps. First, it is not clear that the German system of employee involve-
ment has the instrumental benefits ascribed to it by proponents of govern-
ment mandates. Second, the differing treatment of employee involvement
among these nations is properly ascribed to politics and not the degree of
workplace trust exhibited in their firms. Third and finally, government-
mandated employee involvement will not increase the level of trust in U.S.
workplaces.
As to the instrumental utility of employee involvement, it appears to
be less successful in Germany than is commonly thought.361
Codetermination has been found to have the least impact on productivity
and employee attitudes of any participatory management scheme. 362 In-
deed, many studies of codetermination have shown it to have negative pro-
ductivity results. 363 One recent meta-analysis of codetermination studies
confirmed these findings, concluding "that worker participation in deci-
sion making imposed by government decree is negatively associated with
productivity."3 64
356. See id. at 21 (discussing works councils).
357. See id. (discussing concerns and focuses of works councils).
358. See id. at 21-23 (discussing control of works councils). -
359. See id. at 21 (discussing works councils' entitlement to information, con-
sultation or codetermination).
360. See id. at 21-22 (noting range of statutory mandate).
361. See Co-rroN, supra note 14, at 78 (discussing success of quality circles in
Japanese firms). According to one study, only one-third of the quality circles used
by Japanese firms have proven successful over time. See id. Employee involvement
is also less pervasive in Japan than is commonly thought.
362. See id. at 232 (finding codetermination to have least impact of any par-
ticipatory management scheme).
363. See id. at 119 (noting that many studies of codetermination show negative
results).
364. Chris Doucouliagos, Worker Participation and Productivity in Labor-Managed
and Participatory Capitalist Firms: A Meta-Analysis, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 58, 69
(1995).
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Similar doubts about the economic viability of the German labor rela-
tions system are revealed when we turn to data on relative competitiveness.
Although proponents of government-mandated employee involvement
frequently assert that German (and Japanese) firms are more efficient
than U.S. firms because of their greater levels of employee participation in
corporate governance, I find these arguments unpersuasive.3 65 American
enterprise long prevailed in world economic competition. 366 Moreover,
despite the conventional wisdom about German and Japanese competitive
success, American enterprise in many respects is still winning the competi-
tiveness war.367 According to a recent competitiveness ranking by the In-
ternational Institute for Management Development, the United States
ranked first every year from 1993 to 1997.368 In contrast, Japan fell from
second in 1993, to fourth in 1995 and to ninth in 1997.369 Likewise, Ger-
many fell from fifth in 1993, to tenth in 1996 and to fourteenth in 1997.370
Assuming arguendo that employee involvement has instrumental ben-
efits, there is still a chicken and egg problem here. Does Germany have
high levels of workplace trust because it has widespread employee involve-
ment or vice-versa? O'Connor's argument that government-mandated em-
ployee involvement will promote trust assumes that causation runs in the
former direction. In contrast, I suspect that the causation arrow points in
the latter. Law cannot be expected to develop universal patterns:
For [people's] circumstances vary mightily one from another-
affected by climate, by soil, by extent of a country, by historic
experience, by customs and habits, by strategic situation, by com-
merce and industry, by religion, by a multitude of other influ-
ences. Therefore every people develop their own particular laws,
and rightly so.3
7 1
There are radical differences between U.S. and German (orJapanese) cul-
ture and law that pervasively affect the employment relationship. 3 72 It is
365. See, e.g., O'Connor, Human Capital Era, supra note 17, at 912-13 (arguing
that German firms are more efficient than U.S. firms due to higher employee
participation).
366. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 254 (1994) (noting that America has long
prevailed in economic competition).
367. See Hobart Rowen, Challenging Convention on Productivity, WASH. POST,
Nov. 22, 1992, at HI (noting that American enterprise is still winning competitive-
ness war).
368. See International Institute for Management Development, World Competi-
tiveness On-Line: The World Competitiveness Scoreboard (visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://
www.imd.ch/wcy/factors/overalldata.html> (ranking countries' competitiveness).
369. See id. (discussing Japan's ranking).
370. See id. (discussing Germany's ranking).
371. RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 352 (3d ed. 1991) [here-
inafter KIRK, ROOTS] (discussing Montesquieu's theory of law).
372. See generally Clyde W. Summers, Comparative Perspectives [hereinafter Sum-
mers, Perspectives], in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE: THEORETICAL AND TRANS-
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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these differences that determine each nation's approach to employee
involvement.
As its statutory basis suggests, German codetermination reflects a
political bargain between labor and capital. 373 This bargain has several
dimensions. In an earlier era, when the German economy was capital-
poor, codetermination represented a means of encouraging workers to
invest in firm-specific human capital despite comparatively low wages. 374
At present, codetermination reflects a political bargain in which employ-
ees' pensions are not well-funded, but employees have some voice in cor-
porate governance.
375
In more general terms, Germany has used codetermination to reduce
labor conflict and prevent worker revolts. 3 76 As such, it was not intended
to produce improved employee attitudes or greater productivity, but
rather to redistribute power within firms, putting labor on a more equal
footing with managers and shareholders. 37 7 This was the price German
firms paid for labor peace. They were willing to do so because even under
codetermination, stockholders are likely to prevail if push comes to shove
and, even more importantly, codetermination exists in the context of laws
that restrict strikes and other forms of labor activism.3 78 The bargain thus
struck is maintainable, despite its apparent economic problems, because
of the choice of law rule that puts physical presence ahead of statutory
domicile and the European Union harmonization processes. These fac-
tors stifle the state competition for corporate charters that result in share-
holder value-maximizing rules.3 79
ACTIONAL PERSPECTRIES 139 (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel G. Collins eds., 1988)
[hereinafter LABOR LAw AND BUSINESS CHANGE] (comparing how different labor
law systems deal with employment relations problems arising out of major changes
in enterprises). The following discussion focuses on the distinction between Ger-
many and the United States mainly because the former's system of industrial rela-
tions is much more heavily a creature of statute than is that of Japan.
373. See generally ROE, supra note 366, at 213-15 (discussing German
codetermination).
374. See id. at 215 (discussing codetermination as means of encouraging work-
ers to invest in firm-specific human capital).
375. See id. at 214-15 (discussing codetermination as political bargain).
376. See id. at 215 (discussing codetermination as means to reduce labor con-
flicts and prevent worker revolts).
377. See COTTON, supra note 14, at 114-15 (discussing codetermination as
power redistribution tool); Hopt, supra note 350, at 211 (same).
378. See Summers, Perspectives, supra note 372, at 147 (explaining that German
works councils are barred by law from striking or engaging in other forms of eco-
nomic action).
379. See Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Compara-
tive Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2031 n.30 (1993) [hereinafter Romano, A
Cautionary Note] (stating that both continental Europe corporate choice of law rule
and European's corporation code harmonization process stifle competition for
corporate charters among nations); see also Hopt, supra note 350, at 206 (stating
that changing corporate seats to escape codetermination would only be considered
in most dramatic circumstances). In an important contribution to this literature,
Bill Carney has characterized codetermination as a species of rent-seeking by labor
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United States labor law also can be viewed as a political bargain,
which has been struck in ways radically different from the German model
on almost every point relevant to codetermination. 38 0 To be sure, there
was a moment in American history in which the bargain nearly went to-
wards the German model. In the New Deal years prior to the adoption of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 381 President Roosevelt ex-
pressed the hope that there would develop "a kind of works council in
industry in which all groups of employees, whatever may be their choice of
organization or form of representation, may participate in joint confer-
ences with their employers." 38 2 Despite this presidential endorsement,
the United States achieved labor peace through general welfare laws and
labor legislation that emphasized collective bargaining.38 3 Indeed, the
NLRA's drafters' refusal to provide for works councils or other forms of
employee representation presumably resulted in no small measure from
the pronounced union preference for collective bargaining.38 4
In any event, even if changes in U.S. politics now permitted us to rep-
licate the German bargain, doing so would not be enough to make
codetermination viable here. Fukuyama treats codetermination as being
part of a larger set of social and cultural patterns. 38 5 Several factors he
identifies are particularly relevant to the codetermination phenomenon.
First, German firms and workers have preserved much of the cultural heri-
tage that descends from the medieval guilds.38 6 Many traditional indus-
interest groups. See William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corpo-
rate Charters, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 309-11 (1997) [hereinafter Carney, The Political
Economy] (explaining that rent-seeking labor interest groups seek special interest
legislation in states where few foreign corporations are incorporated). Carney ar-
gues that this and other special interest legislative provisions are more likely to
appear in European than in American law because of barriers to migration (for-
merly tariffs and presently the real seat conflicts of law rule) that shield special
interest group legislation from market forces. See id. at 312 (explaining that large
costs of European firm migration provide considerable room for interest groups to
seek rents from local corporations and their investors).
380. See Summers, Perspectives, supra note 372, at 147-49 (explaining how Ger-
man labor law differs from that of United States); see also ROE, supra note 366, at
210, 216 (stating that German labor law has roots in Germany's nondemocratic
past).
381. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
382. David Brody, Workplace Contractualism in Comparative Perspective, in INDUS-
TRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 171, at 176, 192.
383. See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 24-25 (explaining American policy
choice of collective bargaining as means to labor peace).
384. Although participatory management is often regarded as novel and de-
rived from Japanese roots, it in fact goes back to turn of the century United States
labor practices, where it was routinely used as an anti-union weapon, no doubt
prompting labor's preference for collective bargaining. See HOGLER & GRENIER,
supra note 212, at 2-5. See generally KoCHAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 25-27 (describ-
ing centrality of collective bargaining to New Deal framework).
385. See FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 333, at 217-18 (explaining how
codetermination arose out of German intellectual climate).
386. See id. at 245-52 (noting guild influences on German workplace).
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trial relations patterns and expectations formed in the guild system still
survive in the German workplace, most of which feature a strongly com-
munitarian and egalitarian streak.3 87 Second, Fukuyama contends that
the willingness of German managers to trust workers with significant re-
sponsibilities, including governance duties, is closely related to the high
skill level of those workers and, consequently, to the highly developed sys-
tem of vocational and industrial training provided by the German educa-
tional and apprentice systems. 388 Those systems also have an important
socialization function, of course, which helps promote workplace solidar-
ity.389 Thus, one simply cannot selectively choose certain aspects of the
German culture and law to be transplanted to the United States.
Nevertheless, let us assume that the United States adopted some form
of government-mandated employee involvement. Would doing so pro-
mote trust between workers and managers? I do not believe so, because I
believe that the source of workplace distrust is not the tradition of scien-
tific management, as Fukuyama asserts, but rather is located far deeper
within the culture.
By its very nature, trust implies vulnerability. If I trust you to perform
as per our agreement, I am by definition voluntarily assuming the risk of
nonperformance. Trust may therefore be defined as "the willingness of
one person to increase his or her vulnerability to the actions of another
person whose behavior he or she could not control."3 90 Assuming I am
risk averse, why should I be willing to risk uncompensated loss? Put an-
other way, in what social contexts and under what conditions is trust most
likely to arise?3 91
Trust is essentially social and normative, rather than individual and
calculative.3 9 2 It arises out of a set of shared background assumptions and
norms.39 3 As Fukuyama acknowledges, trust derives from shared values
387. See id. (noting that guild influences can still be found in German
workplace).
388. See id. at 237 (discussing high skill level of German workers with respect
to German educational and apprentice systems).
389. See id. at 238 (discussing socialization function of education and
apprenticeships).
390. Larue Tone Hosmer, Trust: The Connecting Link Between Organizational
Theory and PhilosophicalEthics, 20 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 379, 383 (1995) (citing Dale E.
Zand, Trust and Managerial Problem Solving, 17 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 229 (1972) (defining
trust)).
391. For ease of exposition, I treat the problem of interpersonal trust as a two-
state model: either A trusts B, or A does not trust B. In fact, however, there are
degrees of trust; in particular, the range of domains over which one trusts another
tends to vary. One might trust a parent over a wide range of conduct, while trust-
ing a distant relative over a smaller range of behavior. Strangers would be trusted
over an even smaller range of conduct. See Karen Jones, Trust as an Affective Atti-
tude, 107 ETHics 4, 7 (1996) (explaining different degrees of trust).
392. See Hosmer, supra note 390, at 389 (arguing that trust is social and
normative).
393. See id. (arguing that trust stems from norms and assumptions).
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and, accordingly, is most likely to arise in homogeneous groups. 394 Rob-
ert Ellickson's work on the role of social norms in constraining behavior
assumes that such norms arise in close-knit groups, but is agnostic as to
whether such norms emerge in other settings.39 5 Other scholars put the
case even more strongly. According to Donald McCloskey, for example,
the importance of trust to market exchange explains why members of the
same ethnic group can deal so profitably with one another.
3 9 6
Close-knit groups have several features that promote trust within
them. Shared values, which are critical to formation of trust, are one such
feature. J. Budziszewski makes this point in the course of critiquing com-
munitarian political theories.3 9 7 He observes that because the polity is a
community of communities, a strategic mutual accommodation can be
reached only by those sub-communities whose value systems share some
common ground.39 8 "For instance Catholics, Orthodox, evangelical Prot-
estants, and religious Jews might be able to reach such an accommoda-
tion."3 99 Generalizing from Budziszewski's example, we infer that shared
religious values are important for the development of trust among per-
sons. 409 Virtue is in the first instance an adaptive response to the instinc-
tive human recognition of (and need for) a transcendent moral order
codified in a body of natural law. 40 ' People are most likely to act virtu-
ously when they believe in an external power, higher and more permanent
than the state, which is aware of their shortcomings and will punish them
in the next life even if they escape retribution in this life.40 2
394. See FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 333, at 252-53 (explaining presence of
trust in homogenous societies, such as Germany and Japan). Even within a ho-
mogenous group, individual interests are likely to vary and conflict. If nothing
else, the basic economic principle of scarcity suggests a certain amount of intra-
group competition for scarce resources. These conflicts inevitably become even
more pronounced in the absence of familial or tribal ties.
395. See ELLICESON, supra note 314, at 184 (noting proposition that "members
of close-knit groups develop workaday substantive norms").
396. See Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, AM. SCHOLAR, Spring 1994, at
177, 183-84 (explaining how trust enables members of same ethnic groups to deal
profitably with each other).
397. See J. Budziszewski, The Problem with Communitarianism, FIRST THINGS,
Mar. 1995, at 22, 26 [hereinafter Budziszewski, Communitarianism] (noting that
shared values strengthen communities).
398. See id. ("First, any 'communitarianism' feasible for the polity as a whole
could be reached only by strategic mutual accommodation; second, it could be
reached only among those communities whose stories were sufficiently related for
them to find some common ground.").
399. Id.
400. But see Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations (National Bu-
reau of Economics, Research Working Paper No. 5864) (Dec. 1996) (stating that
"we find a strong negative association between trust and the dominance of a strong
hierarchical religion in a country, most notably Catholicism").
401. See PAUL JOHNSON, THE QUEST FOR GOD 6-17 (1996) (providing general
discussion on human instinct for faith).
402. See Proverbs 1:7 (stating that "fear of the Lord is the beginning of
knowledge").
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Close-knit groups also have several other advantages. Although the
old adage opines "familiarity breeds contempt," personal proximity to
others in fact positively affects behavior.40 3 As people become closer, their
behavior tends to improve. Virtue is thus inculcated not only through reli-
gion, but also through participation in a variety of voluntary communities
(churches, schools, social clubs, etc.). As James Q. Wilson observed,
"something in us makes it all but impossible to justify our acts as mere self-
interest whenever those acts are seen by others as violating a moral princi-
ple. ' 40 4 Rather,."[w]e want our actions to be seen by others-and by our-
selves-as arising out of appropriate motives." 405 Voluntary communities
strengthen this instinct in several ways. First, they provide a network of
reputational and other social sanctions that shape incentives. Because
membership in close-knit groups satisfies the human need to belong, the
threat of expulsion gives the group a strong sanction by which to enforce
compliance with group norms. Because close-knit groups involve a contin-
uing relationship, the threat of punishment in future interactions deters
the sort of cheating that is possible in one-time transactions. 40 6 Second,
because people care about how they are perceived by those close to them,
communal life provides a cloud of witnesses whose good opinion we value.
We hesitate to disappoint those people and thus strive to comport our-
selves in accordance with communal norms. Third and finally, there is a
transaction costs economics explanation for the importance of closeness
in trust relationships. Close-knit groups know a lot about one another,
which reduces monitoring costs and thus further encourages compliance
with group norms.40 7 Therefore, members of close-knit groups tend to
internalize group norms, which allows members of the group to trust one
another in ways they would not be willing to risk when dealing with
outsiders.
Under modern working conditions, workers and senior managers can
hardly be described as close knit. In particular, two factors seem especially
significant with respect to the erosion of trust in U.S. workplaces-diver-
sity and the loss of shared values formerly held by both managers and
workers. As to the former, U.S. workers are required to function in in-
creasingly diverse work forces. Without intending to get into the current
public policy debate over affirmative action, I note that the importance of
403. See Naughton, Participation in the Organization, supra note 42, at 929 (dis-
cussing proximity thesis and citing belief in papal writings that worker participa-
tion enables workers to grow in solidarity with management).
404. James Q. Wilson, What is Moral, and How Do We Know It?, 95 COMMENTARY
37, 39 (1993).
405. Id.
406. See ELLICKSON, supra note 314, at 179 (discussing continuing relation-
ships of close-knit groups). But see La Porta et al., supra note 400 (noting some
experimental evidence that "people expect certain fair or cooperative behavior of
their opponents even when they do not expect to see them again").
407. See ELLICiSON, supra note 314, at 180-81 (noting reduction of monitoring
costs in close-knit groups).
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ethnic and similar ties to the development of trust within a group has de-
monstrable consequences for the viability of participatory management in
a diverse workplace. Even within communitarian societies, egalitarian re-
lationships are often limited to homogeneous cultural groups. 408 In het-
erogeneous groups, mandated due process rights tend to substitute for
spontaneous and genuine trust.40 9 This conclusion is supported by empir-
ical evidence that worker participation in corporate decisionmaking is
most effective in homogeneous work forces. 4 ' 0 The success of the well-
known worker cooperatives at Mondragon in Spain, for example, is attrib-
uted to the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the Basque workforce. 4 "
Consider also the observation that many Japanese-owned U.S. manufactur-
ing firms, "particularly in electronics, have adopted very fewJapanese pro-
duction methods. Rather, they utilize paternalistic and low-wage
employment strategies with little evidence of any sophisticated work prac-
tices."4 12 Practices found in the homogenous Japanese society apparently
have not been transplanted to the more diverse U.S. workplace.
As to the latter factor, the loss of shared values between workers and
managers, I believe it is yet another consequence of Lasch's Revolt of the
Elites. Seymour Martin Lipset argued that U.S. society incorporates cer-
tain core "values, culturally embedded and persistent across the barriers of
socioeconomic class, ethnicity, race, religious belief, and political ideol-
ogy, [that] stress individual achievement and egalitarianism in social rela-
tionships."4 3 If so, one might infer that German-style egalitarian work
practices might be successful in the U.S. There are two counter-argu-
ments, however, against drawing such an inference.
First, there is an inherent tension between the identified values of
egalitarianism and individual achievement. Individualism tends to
predominate with respect to decisions affecting personal matters, while
deference to hierarchy tends to predominate with respect to group deci-
sions. 4 1 4 Taken together, these push/pull forces bode ill for the viability
of participatory management. On the one hand, Americans' individualis-
tic streak is inconsistent with the cooperative values necessary for par-
ticipatory management to succeed. On the other hand, the tendency to
defer to hierarchical decisionmaking in group settings is inconsistent with
408. See FUKUAMA, TRUST, supra note 333, at 252.
409. See id. (comparing due process rights to trust, and stating that there is
formal equality and due process instead of trust in heterogenous societies).
410. See Drago, supra note 176, at 59 (providing statistical evidence that
worker participation in corporate decisionmaking is most effective in homogenous
groups).
411. SeeJacqueline Bhabha, The Right to Community, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1117,
1126 (1998) (noting success of cooperatives at Mondragon).
412. KOCHlAN ET AL., supra note 15, at xvii.
413. Seymour Martin Lipset & Marcella Ridlen Ray, Technology, Work, and So-
cial Change, 17J. LAB. RES. 613, 623 (1996).
414. See WIrE, supra note 162, at 41 (comparing individualism to hierarchical
deference in decisions).
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giving substance to the democratic rhetoric of participatory management.
The evidence recounted above, which suggests that both workers and
managers often resist employee participation, thus seems to be less a prob-
lem of economic imperfections in the labor market and more a question
of strongly ingrained cultural biases. As such, it is unlikely that cultural
impediments of this sort would readily respond to surface changes in legal
rules. 415
Second, query whether Lipset is correct in asserting that these values
persist across the class boundaries between workers and managers. Status-
based differentials within corporate hierarchies have been widely criti-
cized. 4 16 Such differentials presumably impede the development of trust
between managers and workers, which is presumably one reason proposed
participatory management mandates often include concomitant proposals
to flatten wage structures. 417 It is important that all employees, manage-
ment and labor included, have common goals, including upward mobility,
achievable status and belonging to the same team.4 18 But how can they
achieve mutual interdependence if they are not part of a community of
shared values? As Christopher Lasch explains:
[T] he new elites, the professional classes in particular, regard the
masses with mingled scorn and apprehension. In the United
States, "Middle America"-a term that has both geographical
and social implications-has come to symbolize everything that
stands in the way of progress: "family values," mindless patriot-
ism, religious fundamentalism, racism, homophobia, retrograde
views of women. Middle Americans, as they appear to the makers
of educated opinion, are hopelessly shabby, unfashionable, and
provincial, ill informed about changes in taste or intellectual
trends, addicted to trashy novels of romance and adventure, and
stupefied by prolonged exposure to television. They are at once
absurd and vaguely menacing .... 419
415. See id. at 2 ("[M]eaning/ul workers' participation will be extremely diffi-
cult to achieve, given the widely held American faith in meritocracy. ... ).
Marleen O'Connor argues that legal reforms can produce the requisite cultural
changes. See O'Connor, Human Capital Era, supra note 17, at 944 (opining that
current law "represses the expression of altruism, erodes the sense of community
in the firm, and sanctions the expropriation of workers' firm-specific invest-
ments"). Query, however, whether legal reform could precede cultural change,
especially in the teeth of rent-seeking by special interest groups.
416. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 21, at 192 (critiquing disparate treatment
based on status).
417. See id. at 192-93 (noting that although hierarchical firms with wide wage
differentials will be more profitable than participatory firms with minimal pay dif-
ferentials, they are less socially desirable).
418. See, e.g., NovAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING, supra note 271, at 125-28
(stressing need for community within work environment).
419. LASCH, supra note 84, at 28-29.
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Given the importance of shared ethnicity and/or religious beliefs to the
development of trust, Lasch's comments on the elite class's attitude to-
wards religion are especially instructive: "A skeptical, iconoclastic state of
mind is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the knowledge
classes. . . . The elites' attitude to religion ranges from indifference to
active hostility. '420
In sum, trust has. considerable social value. In some societies, most
notably Japan and Germany, trust between managers and workers appears
to be a component of economic success. There is room to doubt, how-
ever, whether their high levels of trust are the consequence of their sys-
tems of employee involvement. There is far greater reason to doubt that
government-mandated employee involvement would lead to instrumen-
tally beneficial trust in U.S. workplaces.
2. The Virtue of Trustworthiness in the Workplace
My arguments regarding the effect of participatory management on
manager-worker trust thus far have sounded in purely instrumental terms.
Trust has undeniable instrumental value, but from a moral perspective,
trust must be distinguished from trustworthiness. Trust per se is not a
virtue, but trustworthiness is. 42 1 "The Lord abhors dishonest scales, but
accurate weights are his delight."422 We are called to be trustworthy in all
things, even if we are sometimes (or even often) disappointed by others in
whom we trusted. "Wealth is worthless in the day of wrath, but righteous-
ness delivers from death."4 23
Precisely because trustworthiness is a virtue, the question arises-can
we assume virtuous behavior by the masses of a secular society?: "It is usual
to praise a pagan or Christian virtue and then complain how much we
moderns lack it. Shamefully we bourgeois are neither saints nor heroes.
The age is one of mere iron-or aluminum or plastic-not pagan gold or
Christian silver."42 4 No realistic social order can assume "heroic or even
consistently virtuous behavior" by its citizens. 42 5 Instead, because all have
sinned,4 26 a realistic social order must be designed around principles that
fall short of ideal virtues.4 27 Legal rules and predictions about human
behavior must assume the fallen state of humans.
420. Id. at 215.
421. See Hardin, supra note 330, at 28-29 (distinguishing between trust and
trustworthiness). There are empirical questions here: Do employees who partici-
pate in corporate decisionmaking become more trustworthy? Do firms that foster
employee involvement become more trustworthy? The connection between the
two appears to be tenuous, at best.
422. Proverbs 11:1.
423. Id. at 11:4.
424. McCloskey, supra note 396, at 178.
425. NOVAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING, supra note 271, at 28.
426. See Romans 6:12.
427. See NOVAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING, supra note 271, at 28.
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Assume arguendo that public policy can make fallen people more
trustworthy. As the number of honorable and trustworthy people in soci-
ety rises, the gains of cheating also rise. 428 If most people are trustworthy
most of the time, transactions will be premised on trust, which makes un-
trustworthy behavior even more profitable precisely because it permits the
dishonest to take advantage of their naively trusting business associates. A
public policy of promoting intra-firm trust through employee involvement
will therefore require the state to provide a coercive backstop to punish
behavior that departs from government-mandated standards of
trustworthiness.
The trust-based justification for government-mandated employee in-
volvement thus suffers from a serious internal inconsistency that is ulti-
mately self-defeating. Coercion is an odd way, at best, of promoting either
trust or trustworthiness. The nanny state is a poor substitute, at best, for
the virtue-inculcating power of faith and voluntary community. We may
fear the faceless bureaucrat, but he does not inspire us to virtue. Conduct
that rises above the lowest common moral denominator thus cannot be
created by state action. Although the state cannot make its citizens virtu-
ous, it can destroy the intermediary institutions that do inculcate virtue-
"[c]ommunities can be destroyed from without, but they cannot be cre-
ated from without; they must be built from within." 429
Once we recognize that government-mandated employee involve-
ment programs cannot evade the need for an oppressively high level of
state coercion, an even more serious and fundamental objection to such
programs emerges. If America is becoming a low-trust society, as
Fukuyama contends, it is precisely because of the sort of statism inherent
in proposals to mandate employee involvement. 430 The decline in social
trust began when the rich set of mediating institutions famously praised by
Tocqueville was caught, like the Romans at Cannae, between the nanny
state on one side and judicial hijacking of the state's monopoly on the use
of coercive force to advance a hyper-legalistic cult of the autonomous indi-
vidual on the other. 43 1 Although I defer full development of this argu-
ment until the next section, it should be noted that a natural law
argument against government intervention thus has a strong moral/polit-
ical component.
428. See POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS, supra note 192, at 417 (exemplifying this
notion in context of insider trading).
429. RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 324 (1995).
430. See Francis Fukuyama, The Economics of Trust, NAT'L REv., Aug. 14, 1995,
at 42-43 [hereinafter Fukuyama, Economics] (contending that America is becoming
low-trust society).
431. See, e.g., Peter L. Berger, Trusting Laws, Trusting Others, FIRST THINGS,
Apr. 1996, at 12, 12-13 (correlating decline of social trust with proliferation of
laws); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 429, at 323-25 (discussing tendency of state to
destroy voluntary communities).
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B. Workplace Democracy
The Bishops' pastoral letter asserted that economic justice required
incorporating "democratic ideals" into the workplace. 43 2 In making this
claim, it partly reflected the strong communitarian streak in Catholic so-
cial teaching, which emphasizes participation within communities as an
essential component of human dignity. 43 3 The Bishops' position, how-
ever, also appears to reflect the same ideology of participatory democracy
that characterizes the secular humanist literature.434 This ideology opines
that democratic organizational structures and self-directed work lead not
only to enhanced productivity, but also to a more just organization:
Through both role and process empowerment, [i.e., par-
ticipatory management] employees gain an increased sense of
ownership over their own work processes. As a result they are
less inclined to be absent, to be late, to seek transfers, or to pro-
vide grudging minimal performances. Empowered workers exer-
cise greater discretion over the character of their own
organizational involvement, possess a greater sense of identifica-
tion with their organizations, and correspondingly work both
more productively and with greater personal satisfaction.43 5
Although workplace democracy might take a myriad of forms, my
analysis herein focuses on proposals that the United States move towards a
variant of the German system of codetermination. Due to the extensive
German (and to a lesser extent the Scandinavian and Dutch) experience
with codetermination, it is not only the best developed form of par-
ticipatory workplace democracy, but is also the one about which the most
is known. In this context, a focus on codetermination is especially appro-
priate because it is the form of industrial democracy with which Catholic
social teaching has been especially concerned. 436
432. See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 39, 1 298, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC
CHALLENGE, supra note 39, app. (noting that economic justice requires incorporat-
ing democratic ideals in workplace).
433. See Kenneth R. Himes, Rights of Entitlement: A Roman Catholic Perspective,
11 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 507, 523 (1997) (emphasizing participa-
tion within communities as essential in human dignity).
434. The relevant papal encyclicals are fairly circumspect in their treatment
of industrial democracy, largely limiting it to trade unionism, while recognizing
the need for authoritative direction within the business enterprise. See, e.g., MATER
ET MAGISTRA, supra note 158, 1 92, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra
note 2, at 98 (acknowledging that firms must "maintain a necessary and efficient
unity of direction").
435. Gandz & Bird, supra note 177, at 385 (citations omitted); see THE CUOMO
COMMISSION ON TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS, THE CUOMO COMMISSION REPORT: A
NEW AMERICAN FORMULA FOR A STRONG ECONOMY 200 (1988) (stating that "[w]hen
workers participate in major decisions, our enterprises produce not only goods,
but citizens").
436. See Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, Companies and Employees: Common Law
or Social Dimension, 109 LAw Q. REv. 220, 230 (1993) (observing that political sup-
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The core intuition of my critique of promandate normative claims
based on notions of workplace democracy is that the moral norms of a
democratic polity do not require that all of its components adopt par-
ticipatory democracy as their internal governance mechanism. Indeed, to
the contrary, the moral norms of our democratic polity forbid the govern-
ment from imposing internal governance schemes, democratic or not, on
other segments of society.
A corporation is not a New England town meeting.4 37 Rather, it is
one of the most hierarchical of our social institutions. Its principal demo-
cratic aspect is the shareholders' right to elect directors and vote on a
handful of other decisions. Thereafter, democracy goes out the window.
In theory, the firm is managed by its directors, limited only by their fiduci-
ary duties. In practice, it is usually a bureaucratic hierarchy commanded
by a strong chief executive or, perhaps, an oligarchy comprised of its se-
nior officers.
Hierarchy has become a dirty word in the academic circles out of
which secular humanist literature comes. As the radical critique of the
modern corporate structure goes, "Bosses exploit workers, and hierarchy
is the organizational device by which this result is accomplished. '4 38 As I
have demonstrated in detail elsewhere, however, hierarchy benefits all of
the corporation's constituencies, including its employees. 43 9 Hierarchy
serves two basic functions-monitoring workers to ensure accountability
and the efficient transmission of information within the firm.440
port for codetermination within European Union "can as easily be seen as part of
the tradition of Catholic social reformism as of any socialist tendency").
437. Cf In re TW Servs., Inc. Shareholders Litig., Civ.A.No. 10427, 1989 WL
20290, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989):
Questions of this type call upon one to ask, what is our model of corpo-
rate governance? "Shareholder democracy" is an appealing phrase, and
the notion of shareholders as the ultimate voting constituency of the
board has obvious pertinence, but that phrase would not constitute the
only element in a well articulated model. While corporate democracy is a
pertinent concept, a corporation is not a New England town meeting;
directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation ....
Id.
438. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 321, at 207. See, e.g.,
Hyde, supra note 166, at 180 n.66 (stating that "[h]ierarchies don't arise just be-
cause they are efficient and may perpetuate themselves long after they have ceased
to be efficient at all, because people in power enjoy having power and do not give
it up willingly").
439. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at 661-73 (discuss-
ing importance of centralized decisionmaking process and rise of manager-con-
trolled corporate hierarchies as dominant form of business organization); see also
Bainbridge, Organizational Failures Analysis, supra note 10 (discussing benefits to all
of hierarchical organization).
440. See Bainbridge, Organizational Failures Analysis, supra note 10 (noting and
explaining functions of hierarchies in firms). As I have demonstrated elsewhere,
bureaucratic hierarchies sometimes fail to carry out these tasks efficiently. I have
posited that in such situations, participatory management may be a more efficient
805
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Accountability is at issue because true participatory democracy
(whether in the workplace or elsewhere) requires a great deal of virtue on
the voters' part. Virtuous citizens will pursue the collective interest of the
polity even when doing so conflicts with their personal self-interest. In
economic terms, the virtuous citizen refrains from using his voting rights
as a rent-seeking mechanism. As we have seen, however, no realistic social
order can assume "heroic or even consistently virtuous behavior" by its
citizens. 44 1 A realistic social order, therefore, must be designed around
principles that fall short of our ideals: "Any social order that intends to
endure must be based on a certain realism about human beings and,
therefore, on a theory of sin and a praxis for dealing with it."'44 2
In the employment arena, such a "theory of sin" is provided by the
economic concept of agency costs. 4 4 3 Agency costs are defined as the sum
of the monitoring and bonding costs, plus any residual loss incurred, to
prevent shirking by agents. 444 In turn, shirking is defined to include any
action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests
of the team as a whole. 445 As such, shirking includes not only culpable
cheating, but also negligence, oversight, incapacity and even honest mis-
takes.4 4 6 In other words, shirking is simply the inevitable consequence of
bounded rationality and opportunism within agency relationships.
A sole proprietorship with no agents will internalize all the costs of
shirking because the proprietor's optimal trade-off between labor and lei-
sure is, by definition, the same as the firm's optimal trade-off. Agents of a
firm, however, will not internalize all of the costs of shirking; the principal
reaps part of the value of hard work by the agent, but the agent receives all
of the value of shirking. Although agents ex post have strong incentives to
shirk, ex ante they have equally strong incentives to agree to an employ-
ment contract containing terms designed to prevent shirking. 447
way of accomplishing these two goals. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management,
supra note 5, at 709-10 (noting that participatory management has purely instru-
mental explanation having little to do with notions of workplace democracy and
that this explanation of participatory management's economic function argues
against imposing mandatory employee involvement).
441. MICHAEL NovAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 28 (1990)
[hereinafter NovAK, THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION].
442. Id.
443. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Con-
trol, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301, 304 (1983) (discussing agency costs).
444. See id. (defining agency costs).
445. See Dooley, Two Models, supra note 322, at 645 (defining shirking as temp-
tation to pursue self-interest at expense of others).
446. See id. (explaining shirking as embracing all failures to keep previous
commitments, whether such failures result from culpable cheating, negligence,
oversight or simple incapacity).
447. See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 777, 781-83, 794 (1972) (arguing that
firm exists to decrease monitoring costs). See generally Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
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Bounded rationality, however, precludes firms and agents from entering
into the complete contract necessary to prevent shirking by the latter.
Agents therefore will agree to some system of ex post governance, some
mechanism for detecting and punishing shirking. Accordingly, an essen-
tial economic function of hierarchical management is to monitor the vari-
ous inputs into the team effort-management meters the marginal
productivity of each team member and then takes steps to reduce
shirking.448
Because hierarchy also promotes efficient transmission of informa-
tion within large organizations, it would still be necessary even in a firm
with uniformly virtuous employees. Even such a firm could not rely on
democratic principles once it grew beyond a relatively small size. Collec-
tive action problems necessarily preclude the use of participatory democ-
racy in large firms, as they preclude the United States from being run as
though it were a New England town meeting. Thus, workplace democracy
in such a firm necessarily takes on representative forms, with substantial
hierarchy, such as the supervisory board found in the German
codetermination system. As noted above, however, the German system is
founded on political, rather than economic, considerations. As I have ex-
plained in detail elsewhere, 449 there are sound theoretical reasons for be-
lieving that worker representation on boards of directors is highly
inefficient, and there is fairly persuasive empirical verification of that hy-
pothesis.450 I also have elsewhere demonstrated that government-man-
dated codetermination, including both the supervisory board and the
works council, cannot be justified on economic grounds.4 51
Although I shall not rehash the economic argument here in detail, it
is worth noting that my conclusion is buttressed by considerable evidence
that nominally equal participation in decisionmaking does not equate to
equal influence. 452 Even in systems where fairly substantial influence is
wielded by employee representatives, moreover, there is little impact on
the represented employees. 453 A cross-cultural study of employee involve-
ment found that although de jure participation varies across different
countries, workers generally felt they had little influence irrespective of
their nation's legal structure.
454
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (noting that contractual relations are essence
of firm).
448. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 447, at 794.
449. See generally Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5.
450. See id. at 661-64 (discussing centralized management).
451. See id. at 709-18 (considering ill effects of legislation mandating joint
management-labor committees).
452. See CorON, supra note 14, at 139 (discussing integration of workers' in-
terests into organized decisionmaking in Western Europe).
453. See id. at 140 (demonstrating symbolic as opposed to practical value of
representative participation).
454. See id. at 135 (examining study of participation practices in 12 European
countries).
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My point is illustrated by the German and Japanese systems, whose
purported egalitarianism tends to disappear upon close examination.
4 55
Recall that German codetermination was intended to preserve labor
peace, but also was designed to ensure that shareholders would have a
slight (but critical) superiority on the supervisory board.45 6 In Japan, eco-
nomic outcomes are likewise what drive participatory management, not
concern for industrial democracy.4 57 As a Japanese scholar explained, the
quality circle-like features of Japanese firms are "not intended to increase
workers' autonomy but [only] to help them find out problems in the pro-
duction line so that no defective goods will be produced."458 Japanese
quality circles, therefore, "very often take on a coercive aspect with top-
down control continuing to dominate the small group environment."
459
Why then do arguments sounding in workplace democracy persist in
promandate literature? Recall that much of that literature is fairly charac-
terized as "rights talk." It is in the present context that the validity of that
charge is most readily apparent. There is a strong tinge of left-liberal
political ideology in the promandate proposals: "The leftist vision [of par-
ticipatory management] adopts socialist rhetoric and presents cooperation
as a new weapon in the struggle for industrial democracy and workers'
rights."460 Participatory management thus becomes a mere extension of
class warfare, designed to serve as the entering wedge that will lead to
"genuine workplace democracy."4 1  One routinely encounters this "vi-
sion" in the participatory management area. Other than a handful of old-
line union sympathizers, who see employee involvement as a threat to un-
ions, most academic commentary on participatory management is "in-
spired by New Left visions of participatory democracy, in which, as the
455. See Bainbridge, Community and Statism, supra note 191, at 879-80 ("[T]he
stakeholderists commonly point to Japan and Germany, and assert that their firms
are more efficient ... precisely because those nations mandate employee invlove-
ment .... On close examination, moreover, the evidence falls far short of making
a compelling case for the progressive communitarian account.").
456. See id. at 880 ("German-style codetermination has been found to have
the least impact on productivity and employee attitudes of any participatory man-
agement scheme."). See generally Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation is
Required in a Declining Union Environment to Provide Employees with Meaningful Indus-
trial Democracy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 135, 147-49 (1997) (outlining Germany's
established history of employee involvement programs).
457. See HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 212, at 103 ("In Japan, where consen-
sus decisionmaking and joint consultation are central to the industrial relations
system, the issue of democratization is clearly secondary to economic outcomes.").
458. Wilson McLeod, Labor-Management Cooperation: Competing Visions and La-
bor's Challenge, 12 INDUs. REL. L.J. 233, 255 n.99 (1990) (quoting Haruo Shimada as
quoted in John Hoerr, The Payoff From Teamwork, Bus. WK.,July 10, 1989, at 56, 61);
see Co-rrON, supra note 14, at 78 (noting that quality circles are not intended to
democratize workplace, but simply to provide practical mechanism for addressing
and decentralizing quality control issues).
459. HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 212, at 103-04.
460. McLeod, supra note 458, at 238.
461. Id. at 262.
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critical legal scholar Karl Klare has put it, 'the struggle [is] to make the
workplace a realm of free self-activity and expression.' 462
My point is not that ideological scholarship is inappropriate, but only
that laying bare the ideological underpinnings of promandate scholarship
permits us to evaluate their claims more fully. Would government-man-
dated employee involvement promote democratic and efficient values
widely shared within society or only the values of a sub-set of left-liber-
alism? Despite their democratic rhetoric, might the promandate argu-
ment be inconsistent with the moral norms of a democratic polity?
Despite its democratic rhetoric, Catholic social teaching, as preached
by the Bishops' pastoral letter, has a strong statist slant.463 Although they
do not support nationalizing industry, the Bishops' support of regulation
designed to protect employees and encourage their participation in cor-
porate governance differs only in degree, and not in kind, from collectiv-
ism. Indeed, Milton Friedman complained that "the collectivist moral
strain that pervades the [Bishops' pastoral letter] is repellant."4 64
Although Friedman may have gone a bit too far, it is fair to assert that the
Bishops produced a document that sounded a lot like "the platforms of
European social democratic parties."46 5 Virtually every recommendation
in the text, including those relating to participatory management, contem-
plated some form of government intervention. 466 Likewise, Pope John
Paul II's encyclicals have a strong statist flavor. Although he was sharply
462. Brody, supra note 382, at 176, 177 (quoting Karl E. Klare, JudicialDeradi-
calization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,
62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 338-39 (1978)); cf Stone, supra note 340, at 170 (discussing
labor-management cooperation). Stone stated that:
[L]abor-management cooperation is more of an ideology than a mean-
ingful description of employee participation. It is an ideology that evokes
a vision of the good-a world where labor and management work to-
gether to improve productivity, restore American competitiveness, and
increase social wealth, all the while sharing the bounty fairly and
equitably.
Id.; see Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Coopera-
tion: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 897-99 (1994)
(discussing workplace democracy); McLeod, supra note 458, at 283 (contending
that current participatory management programs are management-oriented and
arguing that unions should pursue alternative forms more favorable to labor); see
alsoJoel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERI-
CAN LABOR LAw, supra note 211, at 15, 19-23 (making both productivity and equal-
ity arguments).
463. See Milton Friedman, Good Ends, Bad Means, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC
CHALLENGE, supra note 39, at 99.
464. Id.
465. Robert Benne, The Bishops' Letter-A Protestant Reading, reprinted in THE
CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39, at 76, 79.
466. See BIsHops' LETTER, supra note 39, 1 116, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC
CHALLENGE, supra note 39, app. ("By collaborating with those national govern-
ments that serve their citizens justly and with intergovernmental agencies, these
corporations can contribute to overcoming the desperate plight of many persons
throughout the world.")
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critical of Marxism, the Pope did not disavow collectivist solutions to eco-
nomic problems. Laborem Exercens specifically posits that "one cannot ex-
clude the socialization, in suitable conditions, of certain means of
production."
467
Nothing in the moral norms of our democratic polity requires the use
of the state's monopoly on the use of coercive force to impose workplace
democracy. Life in a democratic polity does not require that all social
institutions be governed democratically. Corporations, for instance, are
not typically democratic; by their very nature, they are fundamentally exec-
utive institutions. Democratic societies tolerate a host of similarly hierar-
chical institutions, not least of which is the Catholic Church.468 Although
the Bishops presumably concede the hierarchical nature of Catholicism,
presumably they would not concede that the Church deleteriously affects
human dignity.
In fact, the moral norms of our democratic polity oppose government
imposition of mandatory employee involvement. The relevant moral/
political principle is sphere sovereignty, which posits that social institu-
tions, including both the state and the corporation, are organized hori-
zontally, that none is subordinated to the others and that each has a
sphere of authority governed by its own ordering principles. 469 Expansion
of any social institution beyond its proper sphere necessarily results in so-
cial disorder and opens the door to tyranny.
From a perspective founded on sphere sovereignty, proposals for gov-
ernment-mandated participatory management are troubling because they
threaten to invoke the state's monopoly on the use of coercive force in
ways that deny the right of humankind to order society, whether acting
individually or collectively through voluntary associations. 4 70 In a society
467. LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 123, 14, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUS-
TICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 372.
468. For a discussion of the view of the Catholic Church regarding the hierar-
chical ordering of society, see infra note 469.
469. See J. Budziszewski, The Problem with Conservatism, FIRST THINGS, Apr.
1996, at 38, 42 [hereinafter Budziszewski, Conservatism] ("Ordering social institu-
tions horizontally instead of vertically, it says that each has its own domain, its own
authority, and its own ruling norm, for instance love in the case of the family and
public justice in the case of the state."). Sphere sovereignty is a staple of Protestant
political thought. See id. ("Sphere subsidiarity is more prominent in Protestant
social thought."). Similar conclusions can be drawn from the Catholic principle of
subsidiarity. See id. ("Subsidiarity, a precept of Catholic social thought, holds that
greater and higher social institutions like the state exist just to help lesser and
subordinate ones like the family."). Unlike sphere sovereignty's horizontal order-
ing of society, subsidiarity orders society vertically, with the state above "lesser"
institutions, such as the corporation. See id. (noting Catholics' placement of cer-
tain social institutions above others). The state nevertheless transgresses its moral
authority when it absorbs or takes away the legitimate authority of lower institu-
tions. See id. (stating that "to destroy the lesser institutions, absorb them, or take
away their proper functions is" wrong and disturbance of right order).
470. See, e.g., Lodge, supra note 141, at 250-51 (describing desirability of
"clearer control by the political order").
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premised on sphere sovereignty, private property and freedom of contract
are important not in their own right, but rather because they provide es-
sential limitations on the power of the state. As Russell Kirk observed,
"Freedom and property are closely linked: separate property from private
possession, and Leviathan becomes master of all." 4 71 Sphere sovereignty
thus assumes that a limited state is an essential attribute of ordered liberty.
Liberty is best preserved if the state's monopoly on the use of coercive
force is rarely invoked and, in the main, invoked only to deal with serious
moral questions. From this perspective, the trouble with the modern state
is not its existence, but its expansion beyond those functions prescribed by
custom and convention, which were legitimized by ancient usage into the
pervasive nanny state.
Sphere sovereignty and resulting notions of limited government are
fully consistent with the natural law tradition. The great natural law
scholar Thomas Aquinas, who recognized that positive law could not re-
press all vices let alone produce all virtues, stated that positive law should
not "prohibit every vice from which virtuous men abstain, but only the
more serious ones from which the majority can abstain, especially those
that harm others and which must be prohibited for human society to sur-
vive, such as homicide, theft, and the like." 472
In sum, subordination of economic institutions to the state poses a
grave threat to personal liberty.473 Thus, resistance of further state en-
croachments responds to the "notion that the prevailing moral threat in
our era may not be the power of the corporations, but the growing power
and irresponsibility of the state."'474
C. Protection of Employee Interests
Central to many proposals mandating employee involvement is the
proposition that employees have a right to participate in corporate deci-
sionmaking to protect themselves from oppression by opportunistic man-
agers and shareholders. 4 75 Pope John Paul II, for example, calls for
worker solidarity, including mechanisms for employee participation in
firm decisionmaking, as a response to, inter alia, "exploitation" of work-
471. KIRK, CONSERVATIVE MIND, supra note 75, at 9.
472. Zuckert, supra note 32, at 711 (quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEO-
LOGICA I-I, q. 96, art. 2).
473. See, e.g., NOVAK, THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 441, at 34
(stating that "[t]he public interest is best served by an economic system powerful
enough to resist and to restrain the political system, for the classic danger to liberal
ideals comes far more from the tyranny of the public sector than from the sins of
the private sector").
474. Id.
475. See Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured
Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 137 (1993) [hereinafter Sum-
mers, Employee Voice] (assuming that voluntary relationships between employer and
employee must be regulated to prevent coercion and oppression).
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4 7 6 The U.S. Bishops even more explicitly called for "stronger institu-
tional protection," which included "granting employees greater
participation in determining the conditions of work. '47 7 This section ex-
amines both elements of the Bishops' claim: (1) that workers need protec-
tion from, inter alia, managerial and shareholder opportunism and (2)
that participatory management is an appropriate and effective means of
protecting worker interests.
There is no doubt, to paraphrase a recently popular slogan, that op-
portunism happens. Labor contracts are subject to moral hazard
problems on both sides.4 78 Workers shirk, providing less effort than that
to which they have agreed. Owners behave opportunistically, providing
fewer rewards than promised.
Opportunism occurs because investments in transaction-specific as-
sets create quasi-rents that are subject to expropriation through opportu-
nistic behavior by one of the contracting parties.4 79 In the employment
setting, the problem is usually framed as one involving breach of implicit
contracts pursuant to which. employees made investments in firm-specific
human capital. 480 Consider an employee who invests considerable time
and effort in learning how to do his or her job more effectively. Much of
this knowledge will be specific to the firm for which he or she works. The
effort and opportunity costs incurred in developing such knowledge con-
stitute an investment in firm-specific human capital upon which the em-
ployee can earn a return only so long as he or she remains with that firm.
A rational employee will invest in firm-specific human capital only if
rewarded for doing so. An implicit contract thus comes into existence
between the employee and the firm. On the one hand, employees prom-
ise to become more productive by investing in firm-specific human capital.
476. See CENTESIMUs ANNUS, supra note 2, 8, reprinted in PROCLAIMINGJUSTICE
& PEACE, supra note 2, at 438 (stating injustices inherent within labor contracts).
477. BisHoPS' LETTER, supra note 39, 300, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHAL-
LENGE, supra note 39, app. Similar claims are wide-spread in the secular humanist
literature. See, e.g., RONALD M. GREEN, THE ETHICAL MANAGER 190 (1994) [herein-
after GREEN, ETHICAL MANAGER] ("[B]ut there is another, more direct way of limit-
ing abusive conduct in this area. We could simply require employee participation in
decision making about these matters."); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corpo-
rate Law, 39 B.C. L. REv. 283, 302 (1998) ("[E]ven when workers see evidence that
the management is not acting in their best interest, there is less they can do about
it [than shareholders can].").
478. See Hausman & McPherson, supra note 74, at 684 (describing effect of
moral commitments).
479. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978) (providing formula
for computing quasi-rent value of assets and giving example).
480. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Stat-
utes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971, 1006 n.149 (1992) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Interpreting
Statutes] (citing commentaries on shareholder/stockholder interaction and hostile
takeover); see id. at 1006-08 (discussing employee-shareholder relationship, em-
ployee involvement in firm-specific human capital and vulnerability of sharehold-
ers due to implicit rather than explicit contracts).
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They bond the performance of that promise by accepting long promotion
ladders and compensation schemes that defer much of the return on their
investment until the final years of their career. Accepting deferred com-
pensation, in which salary or wages rise with seniority, provides such a
bond because the employee will carry out his or her side of the bargain to
avoid being terminated before compensation rates rise at the end of his or
her career. In return, the firm promises to fulfill its part of the bargain by
providing job security so that the employee will be able to collect that
deferred compensation.
The implicit nature of the contract in question, by which is meant its
lack of legal enforceability, leaves employees vulnerable to opportunistic
corporate actions. Because implicit contracts are enforced via moral and
market sanctions, rather than legal sanctions, there is no direct remedy for
breach of such agreements. An employee could impose a direct market
sanction on an opportunistic employer by quitting, but it is the employee's
very investment in firm-specific human capital that makes exit a costly
remedy.4 8 ' In turn, this allows for expropriation of the quasi-rent created
by their investment in such human capital. Recall that the employees' im-
plicit contracts involve delaying part of their compensation until the end
of their careers. If the firm fires its workers before the natural end of their
careers, replacing them with cheaper, younger workers, or obtains wage or
other concessions from the existing workers by threatening to displace
them or close the plant, the employees will not receive the full value of the
services they provided to the corporation. In effect, a portion of their
firm-specific human capital has been appropriated by the firm.
Opportunism can be constrained, but not eliminated, contractually.
Bargaining is costly, especially when future contingencies are difficult to
predict. Uncertainty, complexity and bounded rationality further com-
bine to ensure that labor contracts will always be incomplete. To say that
market solutions are imperfect, however, is not to say that government
should intervene. Given the moral arguments in favor of the limited state,
reviewed in the prior section, something more than a mere market failure
must be shown. Instead, the superiority of a government mandate must be
demonstrated on a case-by-case basis to warrant government involvement.
481. I do not treat investments in firm-specific human capital as a sunk cost
problem. First, doing so would ignore the incentive effects of appropriation of the
quasi-rents created by firm-specific human capital. Rational actors sink invest-
ments only if they expect to receive quasi-rents on those investments. If those
rents are subject to appropriation, rational actors will not invest in firm-specific
human capital. Thus, the problem can not be assumed away simply by viewing
those investments as sunk costs. Second, although investments in firm-specific
human capital may be properly viewed as sunk costs from an ex post perspective,
firm-specific human capital is a current asset that is subject to appropriation. Put
another way, the presence of high sunk costs is one of the essential conditions for
appropriation of quasi-rents to occur. Third, anecdotal empiricism suggests that
refusing to walk away from sunk costs is one of the most common ways in which
people systematically depart from the rational actor model.
813
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We may identify two natural law principles that are potentially rele-
vant to government intervention that is designed to prevent the opportu-
nism under consideration. First, the prohibition on doing harm. Second,
the right of self-defense.
Most ethical systems recognize a basic prohibition on doing harm. In
operationalizing this duty, we are ethically responsible both for our actions
and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of our actions. 482 Thus, we
must not only refrain from intentionally doing harm to another, but must
also seek to rectify the negative consequences of our conduct.483 There
can be little doubt that society recognizes that this moral norm applies to
the workplace. Various social norms, in fact, appear to play an important
role in preventing both shirking and opportunism. Basic fairness norms,
for example, are widely recognized in the labor setting, such as those en-
capsulated by the old saying "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay." Adher-
ence to such norms is both moral and rational.
If denying employees the right to participate in corporate decisions
directly harms them or denies them essential protections against other
forms of injury, management may have an ethical obligation to permit
such participation. Marshall Sashkin contends that denying employees
the right to participate does injure them psychologically. 48 4 His argument
depends, however, on the assertion that employees have a basic human
need to participate in decisions that affect them. As I demonstrated in
Part II, this line of argument lacks traction.48 5 Even if Sashkin's empirical
assumptions about human needs were valid, moreover, it is not clear that
the purported psychological harm caused employees by a denial of partici-
pation rights rises to an ethically cognizable level:
If one never were to do anything that might psychologically harm
another person, a supervisor would be prohibited, for example,
from refusing to hire someone who lacked crucial skills, firing a
dishonest employee, redesigning a job in a way that somebody
did not like, or requiring an employee to meet quality or service
standards that were higher than his or her personal ones. 4 8 6
482. See Sashkin, Participative Management, supra note 141, at 16 (citing view of
philosopher Gregory Boudreaux that management should be responsible for "rea-
sonably predictable consequences" of its actions and asserting that "this seems to
me to be a. reasonable minimal ethical, requirement for the practice of
management").
483. See id. ("[O]ne is obliged both to prevent harm and to rectify the nega-
tive consequences of one's actions, when those consequences were reasonably
predictable.").
484. See id. (arguing that failing to satisfy basic human work needs harms em-
ployees psychologically).
485. For a discussion of Sashkin's argument, see supra notes 222-24 and ac-
companying text.
486. Locke et al., supra note 143, at 76.
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To be sure, an ideal ethical system might seek to prevent any harm, irre-
spective of its magnitude, Given the above-noted limits of positive law in a
fallen society, however, the law inevitably ignores de minimis harms. As
such, I do not regard the natural law principle against doing harm as hav-
ing significant justificatory force in this context. Instead, the moral claim
that employees are entitled to participate in firm decisionmaking must
rest on their natural right to self-defense.
The right of self-defense is a basic principle of most Western ethical
systems. It is also a basic element of human nature. In the workplace, this
tends to translate into workers' recognition of their need for protection
against management opportunism: "[W] orkers in the West seem less con-
cerned to manage the organizations they work in than to defend their
interests against those who manage them, whether the organizations are in
'private' or in 'public' hands."487 Because of the disparities of power in
the employment setting, however, self-defense by workers against manage-
rial opportunism typically requires some form of collective action. Taken
together, these considerations justify the conclusion that employees have a
natural right to unionize and to bargain collectively with their employers.
The Catholic Church has long (and I think correctly) asserted the exist-
ence of such a right.
4 88
487. Plamenatz, supra note 157, at 298.
488. See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 300, 68.1, reprinted in PROCLAIMING
JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 203 (stating that "[a] mong the basic rights of the
human person is to be numbered the right of freely founding unions for working
people"); see also BisHoPs' LETrER, supra note 39, It 10-27, reprinted in THE CATHO-
LIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39, app. (discussing need for stronger institutional pro-
tections for workers in firms); CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 2, 35, reprinted in
PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 459 ("Here we find a wide range of
opportunities for commitment and effort in the name of justice on the part of
trade unions and other workers' organizations.").
Although I am generally satisfied that employees have a natural right to act
collectively, I want to note a possible counter-argument based on scripture. See 1
Peter 2:18-24 (calling for servants to be submissive to masters). The apostle coun-
sels slaves to submit to their masters, even "those who are harsh." Id. Citing
Christ's example as the suffering servant, Peter suggests that patient endurance of
injustice is part of the Christian's obligation. See id. (noting that when individuals
suffer patiently, they have God's approval). Translated to the modern employ-
ment setting, this passage implies an obligation for workers likewise to submit to
injustices by their employers. Recognizing that doing so requires a level of virtue
verging on the heroic, however, I am inclined to regard the apostle's call as being
aspirational and impractical as a governing norm for a fallen'society.
Recognizing the potential of unions. to protect worker interests and the legiti-
macy of their role in doing so, however, does not mean that we should give unions
the unqualified endorsement offered by the Bishops. See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra
note 300, 1 68.1, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 203
(stating that unionization is basic right); see also BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 39,
300, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39, app. (discussing poten-
tial protection for workers); CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 2, 25, reprinted in
PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 2, at 450 (citing beneficial effects of un-
ions). The Bishops' Letter wholly ignores the risk that cooperating groups, includ-
ing unions, may exert their self-interest in ways that border on monopoly. See
Benne, supra note 465, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, sup-a note 39, at 81
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Recognizing a natural right to collective action by workers is also justi-
fiable on efficiency grounds, which helps it meet Finnis's test of practical
reasonableness. 489 A once dominant view of unions asserted that their
primary purpose was to capture monopoly rents for workers in the form of
higher wages and superior benefits. 490 More recent work, however, sug-
gests that unions serve a transaction cost economizing function.
4 9
'
Although firms may sometimes have ex post incentives to appropriate firm-
specific investments by workers, the plausible assumption that workers
value job security holds out the prospect of reduced labor costs ex ante if
firms can credibly promise to refrain from subsequent appropriations. A
firm that makes such a promise can bond it by signing a collective bargain-
ing agreement with a union.
During the unions' prime, many mechanisms of employer opportu-
nism, such as job reclassifications, automation and plant closings, were
foreclosed to managers because such actions were the subject of
mandatory bargaining between the employer and its unions.49 2 In addi-
tion, unions provided a variety of permanent structural protections against
employer opportunism, such as severance pay, grievance procedures and
promotion ladders. 493 Finally, the union-based collective bargaining sys-
tem provided monitoring and enforcement mechanisms through the
grievance and arbitration systems. 49 4 An old saying nicely captures this
allocation of managerial and union functions: "[M]anagement acts, and
(stating that Bishops' enthusiasm for partnership and participation is too uncriti-
cal). Basic interest-group political theory tells us that unions may use their polit-
ical power to feather their own nests at the expense of society as a whole. See id.
(discussing harmful effects of unions on overall position of nation). Milton Fried-
man has forcefully argued, for example, that the union-supported Davis-Bacon Act,
40 U.S.C. § 276a to a-5 (1994), has had negative economic repercussions for Afri-
can-Americans and other minorities. See Friedman, supra note 463, reprinted in THE
CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra note 39, at 103 (stating that "[g] overnment support of
trade unions has reduced the opportunities available to the disadvantaged").
489. See generally Caryn L. Beck-Dudley & EdwardJ. Conry, Legal Reasoning and
Practical Reasonableness, 33 AM. Bus. LJ. 91, 93 (1995) (stating that their purpose is
"to develop a framework for legal reasoning based on John Finnis' conception of
'practicable reasonableness"' and "to demonstrate how an inclusive natural law
framework can be used in 'redrafting' a U.S. Supreme Court decision on a busi-
ness issue").
490. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 321, at 252 (stating
that dominant view of unions is that their main purpose is to raise wages, and that
this function has been referred to as "the monopoly face of unionism").
491. See id. at 254-56 (describing efficiency-based functions of unions).
492. See Stone, supra note 340, at 89-90 (discussing Fibreboard v. NLRB, 379
U.S. 203 (1964)).
493. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE LJ. 1197, 1208
(1993) [hereinafter Williamson, Governance] ("The grievance machinery and asso-
ciated job structures-ports of entry, promotion ladders, bumping, and so forth-
are thus important parts of efficient governance.").
494. See KocHAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 83 (stating that grievance and arbi-
tration procedures perform function of managing conflicts and excusing proce-
dural adjudication of individual rights at workplace).
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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workers and their unions grieve." 495 All of this served to make the firm's
basic promises more credible.
Changes in the law that reduced the scope of mandatory bargain-
ing,49 6 and the declining strength of private sector unions, have largely
eliminated these traditional sources of protection against managerial op-
portunism. As Oliver Williamson observes, however, the mutual interest of
workers and firms in the transaction cost benefits of unionization should
have, and sometimes did, lead to the development of company unions
before they were outlawed by the Wagner Act.4 9 7 If the current legal ban
on company unions was lifted, might participatory management programs
evolve into de facto company unions that could take over some of the
functions traditionally performed by adversarial unions? I see no evidence
that participatory management today serves to protect workers from ap-
propriation of firm-specific human capital or, for that matter, from any
other form of management exploitation. Nor do I see any evidence that it
is evolving in that direction. Full development of these themes is unneces-
sary here, however, because I have dealt with them elsewhere. 498 Instead,
I turn now to considering whether government-mandated employee in-
volvement might turn the trick.
One can concede both that workers are vulnerable to employer op-
portunism and that workers have a right to defend themselves against such
conduct without having to concede that workers have a right to participate
in corporate decisionmaking. My argument has several parts. First is an
empirical claim that managerial opportunism is probably rare. If so, gov-
ernment-mandated participatory management cannot be justified on this
ground, lest the "tail wag the dog." Second, employee participation cre-
ates perverse incentives. Third and finally, despite claims to the contrary
by promandate scholars, employees are adequately protected through
other contractual and legislative means that do not present the same sort
of moral hazard.499
Conceding that firms have a variety of incentives to appropriate the
quasi-rents generated when employees invest in firm-specific human capi-
tal, I nevertheless suspect that opportunistic breaches of implicit contracts
are probably rare.50 0 Many employees simply do not have significant firm-
495. Id. at 27.
496. See Stone, supra note 340, at 90-91 (citing cases involving numerous is-
sues that courts have found not to be within scope of bargaining).
497. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994); see WILLtAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 321, at 255 (discussing developments of "company unions" in pre-Wag-
ner Act era).
498. See Bainbridge, Organizational Failures Analysis, supra note 10 (finding
that participatory management does not serve to protect workers).
499. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 477, at 301 (noting that workers have less
protection against managerial opportunism than shareholders).
500. See O'Connor, Human Capital Era, supra note 17, at 909-10 (discussing
enforcement mechanisms that ensure implicit employment arrangements are ful-
filled, including 'Job market falls").
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specific human capital that is subject to expropriation. 50 1 With regard to
such employees, there are no implicit contracts to be breached. Indeed,
given current economic trends, there appears to be a decreasing number
of such implicit contracts with which we need to be concerned. In many
front-line industries, skills evolve so rapidly that the skills of even quite
young employees become obsolete and they are replaced by still younger
workers. 50 2 This seems like the extreme case of the promandate argu-
ment that workers whose investments are in firm-specific human capital
are exploited almost immediately, rather than at the end of a long ca-
reer. 50 3 In fact, it has led to a situation in which the old implicit contract
between workers and companies, in which workers traded loyalty for job
security, is "nearly dead. '50 4 Instead, the labor relationship is increasingly
viewed as temporary by both sides. Job mobility is increasingly more com-
mon than job security. 50 5 In such an environment, workers seem more
likely to develop general human capital rather than firm-specific human
capital and, therefore, implicit labor contracts may never come into
existence. 506
501. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Labor Law Successorship: A
Corporate Law Approach, 92 MICH. L. Rv. 203, 233 (1993) [hereinafter Rock &
Wachter, Labor Law Successorship] (distinguishing between external labor market
and internal labor market). The point is not that such employees have no firm-
specific capital. See id. (stating that there is little potential for rent seeking in exter-
nal labor market). It has been argued that internal labor markets (the intra-firm
employment relationship) necessarily entail "a bilateral monopoly with considera-
ble potential for rent seeking." Id. Both firms and workers make transaction-spe-
cific investments, which are lost if the relationship is terminated. See id. (noting
that this occurs once investments are "tied together" in internal labor market).
Moreover, information about the relationship is asymmetrically distributed. See id.
"Firms have private information about product markets and conditions and avail-
able technologies while workers have information advantages concerning their
own work effort and opportunity wages if a new job were sought." Id. One can
concede all of this without conceding the proposition that this results in "consider-
able" risk of rent seeking. See id. ("As a result, the ILM, unlike the ELM, is not a
competitive market, but, rather, is better modeled as a bilateral monopoly with
considerable potential for rent seeking."). There necessarily is a question of de-
gree here.
502. See Brian O'Reilly, The New Deal: What Companies and Employees Owe Each
Other, FORTUNE, June 13, 1994, at 44, 50 (describing lack of job security presently
encountered by many workers in competitive markets and offering statistics con-
cerning percentages of employees reporting their relative level of job security).
503. See Craver, supra note 456, at 156 ("Congress now should provide rank-
and-file employees and lower level managers with fundamental employment dig-
nity and true industrial democracy. Fulfilling this objective requires federal legisla-
tion mandating appropriate employee involvement.").
504. O'Reilly, supra note 502, at 44.
505. See id. at 44-45 (describing emergence of new relationships between em-
ployers and employees, requiring new forms of commitments by both partners).
506. Although some may find this market trend deplorable, it may actually be
economically rational for workers as well as firms. Consider the classic dichotomy
between exit and voice. Participation rights (voice) is neither a necessary nor even
desirable response to oppression so long as exit is an option. To be sure, invest-
ments in firm-specific human capital raise the cost of exit. Meaningfully exercising
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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As to those employees who do make significant investments in firm-
specific human capital, firms have a strong ex ante incentive to provide
such employees with meaningful protections against the firm's ex post in-
centive to expropriate the resulting quasi-rents. 50 7 There must be some
credibility to the firm's promise of job security. Otherwise, fear of losing
their investment in firm-specific human capital will lead employees to ex
ante decide on a suboptimal level of investment in such capital. As such, it
is not in the firm's best interest to breach firm-specific human-capital im-
plicit contracts. 5
0 8
In many cases, employees can reduce the firm's incentives to breach
implicit employment contracts by investing their own resources in devel-
oping their firm-specific human capital. The employee most obviously
pays for training by investing time and effort in the project. He or she also
does so, however, by accepting a wage that is lower than the wage that
someone with his or her new skills could obtain in a competitive labor
market. In this way, employees receive some protection against opportu-
nistic conduct by management because the employer would lose money by
terminating them.
50 9
Even if opportunism is common, it would not necessarily follow that
the law ought to prevent it. For example, it seems probable that managers
have greater investments in firm-specific human capital than do produc-
voice, however, requires a greater investment in firm-specific human capital, creat-
ing a vicious circle. As exit becomes a progressively less attractive option, greater
voice becomes necessary, which makes exit increasingly less attractive. The wise
employee ex ante would opt for a labor market variant of the Wall Street Rule: It is
easier to switch than fight.
507. Misbehavior by management may lead to employee retaliation, such as
"work to the rule" slow-downs. Management opportunism also increases labor
costs in the form of the higher wages that a known cheater must pay to attract new
workers. Moreover, even in some final period situations, there is still an incentive
to behave honorably to maintain one's reputation for fair dealing. One suspects
that managers "seek to keep [those commitments], both for reasons of personal
honor and for reasons of continuing to solicit devoted duty from other employ-
ees." Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 154
(1988) [hereinafter Demsetz, Theory of the Firm].
508. In any event, the incentive firms have to breach implicit'labor contracts
is offset to some extent by the comparable incentives employees have to breach
those same contracts. Firms that invest in training and education of workers de-
velop both the workers' firm-specific and general-human capital. In economic
terms, these investments are a sunk cost from which the employer expects to de-
rive quasi-rents. Because employers have a very limited ability to bind employees
to the firm, however, employees could appropriate the value of those quasi-rents
by moving to a new job at a higher wage that reflects their more valuable human
capital. Unless one believes that employer breaches are empirically more common
or morally more worthy of condemnation, there is no moral justification for inter-
vening to protect only one side of the equation.
509. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 192, at 330 (discussing em-
ployment at will and creation ofjob security). The costs of recruiting and training
a new worker would further deter the employer from opportunistic conduct. See
WEILER, supra note 164, at 145-47 (discussing significant costs incurred by employ-
ers in recruiting and training new workers).
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tion employees. Evidence of the importance of firm-specific human capi-
tal to managerial employees is provided by the fact that senior managers
tend to be "home-grown," having spent thirty years or more with their
firm. 5 10 In theory, this should give managers an even stronger claim to
protection of their implicit contracts than is the case with respect to pro-
duction workers. Yet, even as it applies to managerial employees, the law
does not prevent all breaches of those contracts. In corporate takeovers,
for example, it is top and middle managers, not production employees,
who are most likely to lose theirjobs.51 ' Although the law has given man-
agers some significant tools with which to fight hostile takeovers, it has not
given them carte blanche. 5 12
One reason courts have been loath to give managers free rein to resist
hostile takeovers is a concern that management resistance is likely moti-
vated by selfish interests rather than the best interests of the enterprise's
many constituents. 513 Proposals to mandate employee involvement are
likewise suspect because of the conflicts of interest inherent in employee
participation. In making their case for employee involvement, the Bishops
naively assumed that the introduction of participatory practices would do
away with conflicts of interest within firms.5 14 In fact, however, mandatory
employee involvement will likely result in a substantial increase in agency
costs.
The analysis herein again focuses on proposals to mandate employee
representation on the board of directors, such as that found in the Ger-
man system of codetermination. 515 The most obvious source of concern
510. See Sherwin Rosen, Transaction Costs and Internal Labor Markets, in THE
NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 75, 77 (Oliver E.
Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991) ("Top-level executives in major U.S.
corporations are mostly 'home grown,' having spent thirty years or more with their
firms in lesser positions before breaking into the top echelons.").
511. See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation,
9 YALEJ. ON REG. 119, 141 (1992) [hereinafter Romano, A Guide to Takeovers] (stat-
ing that "it is middle management.., and not production plant employees, whose
ranks are slimmed down after acquisitions"). Indeed, some data suggest that take-
overs increased union member wealth. See id. ("Rosett tests Shleifer and Summers'
breach of contract explanation more directly by examining union wage contracts
before and after takeovers. He finds no support for their thesis: there is, in fact, a
positive gain in union wealth levels after hostile acquisitions."). Given that take-
overs are the transactional context in which exploitation of labor is most often
alleged to exist, these data undercut the exploitation argument.
512. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) (stating that "[a] corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat
any perceived threat by any Draconian means available").
513. See id. (recognizing inherent conflict of interest when managers resist
takeovers).
514. See Benne, supra note 465, reprinted in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE, supra
note 39, at 81 (labeling Bishops' suggestions as "disturbing").
515. I do not propose to defend herein either the proposition that only share-
holders should be entitled to elect the board or that managers should owe fiduci-
ary duties only to shareholders. I have offered my views on those issues elsewhere.
See generally Bainbridge, Organizational Failures Analysis, supra note 10 (providing
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in such proposals is the possibility that employee representation will per-
mit management to pursue its own self-interest, at the expense of both
shareholders and employees, by playing worker and shareholder repre-
sentatives against each other. Legal and market accountability mecha-
nisms constrain this tendency, but because they are not perfect, there
remains the possibility that self-interested managers may throw their sup-
port behind the side of the board whose interests happen to coincide with
those of management in the issue at hand.5 16 Because employee repre-
sentation on the board weakens a key accountability mechanism, as devel-
oped below, this conflict is especially serious.
This conflict is well-known, but there is a more subtle problem that is
often overlooked. Corporate employees have an incentive to shirk so long
as their compensation does not perfectly align their incentives with those
of the firm's shareholders. In turn, knowing of this phenomenon, the
firm's shareholders should expect management to reduce the compensa-
tion of the firm's employees by the amount necessary to offset the ex-
pected degree of employee shirking. Because ex antewage adjustments are
rarely fully compensatory, however, the firm's shareholders should expect
management to monitor the employees and punish ex post those detected
to be shirking. 517 Would it not seem odd that those who are to be moni-
tored should be allowed to choose the monitors? One of the accountabil-
ity mechanisms that aligns managerial and shareholder interests is
monitoring by the board of directors. Allowing employee representation
on the board reduces the likelihood that the board will be an effective
monitoring device. Workers have an interest in supporting rules that free
management from oversight by shareholders. 5 18 "Capital could seek prof-
its by getting highly motivated managers who sweat the labor force."5 19
Therefore, managerial shirking of its monitoring responsibilities often will
redound to the workers' benefit, which suggests that employee representa-
tives on the board of directors are less likely to insist on disciplining lax
managers than are shareholder representatives. If employees are entitled
to voting representation on the board of directors, we would expect moni-
explanation for reason shareholders enjoy voting rights and discussing fiduciary
duties); Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at 657 (discussing rise
of participatory management); Bainbridge, Shareholder Wealth, supra note 318, at
1426 (discussing shortcomings of Green's model).
516. See William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L.
REV. 385, 420-24 (1990) [hereinafter Carney, Defining Constituencies] (discussing
managerial behavior along with loss of accountability and last period problems).
517. See Benjamin Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation
of Ownership and Control, 26J.L. & ECON. 367, 368 n.2 (1983) (stating that "in many
cases letting the agent shirk and discounting his wage will not be an economical
solution because the gain to the shirker and therefore his acceptable compensat-
ing wage discount is less than the cost to the firm from the shirking behavior").
518. See ROE, supra note 366, at 44 (stating that "[w]hen law creates gaps in
the responsiveness of managers to capital, then managers have less incentive to
squeeze every penny of production out of labor").
519. Id.
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toring by the board and its subordinate managers to be less effective,
which in turn we would expect to cause an increase in agency costs.
520
The prediction that agency costs rise when employees are represented
on the board is supported by evidence from the German experience with
codetermination. 521 It is widely reported, for example, that labor's pres-
ence on the supervisory board impedes cost-cutting measures that ad-
versely affect workers. 522 Codetermination is also said to impede the
market for corporate control, an important accountability mechanism for
U.S. firms, by making hostile takeovers more difficult.
523
Proponents of government-mandated employee involvement could
concede the existence of this conflict of interest without conceding that it
falsifies their argument; and they would have a point. To say that some-
one has a conflict of interest is to describe the state of being in which they
find themselves, but it does not connote blameworthiness. In general, cor-
porate law does not prohibit transactions because one party has a conflict
of interest; it merely polices such transactions. Promandate scholars and
theologians might argue that the law should do the same with regard to
employee involvement. This is fair enough, but while corporate law toler-
ates many conflicts of interest, the benefits of doing so ought to outweigh
the costs. The preceding analysis suggests that the costs of employee rep-
resentation are high. The analysis that follows suggests that the benefits,
both to shareholders and workers, are small.
Although it is sometimes asserted that employee representation
would benefit the board by promoting "discussion and consideration of
alternative perspectives and arguments," 524 there is reason to doubt
520. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 443, at 304 (stating that "[c]ontrol of
agency problems in the decision process is important when the decision managers
who initiate and implement important decisions.., do not bear a major share of
the wealth effects of their decisions" and that "[w]ithout effective control proce-
dures, such decision managers are more likely to take actions that deviate from the
interests of residual claimants"). This argument is a specific application of Fama
and Jensen's thesis that agency costs in complex organizations are reduced when
decision management is separated from decision control. See id. (discussing rela-
tions between risk bearing and decision process of organizations).
521. See ROE, supra note 366, at 213 (stating that "codetermination is a coun-
terweight to capital" in German boardrooms, in which employees comprise exactly
half of supervisor boards' seats).
522. See id. at 214 (comparing American and German ideological traditions
and effect of codetermination on German corporate governance); Hopt, supra
note 350, at 208 (discussing possible effects of labor codetermination on outcome
of decisionmaking); Romano, A Cautionary Note, supra note 379, at 2031 (stating
that "[t]here is some anecdotal evidence that codetermination is not the ideal ar-
rangement from the shareholders' perspective").
523. See ROE, supra note 366, at 214 (citing one explanation for failure of
German firms to reincorporate elsewhere in response to codetermination); Hopt,
supra note 350, at 213 (discussing German tendency to shy away from
codetermination).
524. Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, Protecting the Employment Bargain,
43 U. TORONTO L.J. 751, 769 (1993).
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whether those benefits are very significant. Michael Dooley opines that
workers will be indifferent to most corporate decisions that do not bear
directly on working conditions and benefits. 525 "As to the majority of
managerial policies concerning, for example, dividend and investment
policies, product development, and the like, the typical employee has as
much interest and as much to offer as the typical purchaser of light
bulbs."5 26 Dooley's argument is supported by a number of empirical stud-
ies. John Witte's case study, for example, found that workers who did not
desire participation often cited a lack of managerial expertise as the rea-
son.527 John Cotton's review of the literature concluded that participatory
management is most effective when it is directed at "one's everyday work,
not [at] deciding policy issues of the entire organization."528 Sagie and
Koslowsky found that subordinate participation in tactical decisions (those
dealing with working methods), as opposed to strategic decisions (those
dealing with the initiation of a new product or service), was a better pre-
dictor of an increase in change acceptance, work satisfaction, effectiveness
and time allotted to work.52 9 All of this tends to suggest that employee
representatives add little to the board except increased labor advocacy.
Employees also do not appear likely to benefit significantly from
mandatory representation on the board. Instead, employees probably get
greater benefits from other forms of protection. Indeed, just as I argued
above that participatory management is unlikely to encourage worker pro-
ductivity or reduce worker alienation, I am likewise doubtful of its ability
to protect workers from managers determined to behave opportunistically.
Consider, for example, the rule proposed by Ronald Green requiring
that employers "elicit the advice and consent of employees" before making
major corporate decisions that affect the employees. 530 Green never
525. See Michael P. Dooley, European Proposals for Worker Information and
Codetermination: An American Comment [hereinafter Dooley, American Comment], in
HARMONIZATION OF THE LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, AND CORPORATION LAw 128-29 (Peter E. Herzog ed., 1983) (ar-
guing that typical employee of corporation does not have much interest in major-
ity of managerial policies).
526. Id. at 129; accord Locke et al., supra note 143, at 70 (noting that including
employees in decisionmaking for which they lack information leads to poor deci-
sions and bad morale).
527. See WrITE, supra note 162, at 36-37 (discussing reasons that workers do
not support participation).
528. COTTON, supra note 14, at 233; see id. at 235 (discussing ideal employee
involvement program).
529. See Abraham Sagie & Meni Koslowsky, Organizational Attitudes and Behav-
iors as a Function of Participation in Strategic and Tactical Change Decisions: An Applica-
tion of Path-Goal Theory, 15 J. ORG. BEHAV. 37, 38-39 (1994) (reporting results of
increased employee participation in tactical decisionmaking).
530. GREEN, ETHICAL MANAGER, supra note 477, at 191. Green's argument dif-
fers from the usual secular humanist line of reasoning. Green contends that a
moral basis for this asserted fight can be found in an ethical framework that he
calls neutral, omnipartial rule-making, which in this context requires one to ask
the question, "How would I or any other omnipartial rational person feel about
823
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makes entirely clear how a right to advise and consent would operate.5 3 1
If we focus on the advice element of the rule, it would be limited to, for
example, providing a formal mechanism for employees to provide input
during the decisionmaking process. 'A right to participate in this fashion is
essentially meaningless. So long as the final decision rests with manage-
ment, employee input cannot prevent opportunistic behavior. Certainly,
having their voices heard may give the employees a "warm and fuzzy" feel-
ing, but that feeling is unlikely to last very long if management goes for-
ward with its opportunistic plans. If we take seriously the consent element
of Green's rule, however, it effectively becomes a veto on management
decisionmaking. An apt analogy may be made to the Senate's power to
advise and consent to presidential appointments. 532 The power to advise
living in a world governed by the moral rules implicit in [the employer's] con-
duct?" Id. at 188. An "omnipartial" person approaches competing claims with "en-
gaged, involved neutrality and evenhandedness." Id. at 189. Green asserts that the
risk that unilateral employer decisionmaking may lead to abuse of employeesjusti-
ies his rule under that standard. See id. (introducing his revised proposed moral
rule by stating "[b] ut there is another, more direct way of limiting abusive conduct
in this area"). I have serious doubts about the utility of Green's methodology. It is
inherently subjective. Outcomes will largely rest on how the question is posed and
who is asked to answer it. In an earlier exchange on the related issue of stake-
holder rights, for example, Green and I suggested quite different answers to the
same question. Compare Bainbridge, Shareholder Wealth, supra note 318, at 1423
("Our hosts nonetheless posit... that the shareholder wealth maximization norm
is both descriptively and normatively deficient. Frankly, I'm not persuaded."), with
Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1409, 1413-14 (1993) [hereinafter Green, Share-
holders as Stakeholders] (demonstrating misunderstood realities of shareholder-
management relationship, including assertion that "shareholders have no right to
control the use of corporate assets" and fact that limited liability contributes to
lack of shareholder commitment). As such, Green's approach is poorly suited to
the task of determining whether employee participation constitutes a moral norm
as that term is used herein. See GREEN, ETHICAL MANAGER, supra note 477, at 191
(admitting that "within a framework establishing the basic moral principle of em-
ployee advice and consent in pension matters, each of these questions requires
more focused moral analysis"). In fairness, however, that does not appear to be a
task Green has undertaken. See id. ("We need not anticipate all this thinking here.
More important is our grasp of the basic reasoning leading to a high-level moral
norm of this sort.").
531. See GREEN, ETHICAL MANAGER, supra note 477, at 191 (asserting revised
proposed moral rule requiring advice and consent of employees without explain-
ing such processes). As Green recognizes, his bare bones moral rule would need
to be considerably fleshed out before being implemented as a legal norm. See id.
("A basic moral rule of this sort leaves many practical questions unanswered ... for
one thing, there is the question of what 'advice and consent' means."). Perhaps an
even more serious flaw is Green's failure to specify the situations in which a right
to participate would arise. See id. (applying proposed moral rule only to specific
situation of pension fund negotiation without discussing crossover into any other
potential area of conflict).
532. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (establishing Senate's role in confirming Cabi-
net nominees and other executive officers). See generally William G. Ross, The Sen-
ate's Constitutional Role in Confirming Cabinet Nominees and Other Executive Officers, 48
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1123, 1129-30 (1998) (discussing interpretations of Appointment
Clause).
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is given teeth by the power to consent, without which the appointee may
not take office. In view of the conflict of interest identified above, a
worker veto would create serious hold-out problems. Workers would be
empowered to behave opportunistically by withholding their consent from
management proposals without some form of sidepayment.
The economic and political unfeasibility of a worker veto is forcefully
illustrated by the experience with German codetermination. Although
codetermination gives German workers greater board representation than
any U.S. form of employee involvement, the German legislature has been
unwilling to give workers a veto. As already noted, shareholders retain a
slight (but critical) numerical advantage on the board. Moreover, Ger-
man managers sometimes deprive the supervisory board of information
because they do not want the supervisory board's employee members to
learn it. 5 3 3 Alternatively, the board's real work is sometimes done in com-
mittees or de facto rump caucuses from which employee representatives
are excluded.53 4 As a result, while codetermination raises the costs of
decisionmaking, it may not have much effect on substantive decisionmak-
ing. This prediction is borne out by the Scandinavian experience with
codetermination, where it reportedly has had little substantive effect on
corporate decisionmaking. 535 Absent a veto, however, workers would be
better advised to rely on self-help (exit or work to rule slow-downs), con-
tracts and general welfare legislation for protection against management
opportunism.
Kent Greenfield recently opined, in contrast, that "[i]t would hardly
seem obvious to most people, especially to most workers, that employees
have greater ability to protect themselves from managerial exploitation
than do capital investors." 536 Having weighed in on the contractarian side
of this debate elsewhere, however, I shall not delay the reader by re-
hashing those arguments here. 537 Instead, I pause only to make a point
that I have not made elsewhere; namely, that the risk that a firm will ap-
propriate quasi-rents created by employee investments in firm-specific
human capital at most argues for some protection against coerced, mid-
stream changes in explicit and implicit contracts making up the corporate
533. See ROE, supra note 366, at 177 (giving examples of effects of German
codetermination); Hopt, supra note 350, at 206 (stating that tendencies exist to
keep information given to supervisory board at low level).
534. See Summers, Codetermination, supra note 14, at 166 (discussing exclusion
of employee representatives from real decisionmaking process).
535. See Tove H. Hammer et al., Worker Representation on Boards of Directors: A
Study of Competing Roles, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 661, 663 (1991) (discussing
Scandinavia's experience with different forms of worker participation and labor's
involvement in organizational decisionmaking).
536. Greenfield, supra note 477, at 314.
537. See generally Bainbridge, Community and Statism, supra note 191, at 858,
873-902 (characterizing contractarianism and discussing incompleteness of con-
tract criticism); Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 5, at 657 (charac-
terizing firms as nexus of contracts).
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employment relationship. A direct analogy is provided by the nexus of
contract literature on corporate charter provisions. Virtually all con-
tractarians agree that charter and by-law provisions adopted prior to the
corporation's initial public offering are wholly unproblematic. 538 The
capital markets readily can price such provisions, such that shareholders
who purchase shares in the initial public offering can be treated as having
accepted the terms of the corporate contract. There is somewhat less
agreement about mid-stream changes in the charter or by-law provisions,
as some contractarian scholars argue that shareholders can be coerced
into accepting such changes. 539 These scholars argue for legal rules pro-
tecting shareholders against mid-stream changes. 540 The same rationale
ought to apply to the labor market. Although competition in external la-
bor markets fully protects employees at the time the employment relation-
ship is created, a case might be made by analogy to the charter and by-law
amendment debate for protecting employees who accept a position with a
firm from subsequent changes in the conditions of employment. Ironi-
cally, this would argue against imposition of mandatory employee partici-
pation, because for many employees, participatory management would
constitute a substantial change in their working conditions. In any case,
the argument for giving employees a voice in corporate governance to
protect them from adverse mid-stream changes is not robust. Even con-
ceding arguendo that employees are powerless to bargain ex ante for pro-
tections against subsequent changes in their working conditions, why
should one expect that a voice in corporate governance would provide
much protection in this regard as long as employees lack a veto over such
changes?
In any case, the argument against government-mandated employee
involvement does not depend on the claim that workers are adequately
protected either by contract or self-help. As private sector unions have
declined, the government has intervened to provide, through general wel-
fare legislation, many of the same protections for which unions once bar-
538. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:
The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1820, 1820 (1989)
[hereinafter Bebchuck, Limiting Contractual Freedom] (taking issue with "the in-
creasingly influential view that companies should be completely free to opt out of
corporate law rules by adopting appropriate charter provisions").
539. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395, 1399 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Debate on Contrac-
tual Freedom] (outlining two sides of debate on contractual freedom mid-stream).
540. See id. at 1399-1404 (summarizing debate regarding contractual freedom
in corporate law).
[Vol. 43: p. 741
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gained. 541 The Family and Medical Leave Act 542 grants unpaid leave for
medical and other family problems. 54 3 The Occupational Safety and
Health Act 544 mandates safe working conditions. 545 Plant closing laws re-
quire notice of layoffs. 546 Civil rights laws protect against discrimination
of various sorts.
5 4 7
This observation runs counter to Kent Greenfield's recent assertion
that society reasonably might "decide to forgo the possibility of very high
corporate profits in order to avoid the disproportionate harm workers (or
communities, or creditors) would suffer if risky business decisions do not
pay off."'548 Such arguments are a staple of the promandate literature, as
well as related stakeholder literature, but they present a false dichotomy.
Implicit in Greenfield's argument is the notion that incorporating
codetermination and related stakeholder rights into U.S. corporate law is
all that stands between workers and the poor house. Society could equally
decide that corporate law ought to be concerned with maximizing share-
holder value, however, while leaving worker* protection issues to general
welfare legislation in other areas. 54 9
541. See Geu & Davis, supra note 146, at 1696 (discussing congressional in-
volvement in bargaining over prohibitions against hiring undocumented workers,
unpaid medical leave, maintenance of reasonably safe workplace and advance no-
tice of layoffs). Acknowledging the role of the state as a source of employee pro-
tection also raises the question of whether additional state intervention in the form
of mandatory employee involvement is morally appropriate. The relevant princi-
ple again is sphere sovereignty, which argues against further expansion of the
state's role. For a discussion of sphere sovereignty, see supra notes 469-74 and
accompanying text.
542. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
543. See id. § 2612(a) (establishing entitlement to leave and expiration of
such entitlement for reasons of birth or adoption of child, need to care for ill or
close relative or serious health condition in employee).
544. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
545. See id. § 651 (stating congressional findings, declaring purposes and au-
thorizing Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health
standards).
546. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1994) (requiring employer to issue 60-day written
notice before plant closings and mass layoffs).
547. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (establishing liability for violation of civil
rights provided for by Constitution and its Amendments).
548. Greenfield, supra note 477, at 310.
549. To be sure, general welfare legislation of the forms discussed is subject to
much the same critique to which I have subjected proposals to mandate employee
involvement. To forestall charges I am attempting to have my cake and eat it too, I
make three observations. First, I am evaluating government mandated employee
involvement against the backdrop of existing general welfare legislation, not criti-
quing that backdrop. Second, granting workers participation rights in light of the
backdrop of general welfare legislation amounts to a second bite out of the apple.
I have attempted to demonstrate that the costs associated with such a "second bite"
outweigh the benefits, both in an economic and a moral sense. Third and finally,
for the reasons developed below, I believe a sharp division between rules of corpo-
rate governance and general welfare legislation should be preserved.
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Indeed, such an approach has much to commend it. A defense of
shareholder wealth maximization as a moral norm might begin with prag-
matic arguments about the size of the economic pie. Those who favor
distributional concerns over wealth maximization often give short shrift to
the positive effects of shareholder wealth maximization. In contrast, I pre-
fer the old adage "a rising tide lifts all boats." Critics of neoclassical eco-
nomics often fail to take into account the secondary, unintended effects of
regulating economic activity. Because the secondary effects are often
counter to and larger than the primary intended effects, more social legis-
lation makes matters worse, not better. This is so, even if one rejects pub-
lic choice-based arguments about the merits of regulation, because the law
of unintended consequences inevitably follows from the bounded rational-
ity of human minds. Accordingly, whatever distribution scheme society
adopts, everyone is likely to be better off if the pie to be distributed is
larger. From this perspective, wealth creation and distribution are two in-
dependent questions. Society's first task is to set up wealth maximizing
rules to encourage wealth creation. Only then should society consider dis-
tributional questions. By separating corporate law, with its wealth max-
imization norm, from general welfare legislation, society appears to have
struck just that balance.
V. CONCLUSION
Although many scholars have argued that employees have a moral
right to participate in corporate decisionmaking, my analysis demonstrates
that those claims are untenable. A natural right worthy of codification
into positive law must be supported by one or more moral norms, satisfy-
ing two criteria-truth and substantial support in the relevant community.
This Article has demonstrated that claimed participation rights fail both
criteria. Insofar as the truth of such claims is concerned, none of the
three most widely accepted sources of natural law supports them. Mea-
sured by the revealed truths ofJudaic-Christianity, many of the arguments
made in favor of such rights prove to be nonscriptural, while others are
antithetical to Western religious tradition. When tested by the standards
of practical reasoning, the claims lack both instrumental and noninstru-
mental justification. Finally, many of the arguments made in favor of such
rights prove to be contrary to Western moral and political traditions. Inso-
far as community support is concerned, the empirical evidence indicates
that many firms and workers remain unpersuaded by the merits of em-
ployee involvement. In the absence of a clearer community consensus,
government mandates risk imposing a "one-size-fits all" standard of indus-
trial relations that fails to fit many.
[Vol. 43: p. 741828
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